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INTRODUCTION

[U]nder our system of criminal justice even a thief is entitled to complain that he has been unconstitutionally convicted and imprisoned as
a burglar. 1
[I]nformal . . . practices have been used to induce conviction by "consent" in a significant number of cases in which the protections of the
formal system would have precluded condemnation.2
The critical questions, which have not yet been honestly faced by [either the accusatorial or the inquisitorial] systems, are how cases that
will receive less than the full process should be chosen, and what combination of adversarial procedures and judicial initiative should constitute that summary process.3

Although our criminal justice system has many inquisitorial4 features, it remains in theory an accusatorial process5 because of its constitutional commitment to protect fundamental values, such as the
presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, lay adjudication, and the privilege against self-incrimination. These principles, which I shall refer to as our system's "legal guilt"6
I. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1979).
2. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89
HARV. L. REV. 293, 311 (1975).
3. Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three Inquisitorial Systems:
France, Italy and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 283 (1977).
4. Inquisitorial systems view the criminal process as an official inquiry where state officials
take primary responsibility for determining whether the defendant has committed a crime.
[T]he dominant mode is state control of the case, usually through the judiciary, rather
than party control. The judge, whether as investigating magistrate or at trial, regards
himself as more than an umpire. He is expected to take the initiative in amassing evidence and in assuring that the merits of guilt and penalty are correctly assessed.
Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1019 (1974). To ensure that the inquiry advances both substantive and
procedural state policies, state officials direct the official investigation, determine the appropriate charges, and conduct the course of a nonadversarial trial that offers a public recapitulation
of the official investigation. All relevant sources of information may be used, including noncoercive questioning of the accused during either the investigatory or trial stages.
5. Our accusatorial system structures criminal proceedings not as an official inquiry but as
a dispute between two parties, the state and the accused. However, accusatorial procedure
encompasses not only an adversarial trial procedure but other fundamental norms taken from
constitutional law that regulate the balance of advantage between the state and the accused
throughout the criminal process. Thus, accusatorial norms like the privilege against self-incrimination reflect the system's requirement that the state bear the burden of developing evidence of guilt through its independent efforts. The presumption of innocence lies "at the heart
of an accusatorial system" because it requires the accuser to present compelling proof of the
accused's guilt to an independent adjudicator. "Until certain procedures and proofs are satisfied, the accused is to be treated by the legal system as !fhe is innocent and need lend no aid to
those who would convict him." Goldstein, supra note 4, at 1017 (emphasis in original). The
parties control the course of both the investigation and trial. Unlike its inquisitorial counterpart, the court plays a fairly passive role at the trial as an umpire who ensures that the parties
abide by the technical evidentiary rules that are necessary to regulate an adversarial proceeding before a lay adjudicator.
6. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 166-67 (1968). Professor
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requirements, are designed in part to ensure that the state will only
apply its most coercive and stigmatizing sanction to those defendants
who have in all probability committed a substantive offense, the factually guilty.7 However, most of these legal guilt requirements are
equally concerned with the investigatory and adjudicatory processes
by which these reliable final judgments are reached. Indeed, our system's legal guilt requirements are most distinctive for their attempt
to maintain a fair accusatorial process before conviction (a fair balance of advantage between the state and the accused) by safeguarding the individual's rights during the investigatory process and by
requiring a reliable and independent adjudication of guilt before application of the criminal sanction. For example, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly found coercive state interrogation practices to violate
the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination (or the right to
due process8) in cases where the resulting confession was trustworthy.9 In explaining those decisions, the Court has emphasized that
the privilege fosters "a fair state-individual balance" 10 before conviction by requiring the government to honor its accusatorial burden of
Packer used the term legal guilt to refer to those procedural requirements which have nothing
"to do with the factual question of whether the person did or did not engage in the conduct
that is charged as the offense against him" which Packer defined as factual guilt. Id. at 166.
I believe that Packer's distinction between factual and legal guilt is a useful analytical
device but I define the terms quite differently. I equate factual guilt with the substantive criminal law's definition of criminal conduct. Therefore, an affirmative defense which justifies or
excuses the defendant's conduct negates his factual guilt. I use the term "legal guilt requirements" to encompass all those procedural requirements that the state must satisfy in an accusatorial system of justice before it can apply the criminal sanction. While many of these legal
guilt requirements have nothing to do with the question of factual guilt (e.g., venue, statute of
limitations, double jeopardy), others, such as the trial's formal proof requirements, dictate the
procedural norms by which factual guilt is reliably adjudicated. The term "legal guilt" refers
to the final outcome of that procedural process. While I believe that the substantive-procedural distinction between factual and legal guilt is useful in distinguishing different screening
standards, the reader should remember that factual guilt is an artificial construct that cannot
be empirically verified. The question of whether the accused violated the substantive criminal
law cannot ultimately be separated from the procedural mechanism used to adjudicate it. See
text at notes 64-84 i,!fra.
7. For example, the trial's proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement protects the factually innocent by requiring that the state provide compelling proof of factual guilt to an
independent adjudicator. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970).
8. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U,S. 219, 236-37 (1941) ("The aim of the requirement of
due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false. Such unfairness exists when a coerced confession is used as a means of obtaining a verdict of guilt."). See also Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961).
9. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464 n.33 (1966):
The decisions of this Court have guaranteed the same procedural protection for the defendant whether his confession was used in a federal or state court. It is now axiomatic
that the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated if his conviction is based, in
whole or in part, on an involuntary confession, regardless of its truth or falsity.
IO. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). The Court emphasized that the privilege against self-incrimination is "the essential mainstay of our adversary system," 384 U.S. at
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developing reliable evidence of the defendant's guilt through its independent efforts.
While the accusatorial values protected by the system's legal guilt
460, because it vindicates essential accusatorial norms that apply directly to the investigatory
process.
Some co=entators have criticized Miranda's broad view of the interests protected by the
fifth amendment privilege. See Grano, Voluntariness, Free Mil and the La.w of Co,ifessions, 65
VA. L. RE.v. 859, 926-37 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Voluntariness]. Professor Grano argues
that the Court's suggestion that the privilege against self-incrimination protects accusatorial
norms like "a fair state-individual balance" is "neither valid nor helpful to analysis" of the
investigatory stage, which Grano characterizes as essentially inquisitorial in function. ''To
posit a system that is completely accusatorial is to beg the question and to do so inaccurately''
because "we have in fact a mixed system of criminal justice - one primarily accusatorial,
especially at the judicial stages, but also partly inquisitorial." Id. at 934. For example, police
interrogation is essentially inquisitorial because "police, with society's approval, seek to obtain
the truth from a suspect, who, if guilty, has nothing to gain and much to lose from giving the
police what they wanL" Id. at 913. To perform this inquisitorial function, "police interrogation cannot assume the attributes of the adversary trial and still be police interrogation." Id.
Grano argues that judicial approval of police interrogation and other inquisitorial aspects of
the investigatory process (e.g., the grand jury) demonstrates that the government need not
shoulder the entire load of proving guilt because these inquisitorial bodies permit the government to use the accused as a source of evidence.
Grano's perception of police interrogation and the rest of the investigatory stage as essentially inquisitorial leads him to conclude that the fifth amendment privilege merely protects the
accused's right not to be compelled to answer police questions. Id. at 937. Instead of giving
the accused a right to remain silent that would force the state to honor its accusatorial burden
of developing its own evidence of guilt, the privilege simply protects the accused "from undue
impairment of mental freedom in his decision to answer questions put to him." Id. at 936.
The most obvious objection to Grano's mixed model of our criminal justice system is that it
really posits two different models _working at cross-purposes with each other. Indeed, Professor
Grano concedes that his description of our criminal justice system "may seem schizophrenic in
its rigid insistence on accusatorial protections during the judicial process and its complacent
tolerance of inquisitorial procedures, which frequently assure conviction, before the judicial
process begins." Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need lo Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the La.w of Co,ifessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. RE.v. I, 27 (1979). Grano insists,
however, that this dichotomy "is a product not of [systemic] schizophrenia but of historical
compromise," id., between the competing tensions of inquisitorial and adversarial models.
Since police interrogation is essentially inquisitorial, its legitimacy cannot be evaluated by
adversarial standards that would preclude police from performing this valuable function.
Therefore, Grano concludes no purpose is served by describing our system as "adversarial" or
"accusatorial" because to "start with such an assertion is to conclude in advance that police
interrogation, at least as we have known it, should not exisL" Voluntariness, supra, at 913.
I believe that the dichotomy Grano posits between norms applicable to the investigatory
and adjudicatory stages of our criminal process stems not from "historical compromise" but
from Grano's mistaken use of the terms "accusatorial" and "adversarial" interchangeably in
his analysis. As I have pointed out, accusatorial criminal procedure encompasses not only
adversarial trial procedure but other fundamental values that regulate the balance of advantage between the state and the accused throughout the criminal process. See note 5 supra.
One may concede Grano's point that it is inappropriate to apply adversarial procedures to
police practices without accepting his conclusion that accusatorial norms do not apply to the
investigatory process. Indeed, the Supreme Court's observation that the privilege helps maintain a fair state-individual balance before conviction is an example of an accusatorial norm
that places some limit on the police's inquisitorial powers by requiring law enforcement officials to develop independent evidence against the accused. The fact that the government need
not shoulder the entire load does not negate its accusatorial obligation to carry most of iL If
one views the privilege as protecting accusatorial norms directly applicable to the investigatory
process, Grano's dichotomy of a two-stage criminal process working at cross-purposes disap-
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requirements are designed to prevent conviction without adjudication and to safeguard individual rights throughout the accusatory
process, our criminal justice system relies primarily on the trial as
the appropriate occasion to vindicate these principles. 11 The trial
gives them concrete substance because its stringent formal proof requirements force the state to develop its own evidence and then convince an independent lay adjudicator of the accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Our system's heavy reliance on the trial to vindicate accusatorial values may have made sense in an earlier day when
trials were fairly simple affairs and most defendants had their day in
court. But the modern adversarial jury trial is far too expensive,
complex, and time-consuming to be used as the system's routine
method for dispute resolution. Since our present system "can offer a
trial to all only if few accept the offer," 12 it places considerable pressure on criminal defendants to convict themselves by pleading guilty
in return for some expected concession from the state. 13 Consequently, most criminal defendants never reach trial because the system convinces them to forgo its protections. 14
It is this Article's thesis that the substitution of plea-bargaining
for the criminal trial as our primary method for determining legal
guilt requires a fundamental reassessment of our pretrial screening
processes. In a system where the prosecutor's decision to file charges
11. The trial lends "concrete substance" to the accused's presumption of innocence and
privilege against self-incrimination by forcing the state to shoulder the burden of proving the
defendant's factual guilt through its independent efforts. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
362-63 (1970). The trial's proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard symbolizes the significance that our society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself by impressing
upon the fact-finder the "necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude" of the guilt of the
accused. 397 U.S. at 372. The trial's adversarial procedures promote a more reliable determination of factual guilt than that by the police and the prosecutor because they give defendants
an opportunity to confront their accusers, expose flaws in the prosecution's case, and raise
defenses that might negate their guilt. The trial also protects the accusatorial principle that the
disposition of society's most serious sanction should not be left exclusively in the hands of
professionals by offering the community an opportunity to participate in its adjudication. See
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-56 (1968). Finally, the trial guarantees that criminal
sanctions will only be applied after the state has shown a neutral judicial official before or
during trial that it has respected the defendant's rights in securing its evidence, making its
charges, and proving its case. See H. PACKER, supra note 6, at 166-69.
12. L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 82
(1977). Commentators have cited such factors as the expansion of the substantive criminal
law, increased crime rates, the professionalization of the police, prosecution, and defense functions and the growing complexity of adversarial trial procedures, to explain why the modern
American jury trial cannot be used as the routine procedural mechanism for adjudicating guilt.
See, e.g., Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Cm. L. REV, 3, 20-21 (1978).
13. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM, L. REV. 1, 42 (1979),
14. During fiscal year 1976, 51,612 criminal defendants passed through federal district
courts. Of the 40,112 convicted and sentenced, 34,041, or 85%, had entered a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SoURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 551
(1977).
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is µsually followed by a negotiated guilty plea, we can no longer
pretend that the pretrial process does not adjudicate the defendant's
guilt. Accordingly, this Article argues that it no longer makes sense
to rely primarily on the trial to safeguard essential accusatorial principles when pretrial screening devices like the preliminary hearing
and the grand jury perform the only independent adjudication of the
defendant's guilt before conviction in most cases.
Plea-bargaining's transformation of the pretrial process into our
major adjudicatory mechanism raises three critical questions for
criminal justice reform efforts:
(1) Should the preliminary determination of guilt during the pretrial
process provide some protection of the accusatorial values that the trial
was designed to vindicate?
(2) If so, does our present pretrial process adequately protect those
principles?
(3) If not, how can those accusatorial principles be safeguarded during the pretrial process without unduly burdening an already overtaxed criminal system?

This Article assumes that our Constitution has answered the first
question affirmatively. 15 Since our system's legal guilt requirements
protect not only the reliability of the final outcome but also the fairness of the process which determines that outcome, we cannot simply
equate the doctrine of legal guilt with the procedural protections required at trial. Thus, the fact that the defendant waives some of
these legal guilt requirements by pleading guilty does not alter the
state's obligation to provide a fair accusatorial process before conviction. The government's accusatorial burden to develop evidence independently, our system's commitment to apply the criminal
sanction only after making a compelling showing of a defendant's
factual guilt, the principle of independent fact-finding, our preference for lay participation in adjudicating guilt - all attempt to establish a fair accusatorial process that reliably adjudicates
defendants' factual guilt while safeguarding their individual rights.
While these dual objectives can be completely vindicated only at
15. Some of these legal guilt requirements apply directly to the investigatory process. See
notes 5 & IO supra. The defendant's waiver of those requirements by pleading guilty does not
affect the state's constitutional obligation to comply with them before conviction. Waiver
merely affects the defendant's ability to raise their violation to undo a conviction.
Many prosecutors seem to believe that the defendant's guilty plea waives the state's obligation to satisfy legal guilt requirements. To them, the doctrine of legal guilt applies only to
defendants who elect to contest their culpability in an adversarial forum. See note 213 iefra
and accompanying text. But see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2 (1975) (per
curiam), where the Supreme Coun emphasized that not all legal guilt requirements, such as
the double jeopardy clause, are necessarily waived by a guilty plea.
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trial, they merit significant protection16 in any summary process that
provides an altemative 17 model of resolving criminal disputes.
What follows begins to ~swer the last two questions. Section I
evaluates our present pretrial screening process. 18 First, it identifies
several screening standards presently used in the pretrial process to
evaluate factual guilt (probable cause) 19 and legal guilt (directed verdict20 and likelihood of conviction at trial21 ). It then examines
whether the formal stages of pretrial review (initial appearance, preliminary hearing; and grand jury) screen out cases where there is
substantial doubt concerning a defendant's factual guilt or where the
government's evidence will probably not satisfy the trial's formal
proof requirements. Using the federal pretrial process as its model,
this Section demonstrates that both Congress and the courts have
assumed that the trial will ensure reliable prosecutorial screening of
legal guilt and provide the appropriate forum for its adjudication. 22
Acting on that assumption, both institutions have limited the formal
pretrial inquiry to whether the government's evidence presents a factual basis (probable cause) for believing that the defendant committed the crime. As a result, the prosecutor is the primary pretrial
official responsible for screening out cases where the system's legal
guilt requirements would preclude conviction at trial.
16. For example, judicial review procedures at the plea hearing are designed to protect
some of these accusatorial principles. Judicial inquiry into the factual basis for the plea protects the factually innocent defendant by insuring that an independent fact-finder will examine
the evidence before accepting the plea. See text at notes 272-86 infra. The constitutional requirement that the plea be voluntary protects a fair state-individual balance by invalidating
guilty pleas produced by state coercion. See text at notes 250-56 infra. Section III suggests,
however, that those judicial safeguards insufficiently protect these accusatorial principles. See
text at notes 298-307 infra.
17. Our system's legal guilt requirements reflect its co=itment to limit the state's ability
to convict in order to protect individual rights. Accordingly, they undermine the view that the
sole objective of accusatorial criminal procedure is to detect the truth (ie., factual guilt).
Viewed from this perspective, plea-bargaining represents a su=ary process for resolving disputes whose legitimacy depends in part on the plea's reflection of the trial's probable outcome.
See generally Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, LAW & CoNTEMP, PROD.,
Winter 1977, at 102, 118-26. See also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding
that a court has the discretion to accept a guilty plea from a defendant who refuses to admit
culpability as long as the state's evidence demonstrates that a conviction at trial is likely).
A!fard is discussed in text at notes 287-97 infra.
18. Most co=entators agree that the primary function of the pretrial process is to screen
out cases that should not go to trial. See Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los
Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations (pt. 1), 18 UCLA L. REV. 635,
639-40 (1971).
19. See text at notes 72-76 infra.
20. See text at notes 79-80 infra.
21. See text at notes 81-83 infra.
22. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1974); Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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Section Il therefore examines whether the possibility of facing
the system's legal guilt requirements at trial guarantees reliable
prosecutorial screening of legal guilt before trial. There is reason to
be skeptical. Several circumstances, including the seriousness of the
crime,23 the reputation of the accused,24 and the possibility of conviction through plea-bargaining,25 may lead the prosecutor to indict
a defendant when the government's proof of legal guilt is marginal
at best.26 Since the pretrial process does not require the government
to present compelling evidence of factual guilt to an independent
fact-fi.nder27 or demonstrate that its evidence could satisfy the trial's
formal proof requirements, prosecutors can and sometimes do get
indictments despite insufficient evidence to support a conviction at
the time of indictment.28
Section Ill continues the examination of the pretrial system by
exploring the balance of advantage between the state and the accused during plea-bargaining. It evaluates whether the parties negotiate on an equal footing and whether their bargains approximate the
trial's probable outcome.29 This Section rejects the Supreme Court's
assumption that the participation of competent defense counsel will
ensure that the defendant has intelligently decided to plead guilty30
by demonstrating how several institutional factors impair defense
counsel's ability to prepare a defense or to accurately gauge the
strength of the government's case.31 Nor does judicial review of the
23. See, e.g., Kaplan, The Prosecutorial .Discretion -A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 174,'
181-83 (1965).
24. Id.
25. See text at notes 210-17 i,yra. See also Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968).
26. See H. MILLER, W. McDONALD & J. CRAMER, PLEA-BARGAINING IN THE UNITED
STATES 97-114 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L.E.A.A. STUDY].
27. See text at notes 170-77 i,yra.
28. See note 469 i,yra.
29. See note 17 supra. While neither the prosecutor, defense counsel, nor the court can
predict the likely outcome at trial with scientific precision, the state should not be permitted to
convict a defendant through plea-bargaining where its independent evidence of factual guilt is
so weak that the defendant would have won a directed judgment of acquittal at trial. See note
71 i,yra. To permit such a result would dilute the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and the state's concomitant obligation to prove guilt through its independent elforts. The
state could indict an individual without making any reliable showing that its evidence would
warrant a conviction at trial and then pressure the defendant to plead guilty in return for some
expected sentencing concession from the state.
Conversely, those observers who believe that the criminal process's sole objective is to discern the truth (factual guilt) would not require the bargain to approximate the trial's probable
outcome because "all matters alfecting the persuasiveness of the prosecution case [would] be
irrelevant," Uviller, supra note 17, at 114, as long as the defendant's admission of culpability
reliably demonstrates factual guill
30. See text at notes 228-29 i,yra.
31. See text at notes 227-49 i,yra.
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case at the plea hearing provide adequate safeguards. Under the
Supreme Court's present standards, judicial inquiry into the
voluntariness, intelligence, and factual basis32 of the plea cannot ensure that guilty pleas will be accepted only when the system's legal
guilt requirements could probably be satisfied at trial. 33 Thus, Section III concludes that the pretrial process seriously dilutes our system's capacity to protect accusatorial values by confining most legal
guilt requirements to a stage of the process that few defendants
reach. Instead of a presumption of innocence, the pretrial process
operates on a presumption of guilt. 34 Instead of providing a neutral
forum to adjudicate a defendant's guilt reliably, the pretrial process
relies on the ex parte determination of factual guilt made by the police and the prosecutor. Lay participation in the adjudication of
guilt is limited to a grand jury that is dominated by the prosecutor. 35
While the state is supposed to develop its case against the accused
independently, the prosecutor need only make a minimal showing of
probable cause before using the state's panoply of permissible pressures to induce the defendant to admit guilt "voluntarily"36 and
plead guilty.
One's prescription for reform depends upon one's diagnosis of
the disease. Some observers37 suggest that plea-bargaining is the
problem and therefore recommend its .abolition. Others conclude
that the adversarial trial itself is the problem and accordingly urge
adoption of the best features of inquisitorial systems.38 Section IV
briefly examines and rejects these proposals. Returning to an adversarial trial system, which has not been used to adjudicate guilt for
most cases in this century,39 would cost far more than we can afford.
32. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure I 1, which governs the acceptance of pleas, reads
in part: "(f) Determining accuracy of plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty,
the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall
satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(f).
33. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 280-83; W. RHODES, PLEA-BARGAINING: WHO
GAINS? WHO LosES? 47 (Pub. No. 14, Promis Research Project, Washington D.C., Inst. for
Law & Soc. Research) (1978) [hereinafter cited as PROMIS STUDY]; Finkelstein, supra note 2, at
310-11.
34. See H. PACKER, supra note 6, at 160.
35. See text at notes 170-77 i'!fra.
36. Indeed, our system's informal methods for determining guilt closely resemble Herbert
Packer's "Crime Control" model of the criminal process. See H. PACKER, supra note 6, at 15863.
37. See note 309 i'!fra.
38. See note 310 i'!fra. See, e.g., L. WEINREB, supra note 12; Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978).
39. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 5.
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The debate over the adequacy of inquisitorial safeguards40 and the
severe institutional remodeling required by such proposals suggest
the need for more "intermediate prescriptive steps"41 that use our
present institutional framework to effect change.
Accordingly, Section IV proposes that the pretrial process be
used to provide greater protection of the accusatorial values embodied in our legal guilt requirements. The pretrial process must be reformed to ensure that
(1) the government shoulders its accusatorial burden of developing
independent evidence of a defendant's factual guilt before it encourages the defendant to plead;
(2) a neutral adjudicator evaluates the government's evidence
before or soon after formal accusation to determine whether that evidence can satisfy the trial's formal proof requirements;
(3) where possible, the community is given an opportunity to participate in that preliminary adjudication of legal guilt, so that the disposition of society's most serious sanction is not left exclusively in the
hands of professionals;
(4) the defense attorney has sufficient access to the prosecution's
case to make an informed prediction about the likely outcome at trial
before advising the client to plead.

At the state level, a reformed preliminary hearing seems most
likely to meet those goals. Because it is an adversary proceeding, the
defendant has an opportunity to rebut the prosecution's case by
cross-examination or by presenting a defense. By applying the rules
of evidence and requiring the prosecutor to present a prima facie
case of legal guilt (measured by a modified directed-verdict standard),42 such a proceeding would prevent conviction without adjudication while safeguarding individual rights.
However, the preliminary hearing cannot be an effective vehicle
for federal reform. Unlike most states,43 the federal system only
conducts preliminary examinations in approximately twenty percent
40. See notes 335-37 infra and accompanying text.
41. See Morris, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (1978).
42. See note 342 infra.
43. After the Supreme Court ruled in Hurtado v. California, llO U.S. 516 (1884), that
indictment by a grand jury is not mandated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, many states abolished their mandatory indictment requirements and permitted prosecutors to initiate prosecution either by indictment or by filing an information. See Federal Grand
Jury: Hearings on H.J. Res. 46, H.R. 1277 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 716-17, 716 n.3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings]. In those jurisdictions, most
prosecutions commence by information. See Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 868 (4th ed. 1974). Most information jurisdictions require a preliminary hearing, however. Id. at 977. In some jurisdictions, the accused has a right to indictment
by grand jury for serious crimes, see 1976 Hearings, supra, at 717 n.4, and a few states require
grand jury indictments for capital offenses. See id. at 717 n.9.
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of all prosecutions.44 Thus, mandating preliminary hearings for all
federal prosecutions would generate significant pretrial delay and require up to five times the resources presently committed to such
hearings. Moreover, mandatory preliminary hearings would duplicate the grand jury's screening function since the fifth amendment
requires most federal prosecutions to proceed by indictment.45
Admittedly, a constitutional amendment abolishing the accusatory function of the federal grand jury would remedy the problem of
duplicated screening. Some observers would apparently welcome
that development.46 While the grand jury was enshrined in our Constitution because of its reputed ability to protect the innocent from
unfounded prosecution,47 few scholars or practitioners take its
screening function seriously today.48 Most argue that an inexperienced and untrained body of citizens cannot possibly screen out unwarranted prosecutions in an ex parte proceeding where they hear
only the government's side of the case and depend on the prosecutor
for all legal advice and direction.
Section V takes issue with that explanation of the grand jury's
defects. It argues that the grand jury's present tendency to rubberstamp the prosecutor's decisions stems far more from the limited role
the Supreme Court has assigned to it49 and the type of evidence it
receives50 than from any institutional incapacity. By refusing to prescribe the kind or amount of evidence that the prosecutor should
present to the grand jury, the Supreme Court in Costello v. United
States51 impaired the grand jury's ability to screen factual guilt and
precluded it from determining whether the government's evidence, if
44. See note 370 infra.
45. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury •.•." U.S. CONST. amend. V. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 7(a) invokes the indictment requirement for any offense punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year.
46. See Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973).
However, even some of the grand jury's critics have expressed reluctance about altering the
Bill of Rights for fear that once the process is started and legitimized, other guarantees of
individual liberties may be jeopardized. See, e.g., Morris, Book Review, 87 YALE L.J. 680, 682
(1978). At the very least, those who favor a constitutional amendment abolishing or revising
the fifth amendment's indictment requirement should demonstrate that the grand jury is not
capable of performing a valuable accusatorial function. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL & G.
NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY 118-19 (1977). Section V argues that the abolitionists have not
met that burden.
41. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
48. See, e.g., Antell, The Modem Grand Jury, Benighted Supergovemment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153
(1965); Morris, supra note 46, at 683.
49. See text at notes 176-77 infra.
50. See text at notes 393-505 infra.
51. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction at trial.52 I therefore
suggest a series of federal reforms that check the prosecutor's charging discretion and strengthen the grand jury's ability to make a preliminary ex parte adjudication of factual guilt. Congress should
repudiate Costello by requiring the prosecutor to present the indicting53 grand jury with a prima facie case of legal guilt. Furthermore, to ensure that the prosecutor has presented the grand jury with
sufficient legally admissible evidence to warrant a conviction, the
trial court should have the authority to dismiss any indictment where
the indicting grand jury's transcript54 reveals that the prosecutor has
not met that burden. Finally, I propose specific reforms in the use of
hearsay testimony,55 illegally seized evidence,56 and exculpatory evidence57 that would enable the grand jury to adjudicate factual guilt
reliably and independently without transforming its ex parte inquiry
into a prolonged adversarial proceeding. Although these reforms
will lengthen the grand jury's review of the prosecution's case and
impose a burden on courts reviewing the grand jury's transcript,58
they should prove to be far less expensive and time-consuming than
those proposals mandating adversarial preliminary hearings for all
federal prosecutions.59 While any extension of our system's legal
guilt requirements to the pretrial process will incur costs, the reforms
52. To demonstrate this point, Section V examines how some courts have attempted to
improve the quality of grand jury screening by more actively reviewing the prosecutor's conduct before the grand jury. Those courts have found prosecutorial misconduct justifying dismissal of the indictment when the prosecutor's presentation of evidence precluded the grand
jury from screening effectively. However, the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine does not cure
all of the accusatory grand jury's present ills because Costello prohibits the federal courts from
imposing an affirmative obligation on the prosecutor to present the grand jury with a prima
facie case of legal guilt At best, the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine remedies the worst
excesses generated by Costello without acknowledging that Costello is the source of the problem.
53. One of the major objections to reforms that would enhance the grand jury's accusatory
function is that such reforms would impair the grand jury's inquisitorial function of investigating criminal activity. Accordingly, Section V proposes that Congress enact a statute that
would preclude the same grand jury from performing both functions. This proposal would
permit an investigatory grand jury "to pursue its investigation . . . unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial" United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338,349 (1974). Barring the same grand jury from performing the inconsistent functions
of investigator and impartial fact-finder should also enhance the accusatory grand jury's capacity to perform an independent screening function. See text at notes 553-57 iefra.
54. Section V also proposes that the defendant receive a transcript of all recorded proceedings of the indicting grand jury subject to any reasonable conditions or limitations that the
court may impose to prevent possible abuses. See text at notes 563-80 infra.
55. See text at notes 523-29 iefra.
56. See text at notes 530-34 iefra.
57. See text at notes 536-52 infra.
58. See text at notes 582-84 infra.
59. See text at notes 367-75 iefra.
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suggested in Section V can vindicate essential accusatorial principles
at a price our system can bear.

I. PRETRIAL SCREENING
While the pretrial process serves multiple purposes - providing
opportunities for discovery, 60 preserving witnesses' testimony, 61 and
protecting defendants' constitutional rights62 - most commentators
agree that its primary function is to screen out cases that should not
go to trial. 63 After identifying several screening standards that could
perform this function, this Section examines the actual application of
these standards at the formal stages of pretrial review in the federal
system.
A. Standards for Screening
To examine federal pretrial review, I shall distinguish between
those screening standards that evaluate factual guilt and those that
evaluate legal guilt. Factual guilt refers to the substantive criminal
law's definition of criminal conduct. A factually guilty accused is
one who voluntarily commits the proscribed act or omission with the
requisite intent under circumstances that neither excuse nor justify
that conduct. To determine whether the accused is factually guilty,
the criminal process must provide a procedural mechanism (theoretically the trial) that will reliably adjudicate the factual and normative
questions 64 raised by the substantive criminal law's definition of
60. See United States v. King, 482 F.2d 768, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coleman v. Burnett, 477
F.2d 1187, I 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Note, The Function ofthe Preliminary Hearing in Federal
Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771, 772 n.5 (1974). For a discussion of how the preliminary
hearing permits discovery in California, see Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los
Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations (pt. 2), 18 UCLA L. REV. 916,
916-31 (1971).
61. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970); FED. R. Ev10. 804(b)(I); Graham & Letwin, supra note 60, at 925; Note, supra note 60, at 784 n.63.
62. An arraignment or a preliminary hearing that provides a fair and reliable determination of probable cause assures the legality of a defendant's custody under the fourth amendment, thereby affording pretrial protection of some legal guilt requirements. Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 123-25 (1975). Indictment by a grand jury also satisfies the fourth amendment.
See 420 U.S. at 117 n.19. But see Thompson, The Fourth Amendment Function of the Grand
Jury, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 727, 743-74 (1976), which argues that the grand jury's dependence on
the prosecutor precludes it from making a sufficiently neutral and detached judgment to satisfy
the fourth amendment.
63. See note 18 supra.
64. Most affirmative defenses require the adjudicator to make normative judgments about
the defendant's culpability. For example, a self-defense claim asks the fact-finder to determine
whether a reasonable person would have acted like the defendant under similar circumstances.
See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 393-94 (1972). Criminal responsibility doctrines
implictly require the fact-finder to judge whether it is fair to hold a mentally disabled defendant accountable for his actions. See generally Arenella, Book Review, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 420
(1980).
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criminal conduct. Legal guilt refers to the final outcome65 of that
procedural process. However, the reliable adjudication of a defendant's factual guilt is not the only objective of an accusatorial process. Concern over the gravity of the criminal sanction, respect for
individual rights, and the felt need for community participation in
guilt adjudication have all fostered legal guilt requirements that limit
the state's ability to detect and convict the factually guilty. For example, the state might have reliable evidence of a defendant's factual
guilt that it cannot use at trial because of the rules of evidence66 or
because police violated the defendant's constitutional rights when
seizing the evidence.67 Even if the state has some legally admissible
evidence, it may not have enough to avoid a directed acquittal at
trial. Or the government might have enough legally admissible evidence to reach the jury but not enough to convince it of the defen-·
dant's factual guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the jury
may temper the literal requirements of the substantive criminal law
with community notions of justice by acquitting a defendant despite
compelling proof of factual guilt.68 In all of those examples, our
criminal justice system has deliberately69 created a discrep·ancy between perceived70 factual and legal guilt to promote policies other
than conviction of the factually guilty. Thus, our system should ,not
tolerate the conviction of a defendant who is either factually or legally innocent.71
65. While the defendant is not legally guilty until guilt has been adjudicated at trial or
negotiated by counsel, the accusatorial values underlying the concept (which I refer to as legal
guilt requirements) concern the process of reaching that outcome as well as the ultimate result.
Thus, commentators who equate legal guilt with the trial's actual or predicted outcome devalue the concept by ignoring how many of its requirements embody accusatorial principles
that insure a fair state-individual balance before conviction. See, e.g., Church, In .Defense of
Bargain Justice, 13 LAW & SocY. R.Ev. 509, 515-16 (1979).
66. For example, prosecutors sometimes use lie-detectors to evaluate factual guilt. See
Kaplan, supra note 23, at 178. But such tests are usually not admissible at trial. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cardarella, 570 F.2d 264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997 (1978); United
States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Tremont, 351 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 944 (1966); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
But see United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
61. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
68. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
69. Unintentional "discrepancies may also arise from human error. A factually innocent
defendant may be found legally guilty at trial. Indeed, some commentators and practitioners
have claimed that plea-bargaining provides a more reliable determination of factual guilt than
trial. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 96-97.
70. As noted earlier, factual guilt is an artificial concept that cannot be empirically verified.
Ultimately, the question of whether the accused is factually guilty cannot be separated from
the procedural mechanism used to adjudicate it. See note 6 supra.
71. I use the term "legal innocence" to refer to those cases where conviction at trial would
be impossible because the government lacks sufficient legally admissible evidence to reach the
jury. If the state, through pl~a-bargaining, is permitted to secure the conviction of a defendant
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Screening Factual Guilt
While the pretrial process is not designed to adjudicate a defen1.

dant's factual guilt conclusively, it does attempt to protect the factually innocent by weeding out those cases where the government's
evidence does not provide adequate reason to believe that the accused committed the crime. The primary pretrial screening standard72 for factual guilt used at the formal stages of pretrial review is
the probable cause requirement. While disagreement arises over the
proper evidentiary standard to measure probable cause to indict,73
the standard for probable cause at the initial appearance and preliminary hearing comes from the fourth amendment's definition of
probable cause to arrest. The fact-finder must determine whether
the government's evidence would warrant a person of reasonable
caution to believe that the accused committed the crime.74 The
probable-cause-to-arrest standard screens only75 factual guilt because it can be satisfied by evidence that is inadmissible at trial (such
who could not possibly be convicted at trial, our system's accusatorial requirement that the
state independently develop compelling evidence of factual guilt would lose most of its force.
See note 29 supra. Nor can we simply assume that the defendant would have no incentive to
bargain in such cases. First, several factors influencing a defendant's decision to plead (e.g.,
pretrial custody, very attractive bargains) have little to do with the strength of the prosecutor's
case. More importantly, defense counsel may not have access to sufficient information to assess the government's case, especially when the prosecutor exaggerates its strength or engages
in bluffing tactics. See text at notes 217-18 iefra. Many prosecutors see no ethical problem in
such practices even when they result in the conviction of a defendant who could not possibly
have been convicted at trial. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER 62 (1976).
See also note 218 iefra.
Some commentators have devalued the concept of legal innocence by suggesting that it
refers merely to a prediction of the trial's probable result. See Church, supra note 65, at 516
("Legal innocence is merely an attorney's prediction prior to trial"). Since those predictions
cannot be made with scientific precision, these commentators suggest no unfairness results
when a legally.innocent defendant pleads guilty as long as the defendant was represented by
competent counsel because legal innocence is not empirically verifiable. The assumption underlying that argument is that no incentive to bargain would exist if "defendants did not face a
very real chance of conviction at trial." Id. Many prosecutors rely on this argument to justify
the use of plea-bargaining to secure the conviction of a defendant who probably would have
been acquitted at trial See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 109. My difficulty with the
argument is that it fails to distingujsh between different categories of weak cases. Legal innocence becomes a matter of prediction only when the state has sufficient evidence to warrant a
conviction.
72. Some pretrial screener should also determine whether the conduct charged, if proved,
would constitute a violation of the penal statute noted in the complaint. Graham and Letwin
label this the "demurrer" screening function. Graham & Letwin, supra note 18, at 663.
13. See notes 107-13 iefra and accompanying text for a discussion of the various standards
used by courts.in their charging instructions to the grand jury.
74. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
75. As Professors Graham and Letwin have observed, some of these screening judgments
overlap and some are applied at the same pretrial stage. Graham & Letwin, supra note 18, at
622. For example, I have identified the probable cause requirement as a factual guilt screening
standard because it considers evidence that cannot be used to prove legal guilt at trial. However, judicial review of the probable cause basis for the arrest also protects the defendant's
fourth amendment rights. Consequently, the probable cause requirement could be character-
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as hearsay) or that does not prove the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.76 Moreover, the probable-cause-to-arrest standard is a weak screen for factual guilt because it focuses on whether
the defendant committed the proscribed act. Thus, probable cause
may exist despite factual innocence if the defendant lacked the requisite criminal intent or acted under circumstances that justified or
excused the conduct.
2. Screening Legal Guilt
Since the primary function of the pretrial process is to screen out
cases that should not go to trial, it would make little sense for pretrial screeners to look exclusively to the defendant's factual guilt
without asking whether the government could satisfy our system's
legal guilt requirements.77 On the other hand, evaluating the legal
ized as a legal guilt requirement that insures that the state is respecting the individual's constitutional rights before trial. See note 89 i'!fra.
76. There is a large difference between the two things to be proved [probable cause and
legal guilt], as well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like
difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them.
. . . Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by [legally admissible) evidence . . . .

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities . . . .
"The substance of all the definitions" of probable cause "is a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt" . . . • And this "means less than evidence which would justify condemnation" or conviction. . . .
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173-75 (1949) (citations omitted).
77. Normative considerations would seem to dictate the same conclusion. If one views the
presumption of innocence as a directive to treat the accused as innocent until legal guilt is
adjudicated at trial, the government should not be able to impose the serious economic, moral,
and physical sanctions triggered by indictment without making some preliminary showing that
legal guilt will probably be established. See H. PACKER, supra note 6, at 167. q. McGinnis v.
Royster, 410 U.S. 263,273 (1973) ("it would hardly be appropriate for the State to undertake
in the pretrial detention period programs to rehabilitate a man still clothed with a presumption
of innocence"); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. I, 4 (1951) ("Uuless the right to bail before trial is
preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose
its meaning"). But if. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (majority of Court concluded
that the presumption of innocence "has no application to a determination of the rights of a
pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun").
Wo!jish's limited view that the presumption of innocence applies only to the trial appears
to assume that the system's legal guilt requirements refer only to the procedural protections
afforded to defendants who elect to contest their culpability at trial. Thus, Wolfish could be
used to defend the fairness of a pretrial screening process that examined only factual guilt.
Society's interest in protecting itself from the accused would take precedence at this stage over
the safeguards provided by the legal guilt doctrine. This view of pretrial screening would
permit the government to use the indictment's sanctions as a pressure tactic against the accused. Before trial, the government could use the leverage it gained from the indictment to
convince the accused to cooperate with the government's search for legally admissible evidence against that defendant or others. If legally innocent, the defendant can insist on a trial.
If the defendant resists these pressures to plead or tum state's evidence, the prosecutor would
still have time after indictment to develop sufficient evidence of legal guilt to secure the indictee's conviction.
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sufficiency of the government's proof before indictment poses some
ticklish problems. First, such an evaluation must come late in the
pretrial process to give the government time to develop its case. Second, any preindictment evaluation of legal sufficiency will be complicated by the uncertain admissibility of some of the government's
evidence, an uncertainty that will be resolved only after indictment.78 Finally, any review of legal sufficiency must be performed
expeditiously to prevent undue pretrial delay.
Despite these difficulties, one can suggest at least two standards
for evaluating legal guilt that the pretrial process could apply before
issuing an indictment. First, the pretrial process could eliminate
cases with inadequate admissible evidence to support a conviction at
trial:79 a directed-verdict standard. Establishing a basis for believing in the defendant's factual guilt does not tell us whether the government has sufficient legally admissible evidence to warrant
conviction. A directed-verdict screen makes the latter, more stringent judgment. To ensure that the evaluation considers only admissible evidence, a pretrial screener performing this function should
generally apply the rules of evidence applicable at trial. 80
Second, the pretrial process could predict the jury's reaction to
the government's case: a probability-of-conviction standard. As all
prosecutors know, juries sometimes acquit defendants despite sufficient proof to warrant conviction. Trial juries may acquit because
the government's evidence does not dispel their reasonable doubts
about the defendant's factual guilt. 81 Moreover, nonevidentiary factors may lead juries to acquit or reduce the defendant's criminal liability. A jury may temper the law with community notions of justice:
it may refuse to convict when it sympathizes with the defendant,
when the victim was also at fault, or when the defendant violated an
unpopular law. 82 A jury might also reduce the defendant's criminal
liability by returning a guilty verdict for a less serious offense when it
believes that the penalty for the more serious offense is too harsh for
this particular defendant. 83 The pretrial process should consider
those possibilities to predict intelligently the likelihood of conviction.
Having identified several distinct screening standards84 that can be
78. For example, the admissibility of evidence seized by the government during its investigation will be determined at a post-indictment suppression hearing. See FED. R. CRIM, P. 41.
79. See Graham & Letwin, supra note 18, at 692.
80. Note, supra note 60, at 779-80.
81. See Kaplan, supra note 23, at 183-84.
82. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 68.
83. See generally id.
84. By no means is this an exhaustive list of pretrial screening judgments. For example,
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used to screen factual and legal guilt, the next Subsection examines
how the present pretrial process performs its screening function.
B. Steps in Pretrial Review
Initial Appearance Before a Federal Magistrate
After arrest, the defendant must be taken to the nearest available
federal magistrate "without unnecessary delay" 85 so that judicial supervision of the prosecution may begin. Although judicial screening
may begin even earlier when law enforcement officials apply for arrest warrants under rule 4,86 only a small minority of federal prosecutions involve arrests on warrants. At the initial appearance, the
magistrate must determine that the complaint prepared by the prosecutor or the arresting officer complies "with the requirement of Rule
4(a) with respect to the showing of probable cause." 87
The magistrate's ex parte finding of probable cause is the first
judicial screening of a defendant's factual guilt. 88 It also satisfies the
fourth amendment's requirement that there be a prompt judicial determination of the probable cause basis for detention before the state
restrains an arrestee's liberty for any extended time. 89 Since this ex
parte hearing assesses the validity of a defendant's custody pending
further action by the grand jury, the magistrate does not determine
1.

the prosecutor and arguably the grand jury may refuse to prosecute despite compelling evidence of factual and legal guilt because the particular case is not sufficiently important to merit
the allocation of scarce criminal justice resources. See notes 184-90 i'!fra and accompanying
text. Graham and Letwin have identified the following different screening judgments: the
summary judgment function; the demurrer function; the litigant control function; the abuse-ofprocess control function; the predictive function; the directed-verdict function; the allocation
of resources function; the limitation of jurisdiction function; the sentencing function; and the
community judgment function. Graham & Letwin, supra note 18, at 662-67.
85. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) provides:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person
making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary
delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the event that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer authorized by 18
U.S.C. § 3041. If a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a magistrate, a
complaint shall be filed forthwith which shall comply with the requirements of Rule 4(a)
with respect to the showing of probable cause. When a person, arrested with or without a
warrant or given a summons, appears initially before the magistrate, the magistrate shall
proceed in accordance with the applicable subdivisions of this rule.
86. FED. R. CRIM. P. (4)a provides in part:
If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the defendant has committed it, a warrant for-the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any
officer authorized by law to execute it.
87. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
88. See text at notes 72-76 supra. The magistrate also performs the demurrer screening
function by determining whether the alleged conduct, if proved, would violate the penal statute noted in the complaint. See note 72 supra.
89. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 124-25 (1975).
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whether the government's evidence would support a conviction.90
Instead, the magistrate applies the same probable cause standard
that is required for an arrest warrant.
Few prosecutions are screened out of the process at the initial
appearance because the magistrate's ex parte review of the complaint
is often pro forma at best. The reluctance of magistrates to screen
out cases at this preliminary stage is understandable. They know
that an Assistant United States Attorney has already reviewed the
probable cause basis for the arrest, 91 and any doubts concerning its
propriety can be aired at the preliminary examination, where the defendant is represented by counsel and has more time to prepare the
challenge. Moreover, the primary purpose of the initial appearance
is not to eliminate weak cases but to minimize police interrogation of
uncounseled defendants by requiring that they be brought promptly
before a magistrate.92 At this initial appearance, the magistrate informs a defendant of the criminal complaints involved, the right
against self-incrimination, the right to counsel (appointed if necessary), the right to a preliminary hearing, and the general circumstances under which a defendant may secure pretrial release. 93 After
establishing the conditions for a defendant's pretrial release (if any),
the magistrate sets a date for the defendant's preliminary examination.
2. Preliminary Examination
Like the initial appearance that precedes it, the preliminary hearing's primary function is to test the legality of a defendant's custody.
Notwithstanding the views of many commentators,94 who would
prefer that federal preliminary examinations screen legal guilt by a
90. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4 provides that the "finding of probable cause
may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part." FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b).
91. See notes 180-83 i'!fra and accompanying text.
•
92. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449,454 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 443-44 (1943).
93. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5 provides in part:
Offenses not Triable by the United States Magistrate. If the charge against the defendant
is not triable by the United States magistrate, the defendant shall not be called upon to
plead. The magistrate shall inform the defendant of the complaint against him and of any
affidavit filed therewith, of his right to retain counsel, of his right to request the assignment of counsel if he is unable to obtain counsel, and of the general circumstances under
which he may secure pretrial release. He shall inform the defendant that he is not required to make a statement and that any statement made by him may be used against
him. The magistrate shall also inform the defendant of his right to a preliminary examination. He shall allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel
and shall admit the defendant to bail as provided by statute or in these rules.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
94. See, eg., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.1(1) (1975), which
defines the purpose of the preliminary hearing as being "to determine whether there is suffi-
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probability-of-conviction standard,95 Congress designed the preliminary hearing's timing and evidentiary requirements to assure compliance with the fourth amendment. To prevent investigative
arrests, 96 the hearing must be held shortly after the defendant's arrest. Because the hearing determines only whether a probable cause
basis for the defendant's arrest presently exists, the magistrate may
consider any evidence, regardless of its admissibility at trial, 97 that
establishes a reliable factual basis for believing that the defendant
committed the crime. Given the preliminary nature of that determination, the type of evidence introduced at the hearing, and the possibility that the government may bolster its case after further
investigation, a magistrate will rarely dismiss a charge on the ground
that the prosecution's evidence would not support a conviction at
trial. 98
While the preliminary hearing performs the same screening function as the initial appearance, it is not a superfluous step. First, it
performs valuable collateral functions, permitting the defendant to
discover99 the prosecution's case, preserving the testimony of witcient evidence to proceed to trial"; Graham & Letwin, supra note 18, at 639-40; Note, supra
note 60, at 779.
95. See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text.
96. One of the most important purposes is to provide protection against arrests for
investigation. It is not only a determination of probable cause but a determination of
probable cause shortly after the arrest which is significant. The requirement that the defendant be brought before the Commissioner without unnecessary delay and the right of
the defendant to have a ~earing to determine whether there is probable cause combine to
discourage law enforcement officers from arresting on suspicion and then investigating the
case at their leisure to determine whether there is probable cause. The elimination of the
Commissioner's hearing is an open invitation to arrests for investigation. If a subsequent
investigation develops no probable cause, or establishes the defendant's innocence, the
grand jury can be requested to return an ignoramus. During the interval, the defendant
will have been deprived of his liberty in violation of the Constitution, but will be without
redress. The present hearing provision is one of the best devices which we have found to
implement the Fourth Amendment's requirement of arrest on probable cause. A motion
to suppress at a later time provides protection only if real evidence or a statement has
been obtained from the defendant. It provides no protection for either the innocent defendant or the guilty defendant who remained silent and from whom no evidence was
seized.
·
8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 5.1.02[2], at 5.1-6 n.1 (2d ed. 1976) (quoting Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on
the United States Commissioner System, Part 3, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 266, 270 (1966) (statement
of Professor A. Kenneth Pye)). See generally Note, supra note 60, at 775-79.
97. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 provides in part:
(a) Probable Cause Finding . . . . The finding of probable cause may be based upon
hearsay evidence in whole or in part. . . • Objections to evidence on the ground that it
was acquired by unlawful means are not properly made at the preliminary examination.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.l(a).
98. Thus, the magistrate who disbelieves the government's witnesses or thinks the defendant's defense will prevail at trial is not empowered to dismiss charges. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 60, at 779 n.33.
99. See note 60 supra.
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nesses who may not be available later, 100 and offering an opportunity
to initiate plea negotiations. Second, the hearing's adversarial procedures promote a more reliable determination of probable cause than
the speedy ex parte review at the initial appearance. 101 Finally,
events following the defendant's arrest and initial appearance might
undermine the government's justification for detaining the defendant. For all those reasons, a magistrate is apt to apply the probablecause-to-arrest standard more stringently at the preliminary examination than at the initial appearance. 102
Although the preµminary hearing is not a superfluous screen, it is
a rare one. Since the preliminary hearing assesses only the validity
of a defendant's custody pending action by the grand jury, its purpose is vitiated by the grand jury's indictment, which itself establishes probable cause to hold the defendant for trial. 103 Thus, the
prosecutor usually bypasses the preliminary hearing by obtaining an
indictment against the defendant before the scheduled date of the
hearing. 104
3.

Screening by the Federal Grand Jury

The prosecutor's power to bypass the preliminary hearing increases the importance of the grand jury's screening function. Except for the prosecutor, the grand jury is the only significant sieve
through which most federal prosecutions must pass after the defendant's initial appearance. Moreover, given the high ratio of guilty
pleas to trials, the grand jury is usually the only stage in the federal
criminal process where the community helps to determine whether to
impose criminal sanctions. Because of the grand jury's importance
and the considerable confusion that has permeated discussions of its
accusatory function, this Subsection presents a detailed analysis of
its screening functions.
Judicial references to the grand jury as both a "sword" and a
"shield" 105 reflect its somewhat contradictory investigatory and ac100. See note 61 supra.
101. q. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121-22 (1975). Although the Court concluded that
adversarial procedures are not constitutionally required to make a reliable probable-cause-to•
arrest determination, it conceded that adversarial procedures might "enhance the reliability of
probable cause determinations in some cases." 420 U.S. at 122.
102. Dismissals remain a rarity, however, because the government usually has enough
evidence of defendant's factual guilt to satisfy the probable cause standard.
103. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975).
104. See note 370 infra.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Fein, 504 F.2d 1170, 1179 (2d Cir. 1974) ("We have no
reason to become enmeshed in the long-continuing debate . . . as to whether the grand jury
constitutes a sword or a shield."); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186 n.l (5th Cir.) (Wis-
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cusatory functions in our federal criminal justice system. As investigator, the grand jury uses subpoena, immunity, and contempt
powers to detect criminal activity and identify its perpetrators. 106 As
accuser, the grand jury is supposed to check the prosecutor by eliminating charges where the evidence does not establish probable cause
for believing in the defendant's guilt. Whether the grand jury
screens factual or legal guilt depends upon the type of probable
cause standard it applies and what evidence it considers.
a. Judicial instructions. Judicial instructions to grand juries 107
exhibit considerable disagreement over the proper evidentiary standard for measuring probable cause to indict. Some courts limit the
grand jury to screening factual guilt by equating probable cause to
indict with probable cause to arrest:
Your prime function is to decide whether or not sufficient evidence
has been produced to indicate that a federal crime probably has been
committed by the person accused. If the evidence produced does not
meet the standard necessary for an indictment, because you cannot
conclude that a crime probably has been committed by the accused,
you should have no hesitancy in refusing to vote for an indictment.
You're not a Trial Jury, however. That is, it is not your responsibility to determine the innocence or guilt of an accused defendant, but
solely to determine whether or not sufficient evidence has been produced to indicate that a federal crime probably has been committed by
the person accused. ios

The Department of Justice shares this limited view of the probadom, J., concurring specially) (quoting ABA FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 8 (1959))
("The grand jury is both a sword and a shield of justice - a sword because it is the terror of
criminals, a shield because it is the protection of the innocent against unjust prosecution."),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra
note 43, at 893-955.
I 06. It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope
of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of
the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual
will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. As has been said before, the
identity of the offender, and the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are
developed at the conclusion of the grand jury's labors, not at the beginning.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). See also Schwimmer v. United States, 232
F.2d 855, 862-63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
I 07. Before receiving the judge's charging instructions, federal grand jurors may be given a
copy of the Federal Grand Jury Handbook. Unfortunately, the handbook never defines what
type of evidence grand juries may consider or what specific evidentiary standard grand jurors
should use in evaluating the government's evidence. Instead, the pamphlet exhorts grand jurors to protect "the innocent against unjust prosecution" and not to "find indictments not
warranted by the evidence." A.B.A. FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 8 (1959) (reproduced
in 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 277-97). In fact, the only specific guideline articulated is an
admonition that grand jurors should not let their personal judgment that a particular law is
"unduly harsh" influence their judgment in carrying out their duty to enforce the law as it
exists. Id. at 12. But see United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
108. Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R 94 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, C,'li-
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hie-cause-to-indict standard. In its instruction prohibiting prosecution without "probable cause to believe that a person has committed
a federal offense," 109 the department explains that probable cause is
the same standard for an arrest warrant, "for a magistrate's decision
to hold a defendant to answer in the district court, . . . and for indictment by a grand jury." 110
On the other hand, some judges have suggested in their charging
instructions that the grand jurors should not return an indictment
unless the government's evidence would lead them to convict the accused at trial. As one federal judge explained it, "Before returning
an indictment, the grand jury should be satisfied from the evidence
which is submitted to it that a conviction would be warranted if the
evidence were presented to a trial jury where there was no evidence
to rebut it." 111 That type of instruction asks the grand jury to predict
the likelihood of a defendant's conviction. Such prediction requires
the grand jury to evaluate the quality of the government's evidence,
such as the credibility of its witnesses:
One of the most important functions you are to perform is to judge the
credibility of the various witnesses who may appear before you. You
and you alone are the judges of the credibility of those witnesses, that
is, the believability of their statements to you. In reaching your concluzenship, and International Law ofHouse Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
111 (1977) (Exhibit to A32) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings, pt. 1 or pt. 2).
However, the grand jury's review of factual guilt should be somewhat more structured than
that of the magistrate's evaluation of probable cause to arrest. While the magistrate seeks a
reasonable factual basis for believing that the defendant committed the crime, the grand jury
must consider the crime's material elements. See Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061
(D.C. Cir. 1969), where the D.C. Circuit dismissed an indictment because the grand jury did
not have the actual terms of the indictment before it when it considered the government's
evidence. After listening to an arresting officer testify about the theft Gaither had allegedly
committed, the grand jurors voted to "present" him for grand larceny and recorded their decision on a printed form. The United States Attorney's office then drafted an indictment for
grand larceny and submitted it to the grand jury's foreman, who signed it. None of the other
grand jurors saw or voted their approval of this indictment. 413 F.2d at 1065. In rejecting the
government's contention that the foreman's signature constituted sufficient proof that the indictment reflected the grand jurors' intent, Judge Wright emphasized that the grand jury was
designed to do more than simply approve the prosecutor's recommendation. "The content of
the charge, as well as the decision to charge at all, is entirely up to the grand jury- subject to
its popular veto, as it were." 413 F.2d at 1066.
Judge Wright concluded that "Rule 6 requires the grand jury as a body to pass on the
actual terms of an indictment," because "[w]ithout an indictment before them, the jurors might
not have focused upon each particular element and determined which particular facts should
be included in the ultimate accusation." 413 F.2d at 1071.
109. U.S. .Department ofJustice Materials Relating to Prosecutorial .Discretion, 24 CRIM, L,
REP. (BNA) 3001, 3002 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Justice .Department Standards], The comment to this provision certifies that this probable cause determination is a "minimal requirement." Id. at 3002. The prosecutor may still decide not to prosecute.
110. Id. at 3002.
111. United States v. O'Shea, 447 F. Supp. 330,331 (S.D. Fla. 1978), qffd. per curiam, 588
F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1979).
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sions as to the credibility of any witnesses you: may consider . . the
demeanor of the witness, the witness' manner of testifying, the reasonableness or probability of the witness' story as it is related to you,
whether a witness has been corroborated by other witnesses, evidence
or circumstances in the case. 112

While the probability-of-conviction standard of probable cause
clearly suggests a more rigorous evidentiary barrier to indictment
than the probable-cause-to-arrest standard, most judicial instructions using the former legal guilt standard fail to explain how the
grand jury should measure convictability. 113 Even if this defect were
remedied, the grand jury could not evaluate the legal sufficiency of
the government's proof or assess the likelihood of conviction unless
it considered evidence that the government could use at trial. 114 Indeed, the presentation of some types of hearsay testimony could also
prevent the grand jury from making a reliable assessment of a defendant's factual guilt. m Therefore, the next Subsection examines
the quality of the evidence presented to the grand jury.
b. Judicial supervision of evidence presented to the grand jury.
Most federal courts have consistently declined to review the evidentiary basis of a grand jury's indictment. Their reluctance to do so
stems in large part from the Supreme Court's refusal to dismiss an
indictment based exclusively on hearsay testimony in Costello v.
United States. 116 To understand the importance of Costello, one
must place it in historical context.
(1) Costello's antecedents. Before Costello, some precedent suggested that the rules of trial evidence applied to the grand jury. No
112. United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310,314 (D. Conn. 1975) (quoting routine federal
grand jury instructions for the United States Distri.ct Court for the District of Connecticut).
113. For example, a judge, who defined p~obable cause to indict as sufficient evidence to
convince a trial jury to convict, dismissed an ~dictment because his review of the grand jury
transcript indicated that the prosecutor had not presented "prima facie evidence of probable
cause." United States v. O'Shea, 447 F. Supp. 330, 331 (S.D. Fla. 1978), ajfd. per curiam, 588
F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1979). Yet the judge-insisted that he was not dismissing the indictment
"because of the quality of the evidence." 447 F. Supp. at 332. Dismissal was required because
the indictment was not supported "by any evidence, competent or otherwise, to establish a
prima facie case." 447 F. Supp. at 332 (emphasis added) .
. 114. See United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972).
115. Admittedly, the rules of evidence applicable at trial are "generally not applied in ex
parte proceedings . • . 'mainly because the system of Evidence rules was devised for the special control of trials by jury.'" Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 n.12 (1949) (quoting 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 19 (3d ed. 1940)). But hearsay testimony is also excluded
because it is often less reliable than first-hand accounts of factual events. C. McCORMICK,
LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 244, at 580 (1954). See United States V. Arcuri, 282 F. Supp. 347, 349
(E.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 403 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 913 (1969).
116. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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less of a jurist than Justice Nelson had stated, "evidence before a
grand jury must be competent legal evidence, such as is legitimate
and proper before a petit jury." 117 Moreover, there was a significant
trend in nineteenth-century state courts to 'Judicialize" 118 grand jury
proceedings when it became apparent that the indictment itself imposed serious sanctions against the individual.
However, an examination of the federal case law before Costello
reveals a decided reluctance to dismiss indictments as long as some
competent evidence was presented to the grand jury.I 19 Even if convinced that the grand jury had considered incompetent evidence,
most trial courts would presume that there was enough admissible
evidence to support the indictment, and all courts refused to weigh
the sufficiency of that evidence. 120 The denial of a motion to quash
an indictment based on incompetent evidence was within the discretion of the trial court and not appealable before trial. 121
The Supreme Court's only significant comment on this subject
before Costello was consistent with this trend. Writing for a unanimous Court in Holt v. United States, 122 Justice Holmes vigorously
rejected the petitioner's argument that his indictment should have
been quashed because the grand jury had considered reliable but
117. United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 727, 735 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 16,134).
118. Beginning with a hearing restricted to the prosecution's case alone, with a firm ban
on calling the defendant or his witnesses, most states soon authorized the grand jury to
hear them if it chose. A considerable number enacted statutes providing that the grand
jury was to hear only "legal evidence," or that it "ought" to indict only on the basis of
such evidence. And those requirements were frequently enforced through the granting of
motions to quash indictments based on no evidence at all, or no evidence as to an element
of the crime, or "utterly insufficient" evidence.
Goldstein, '17re State and the Accused: Balance ofAdvantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE
L.J. 1149, 1170 (1960).
119. See Note, Quashing Federal Indictments Returned upon Incompetent Evidence, 62
HARV. L. REV. 111, 113 (1948).
120. See id. at 113. For example, in United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 727 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
1852) (No. 16,134), Justice Nelson rejected a defense counsel's challenge to an indictment
based on the counsel's affidavit that no competent evidence was presented to the grand jury on
a material element of the crime. 27 F. Cas. at 735. While Justice Nelson conceded that the
rules of evidence appli~d to the grand jury, 27 F. Cas. at 735, 738, he argued that judicial
review of the evidence would interfere with grand jury secrecy. 27 F. Cas. at 738. Moreover, if
courts permitted challenges based merely on a defense counsel's assertion that no competent
evidence was presented to the grand jury, they would be faced with reviewing the evidentiary
basis of every indictment. 27 F. Cas. at 738. Decisions like Reed made it quite difficult for
counsel to raise such challenges since they had no direct access to what transpired before the
grand jury. This difficulty did not trouble Justice Nelson because he trusted that the grand
jury would function properly without judicial interference. 27 F. Cas. at 738.
121. See, e.g., Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1927) (citing Durland v.
United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896)); United States v. Rosenburgh, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 580 (1868);
Lewis v. United States, 295 F. 441 (1st Cir. 1924)).
122. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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inadmissible testimony. 123 The opinion did not address the question
of whether an indictment should be quashed when it rested exclusively on incompetent evidence. 124
The first case to face that question directly was Na,!fito v. United
States. 125 The Eighth Circuit explained that the grand jury's screening function required it to consider competent evidence:
It has become accepted as a general rule that investigations before the
grand jury should be made in accordance with the well-established
rules of evidence . . . and ample justification exists for such a rule, in
order that the time of the trial courts may not be consumed in disposing of matters incapable of proof by competent evidence; and further
that persons may not be indicted upon mere suspicion. 126

Therefore, the court concluded that the trial judge should have permitted the defendants to show that the indictment rested exclusively
on incompetent evidence. 127 Moreover, in reaffirming N a,!fito a year
later, 128 the Eighth Circuit came close to imposing a directed-verdict
standard, concluding that an indictment should be quashed "where a
grand jury returns an indictment without any evidence whatever
before it of a separate, distinct, and essential element of the offense."129 With the exception of those Eighth Circuit cases, however,
federal courts rarely analyzed the grand jury's screening function or
how the rules of evidence would frustrate or promote it. Instead,
most federal courts refused to examine the evidentiary basis for the
grand jury's action because they feared that their inquiry would interfere with the grand jury's independence, violate grand jury secrecy, and create intolerable administrative burdens for the courts.
Costello and itsprogeny. Costello 130 presented the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to clarify the juridical confusion over
(2)

123. 218 U.S. at 247-48.
124. The validity of an indictment based solely on incompetent evidence was not squarely
before the Court since only part of the evidence considered by the grand jury in Holt had been
incompetent. See 218 U.S. at 248.
125. 20 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1927). The Na,yito court held specifically that the wife of a
coconspirator was incompetent to testify before a grand jury that subsequently indicted her
husband. 20 F.2d at 378. The husband's guilty plea could not retroactively make the wife's
testimony competent, and, thus, the trial court should have allowed the defendants to make a
showing in support of their motion to quash the indictment. 20 F.2d at 378.
126. 20 F.2d at 378 (citations omitted).
127. 20 F.2d at 378.
128. Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928). The specific problem in Brady
was not that the evidence presented to the grand jury was incompetent but that there was no
evidence of the defendants' use of the United States mail, which was a critical element of the
offenses charged. 24 F.2d at 408.
129. 24 F.2d at 408.
130. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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what types of evidence an indicting grand jury should consider because it raised the questions that Holt left unresolved. After hearing
the testimony of three federal agents, a federal grand jury indicted
Frank Costello for willfully attempting to evade federal income
taxes. 131 The agents' testimony was technically hearsay because they
had no first-hand knowledge of the transactions upon which they
based their net worth computations. 132 However, their testimony
was admitted into evidence at Costello's trial after the government
had laid a proper foundation for it by calling 144 witnesses who testified about the transactions involved and authenticated the documents relied upon by the three agents. 133
Costello filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment supported by an affidavit alleging his belief that the grand jury had
heard only incompetent evidence before it returned the indictment.134 At the close of the government's case, Costello renewed his
motion to dismiss the indictment after cross-examination of the government's trial witnesses established that the grand jury had heard
only the agents' hearsay testimony. The court denied that motion
and Costello was convicted.13s
The Second Circuit could have resolved Costello's appeal 136 on
the narrow ground that the grand jury may rely exclusively on net
worth hearsay testimony because such testimony does permit the
grand jury to screen both factual and legal guilt: the agents' testimony had clear probative value and became competent evidence at
trial once the government laid the proper foundation for its admission. Little would· be accomplished by requiring the government to
repeat the entire trial before the grand jury by calling 144 witnesses
to lay that foundation. Deciding the case in that manner would have
illustrated how unthinking application of all trial rules of evidence to
the grand jury would create a prolonged mini-trial without materially enhancing the grand jury's capacity to screen either factual or
legal guilt.
However, Judge Hand was not inclined to rest the circuit court's
decision on such narrow grounds. His critical discussion of the
Eighth Circuit's definition of incompetent evidence in Na'!fito reflected his view that the grand jury's sole function was to screen fac131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

350 U.S. at 360-61.
350 U.S. at 361.
350 U.S. at 360.
350 U.S. at 360.
350 U.S. at 361.
United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 670 (2d Cir. 1955), q/fd., 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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tual guilt. 137 He emphasized that hearsay information is often quite
reliable· and that the primary reason for its exclusion, the inability to
cross-examine the declarant, does not apply to ex parte proceedings
like a grand jury. 138 He concluded that the courts should not inquire
into the evidentiary basis of the grand jury's action unless "it appeared that no evidence had been offered that rationally established
the facts." 139 In that case, "the indictment ought to be quashed; because then the grand jury would have in substance abdicated." 140
Although Judge Frank concurred in the court's judgment, he expressed "serious misgivings about concurring in a conclusion that a
grand jury may indict solely on the basis of evidence that would not
support a verdict after trial." 141 One might infer from that comment
that Judge Frank wanted the grand jury to screen legal as well as
factual guilt, at least to some extent. Nevertheless, out of "esteem for
Judge Hand's wisdom," Judge Frank reluctantly concurred. 142
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether "a defendant [may] be required to stand trial and a conviction be sustained where only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand jury
which indicted him." 143 Costello argued that such an indictment violated the fifth amendment provision that "[n]o person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of the grand jury . . . ." 144 In the alternative, he asked the Court to exercise its supervisory power over the
federal courts by issuing a rule invalidating all such indictments. 145
A unanimous Court affirmed Costello's conviction. 146
137. If"incompetent" is to cover all evidence, however rationally persuasive it may be,
that would be excluded at a trial[,] with great deference we cannot agree. Legal rules
presuppose that the occasions to which they apply, shall be decided under the ordinary
postulates of reasoning; and the exclusory rules are an exception, for they apply to evidence that is relevant rationally, but that courts will not accept, not because it does not
prove the issue, but it is thought unjust to the opposite party to use it against him, or
because it is within some privilege to suppress the truth.
221 F.2d at 677.
138. 221 F.2d at 677-78.
139. 221 F.2d at 677.
140. 221 F.2d at 677.
141. 221 F.2d at 679 {Frank, J., concurring).
142. 221 F.2d at 680 {Frank, J., concurring).
143.. 350 U.S. at 359 (quoting 350 U.S. at 819, the grant of the writ of certiorari).
144. 350 U.S. at 361.
145. See 350 U.S. at 361. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943), the
Court held that it would exercise its supervisory power to exclude a confession when federal
officers had failed to comply with a statutory requirement that defendants be brought
promptly before a magistrate after their arrest.
146. Justices Clark and Harlan did not participate. Justice Burton concurred with the
Court's decision. 350 U.S. at 364.

492

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 78:463

Writing for the Court, Justice Black offered three justifications
for refusing to prescribe the kind of evidence upon which a grand
jury could act. First, since the American grand jury was patterned
after its English progenitor, Black argued that it should have the
same powers and duties as the English grand jury. 147 He noted that
the English grand jury's freedom "from control by the Crown or the
judges" was strengthened by its power to act "on such information as
they deemed satisfactory," secure in the knowledge that their work
would not be "hampered by rigid procedural or evidential rules." 148
Justice Black's conclusion that the grand jurors' work would be hampered by technical rules designed to ensure the fair determination of
legal guilt in an adversary proceeding reflected his belief that the
grand jury's sole function was to screen factual guilt. If the grand
jury was to screen legal guilt, applying some of those rules of evidence would enhance rather than frustrate its screening objective.
Second, Justice Black wanted to avoid the administrative burdens that would be generated by judicial enforcement of a rule prescribing the evidence a grand jury could consider. Since the
defendant did not have direct access to what transpired before the
grand jury, Justice Black feared that judicial inquiry into the evidentiary basis of the indictment would foster significant pretrial delay
because it would require "a kind of preliminary trial to determine
the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand
jury." 149 - Finally, Justice Black argued that such a cumbersome procedure was unnecessary because it would "add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial," 150 at which the rules of evidence would be
applied to vindicate the requirements of legal guilt. 151 In other
words, the grand jury need not screen legal guilt because the defendant's trial will adjudicate it.
In rejecting Costello's arguments, the Supreme Court more thoroughly insulated indictments from judicial review than had Judge
Hand's opinion. Justice Black concluded that "[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to
call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment re147. 350 U.S. at 362.
148. 350 U.S. at 362.
149. 350 U.S. at 363.
150. 350 U.S. at 364.
151. "In a trial on the merits, defendants are entitled to a strict observance of all the rules
designed to bring about a fair verdict. Defendants are not entitled, however, to a rule which
would result in interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial." 350 U.S. at
364.
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quires nothing more." 152 The breadth of that language combined
with the Court's refusal to use its supervisory powers to regulate the
quality of grand jury evidence, might suggest that courts would be
powerless to dismiss indictments even in an extreme case where the
grand jury received no probative evidence of the defendant's factual
guilt. Responding to that implication, Justice Burton's concurring
opinion repeated Judge Hand's admonition that an indictment
should be quashed "if it is shown that the grand jury had before it no
substantial or rationally persuasive evidence upon which to base its
indictment." 153
While Costello's holding is limited to indictments based exclusively on hearsay testimony, its assumptions apply with equal force
to indictments based on other incompetent evidence that could not
be used to prove legal guilt at trial. The Court has verified that conclusion by relying on Costello to preclude attacks against indictments that were based on evidence seized in violation of a
defendant's fourth and fifth amendment rights.
In Lawn v. United States, 154 the Court held that the petitioners
were not entitled to a hearing to examine their "unsupported suspicion" that the grand jury which indicted them had made direct or
derivative use of materials illegally obtained by a previous grand
jury. 155 Although Justice Whittaker emphasized that the petitioners
had "laid no foundation for the holding of a protracted preliminary
hearing" to prove their "suspicion," 156 he noted that the Court in
Costello had already declined to "establish a rule permitting defendants to challenge indictments on the ground that they are not supported by adequate or competent evidence." 157
Justice Whittaker's reference to Costello implied that courts
should not entertain such challenges even when the grand jury undoubtedly considered incompetent evidence. United States v. Blue 158
transformed Lawn's dictum into precedent. In Blue, the district
court had dismissed a six-count tax-evasion indictment because
pending tax court proceedings dealing with the same alleged tax de152. 350 U.S. at 363 (footnote omitted).
153. 350 U.S. at 364 (Burton, J., concurring) (quoting Judge Hand's opinion below, 221
F.2d at 677). Since the same evidence that established probable cause to arrest satisfies Justice
Burton's factual guilt standard, few indictments would be dismissed under this exception.
154. 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
155. 355 U.S. at 350.
156. 355 U.S. at 349.
157. 355 U.S. at 350 (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956)).
158. 384 U.S. 251 (1966).
-
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ficiencies had forced Blue to incriminate himself. 159 Writing for the
Court, Justice Harlan ruled that the indictment should not have been
dismissed: "Even if we assume that the Government did acquire incriminating evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Blue
would at most be entitled to suppress the evidence and its fruits if
they were sought to be used against him at trial." 160 Although Blue
had not argued that the indicting grand jury had considered the
tainted evidence, Harlan cited both Costello and Lawn as authority
for the proposition that "in any event our precedents indicate this
would not be a basis for abating the prosecution pending a new indictment, let alone barring it altogether." 161
In United States v. Calandra, 162 the Supreme Court dashed any
remaining hopes of overturning indictments based on illegally seized
evidence by rejecting a grand jury witness's attempt to apply the
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings. 163
In ruling that a grand jury witness may not refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, the Court repeated and expanded Lawn's admonition:
[T]he validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the
evidence considered. Thus, an indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of
inadequate or incompetent evidence; or even on the basis of information obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 164

Although Justice Powell's opinion did not state whether an accusatory grand jury's consideration of illegally seized evidence would
further or hinder its screening objectives, he did state that litigation
about the legality of evidence involves "issues only tangentially related to the grand jury's primary objective." 165 While Justice Powell
did not define that objective in terms of factual or legal guilt, his
analysis paralleled Justice Black's argument in Costello that the application of trial rules to the grand jury would frustrate its dual objective of investigating alleged criminal activity and accusing
wrongdoers. Excluding illegally seized evidence "would seriously
impede the grand jury. Because the grand jury does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to pursue
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

384 U.S.
384 U.S.
384 U.S.
414 U.S.
414 U.S.
414 U.S.
414 U.S.

at 252-53.
at 255.
at 255 n.3.
338 (1974).
at 349-52.
at 344-45 (citations omitted).
at 349.
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its investigation and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal
trial." 166
Justice Powell's conclusions are defensible if the grand jury's accusatorial function is to screen factual guilt because most material
seized in violation of fourth amendment rights will constitute reliable evidence of a defendant's factual guilt. However, if a grand jury
should also weed out cases of improbable legal guilt, its screening
objectives would be impeded by the admission of evidence that
would not be admissible at trial. But, Justice Powell's discussion of
the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings indicates that he did not see any compelling reason why grand
juries should screen legal guilt. After arguing that the exclusionary
rule's application at trial sufficiently deters illegal searches, he concluded that most prosecutors would not seek indictments based primarily on illegally seized evidence because, "[f]or the most part, a
prosecutor would be unlikely to request an indictment where a conviction could not be obtained." 167 In other words, we must rely on
the prosecutor, not the grand jury, to screen out cases where proof of
legal guilt is unlikely. In those exceptional cases where the prosecutor does not perform that screening function,~the trial will rectify the
prosecutor's error.
Admittedly, Justice Powell was concerned primarily with how
the application of the exclusionary rule to an ongoing grand jury
investigation would disrupt its proceedings and impair its ability to
detect criminal activity. However, it would make little sense for the
court to approve the introduction of illegally seized evidence if such
evidence would invalidate any resulting indictment. 168 Accordingly,
most federal courts have refused to dismiss indictments based in part
on illegally obtained evidence. 169
166. 414 U.S. at 349.
167. 414 U.S. at 351.
168. See United States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
169. See, e.g., United States v. James, 493 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
849 (1974); United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 1270, 1274 (1st Cir. 1972). Some federal courts
have suggested that an indictment based almost completely on tainted evidence might be dismissed. See, e.g., Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1003 (1968); United States v. Kahn, 366 F.2d 259, 264 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
948 (1966); United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 853-54 (2d Cir. 1964).
In a pre-Calandra decision, one circuit suggested that Costello did not bar a federal court
from dismissing an indictment where the grand jury proceedings themselves violated the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Jones v. United States, 342
F.2d 863, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (plurality opinion). Moreover, some federal courts have
suggested that Calandra does not completely immunize an indictment from challenge on the
basis of any constitutional exclusionary rule, especially where the grand jury proceedings are
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Thus, Costello, Lawn, Blue, and Calandra all reflect the Supreme
Court's view that the grand jury's function is to screen out those
cases where there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused committed the crime. Accordingly, the grand jury should be
free to consider evidence of a defendant's factual guilt regardless of
whether it would be excluded at an adversarial proceeding to protect
the defendant's right of confrontation or to deter improper police
conduct. The Court trusted the grand jury to protect the factually
innocent and the prosecutor to screen out cases where there was little
likelihood of securing a conviction. Consequently, the Court concluded that judicial review of the evidentiary basis for the indictment
would serve little purpose besides generating pretrial delay, increasing administrative burdens on the courts, and interfering with the
grand jury's investigatory function.
(3) Costello's legacy for pretrial screening. While the Supreme
Court viewed the grand jury as a protector of only the factually innocent, its refusal to prescribe the evidence that may be presented to
the grand jury impaired even that limited screening function. Since
the validity of an indictment usually does not depend either on the
quality or sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury, 170
the lower courts have generally refused to dismiss indictments in
cases where the prosecutor's evidentiary presentation may have impaired the grand jury's ability to assess a defendant's factual guilt.
For example, some courts have refused to dismiss indictments when
the prosecutor presented perjured testimony to the grand jury.17 1
Others have sustained indictments based exclusively on hearsay testimony in cases where the government offered no substantial justification for its failure to present its best evidence. 172 Many courts
have refused to dismiss indictments in cases where the prosecutor
failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.1 73 Until recently, 174 most federal courts have justified their decisions by repeatresponsible for the constitutional violation. See, e.g., United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002,
1008 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976).
170. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Klaes, 453 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 920 (1972).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Coppedge, 31 I F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373
U.S. 946 (1963). But see text at notes 427-43 i'!fra.
172. See, e.g., United States v. Klaes, 453 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 920 (1972).
173. See, e.g., Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
933 (1968). But see text at notes 444-77 i'!fra (discussing recent trends to require the prosecutor
to disclose some exculpatory evidence to the grand jury).
174. See text at notes 388-506 i'!fra for a discussion of a recent judicial trend to use the
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ing Costello's reasoning that the grand jury conducts an ex parte
inquiry that does not decide the ultimate question of defendant's
guilt or innocence. 175 Those courts have assumed that any evidentiary error made before the grand jury will be cured at defendant's
trial.
As a result of Costello and its progeny, the federal grand jury can
hardly be considered an independent screening agency that carefully
evaluates the merits of each case. In the words of one grand juror, it
has become
an indictment mill. Grand jurors are running on this treadmill to
make it go as fast as possible so business can be finished by the afternoon. We did not know how to stand up to the U.S. Attorney, we did
not understand our rights and responsibilities, we did not feel qualified
to question the govemment. 176

To keep that mill running smoothly, the prosecutor may present the
evidence for several cases before the grand jury retires to deliberate.
In routine federal prosecutions, a grand jury may only deliberate for
a few minutes on each case before voting to return a true bill. 177
Given this type of evidentiary presentation, it should not be surprising that the grand jury usually agrees with the prosecutor's charging
decisions. After all, it is the third pretrial screen to apply a minimal
probable cause standard to the government's case. Most cases that
cannot meet this minimal factual guilt standard have already been
weeded out of the process.
Ironically, Costello left the grand jury totally dependent upon the
prosecutor whose actions it was supposed to review. 178 While ·endorsing the grand jury's historic function to act as an independent
buffer between the state and the accused, the Supreme Court emasculated the grand jury's ability to do so by precluding it from screening defendants' legal guilt and impairing its ability to assess
defendants' factual guilt reliably and independently.
prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to supervise prosecutors' evidentiary presentations before
the grand jury.
175. See Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933
(1968); United States v. Coppedge, 3ll F.2d 128, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
946 (1963).
176. 1977 Hearings, pt. l, supra note 108, at 561 (letter from William P. Gloege).
177. "Instruction from the U.S. Attorney is like the fox explaining to the chickens how to
be on guard against foxes. It is very hard for the fox to be effective in this role, no matter how
sincere he is." Id. at 560.
178. The grand jury's review of the prosecutor's case serves little purpose in routine prosecutions because the prosecutor often presents the government's case through the hearsay testimony oflaw enforcement agents who summarize the results of the government's investigation.
Obviously, grand juries that consider such evidence cannot evaluate the credibility of the government's witnesses or gauge the strength of its case.
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One can criticize Costello's implicit model of the pretrial process
from two perspectives. Even if the Court is correct in viewing the
pretrial process as essentially a screening mechanism and the trial as
the primary protector of the system's legal guilt requirements, there
should still be a more neutral pretrial screener of a defendant's legal
guilt than the prosecutor. In a system that guarantees that a neutral
body (magistrate, judge, or jury) will review law enforcement officials' determinations of factual and legal guilt, some pretrial screener
should evaluate the prosecution's case to determine whether conviction is sufficiently likely to justify imposing the sanctions of indictment and incurring the expense of holding a defendant for trial.
However, this analysis about who should screen what begs the
more basic question of whether the screening model of the pretrial
process comports with reality. In a system of justice where guilty
pleas are the norm and trials are the exception, we can no longer
view the prosecutor's and grand jury's decisions to indict as mere
interim screening decisions. Since guilty pleas have supplanted trials
as our primary method of securing convictions, we cannot assume
that the trial will necessarily deter prosecutors from seeking indictments against defendants whom they could not convict at trial. Nor
can we safely assume that only factually guilty defendants are indicted since the pretrial process requires only a minimal showing of
factual guilt.
This Section has demonstrated that the formal stages of pretrial
review require only a minimal demonstration of the defendant's factual guilt before indictment. As a result, the prosecutor now bears
primary responsibility for screening out cases where factual guilt is
questionable or where the government cannot satisfy the trial's formal proof requirements. For the vast majority of cases that never
reach trial, the prosecutor's decision to file charges is the only assessment of legal guilt that will be made before plea-bargaining. Once
we view our criminal process from this perspective, Costello's reliance on the prosecution as the sole pretrial screener of legal guilt
becomes far more questionable. Far from being the "sole inquisitional figure in an essentially adversarial landscape," 179 the prosecutor has become the most powerful and important official in our
criminal process. Therefore, the next Section examines the prosecutor's exercise of charging and plea-bargaining powers to determine
whether prosecutorial screening e.ffectively bars either the indictment
or conviction of factually or legally innocent defendants.
179. Morris, supra note 46, at 684.
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THE PROSECUTOR

Costello precluded any effective lay or judicial review of the
prosecutor's decisions. The Court assumed that the trial's stringent
proof requirements would deter prosecutors from indicting defendants whom they could not convict at trial. This Section challenges
that assumption.
A.

Preliminary Standards

In some federal prosecutions, 180 the prosecutor's first contact with
the case 181 occurs after the defendant's warrantless arrest.1 82 The
federal law enforcement agency responsible for the arrest asks the
Assistant U.S. Attorney to initiate prosecution by drafting or approving a complaint that sets forth the probable cause for the arrest, in
compliance with rule 4(a). 183 The prosecutor's evaluation of the evidentiary basis for the arrest constitutes a preliminary screen of the
defendant's factual guilt. Thus, the prosecutor may weed out cases
at this early stage because the agents clearly lacked probable cause to
arrest. Theoretically, the prosecutor could also eliminate cases
180. In other federal prosecutions, the pretrial process begins with the prosecutor's decision to start a grand jury investigation into the alleged criminal activity of various target defendants. At the start of these grand jury investigations, the federal prosecutor has already
made some tentative decisions concerning the appropriateness of prosecution against unknown
or known offenders if sufficient evidence can be developed. Federal prosecutors often use the
grand jury's investigatory powers most frequently in cases involving political corruption, organized crime, white collar crime, and complex economic crimes such as commercial fraud, antitrust violations, and tax offenses. By using the grand jury's subpoena power to compel
production of relevant documents and immunity and judicial contempt powers to compel the
testimony of alleged participants, the federal prosecutor may develop sufficient evidence
against particular defendants to warrant the return of an indictment. At this juncture, the
grand jury must shift roles from investigator to screener in order to assess whether there is
probable cause to charge these putative defendants for various offenses. If the grand jury
returns an indictment, the indictee loses the right to a judicial evaluation of the probable cause
basis for arrest because the indictment itself establishes it. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 117 n.19 (1975). But see Thompson, supra note 62, for a critical evaluation of the grand
jury's capacity to make a neutral fourth amendment inquiry.
Accordingly, a warrant may issue for the indictee's arrest upon the indictment's authority.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(a). After arrest, the defendant will be arraigned on those charges. Since
the indictment precludes judicial evaluation of the evidentiary basis for the charges, the
judge's role is limited to apprising the defendant of constitutional rights, setting bail, and fixing
a trial date.
181. When a warrant has issued for the defendant's arrest, the prosecutor's first contact
will occur earlier. The prosecutor may use the grand jury to aid the pre-arrest investigative
activities of the law enforcement agency. At the very least, the law enforcement agency will
ask the prosecutor to draft or review the affidavits in support of the application for an arrest
warrant in those cases.
182. In practice, arrests routinely occm; without a warrant. See, e.g., Payton v. New York,
100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (allowing warrantless arrests in public where there is
probable cause to arrest).
183. See note 86 supra.
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where proof of legal guilt is unlikely, but that decision is usually
deferred until later in the process. If there is sufficient evidence of
factual guilt to satisfy the probable-cause-to-arrest standard, the
prosecutor would probably draft a complaint because evidence may
still be developed before the case goes to the grand jury.
However, even a prosecutor who believes the accused is factually
guilty and convictable may decide not to prosecute because the case
is not worth the expenditure of scarce criminal justice resources. The
Justice Department recommends 184 a series of selective enforcement
criteria that may justify a decision not to prosecute, including the de
minimig nature of the offense, public antipathy toward enforcement
of the relevant penal statute, a history of nonenforcement of the statute, 185 the probable sentence if the accused is convicted, 186 the accused's relative culpability in connection with the offense, 187 the
accused's willingness to cooperate with law enforcement officials,1 88
the availability of more appropriate civil or administrative remedies, 189 and the possibility that state criminal prosecution pright be
more appropriate. 190
B.

The Decision To Seek an Indictment

Prosecutorial Screening of Factual Guilt
Justice Department standards bar prosecution unless the
prosecutor finds probable cause to believe the accused has committed a federal offense.1 91 However, that minimal probable-cause-toarrest standard does not terminate prosecutorial assessment of factual guilt. A review of the literature concerning prosecutorial discretion indicates that many prosecutors do not seek an indictment
unless they are personally convinced that the suspect has in fact
committed the proscribed offense. 192 In making that determination,
the prosecutor considers information probative of factual guilt such
as informer statements, illegally seized items, and hearsay that could
1.

184. Justice .Department Standards, supra note 109, at 3001.
185. Thus, some prosecutors have refused to charge for possession of marijuana in cases
where less than an ounce was involved. Laws prohibiting certain sexual conduct between consenting adults are rarely enforced in some jurisdictions.
186. Justice .Department Standards, supra note 109, at 3002.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 3002-03.
190. Id. at 3003. For example, federal prosecutors may decide not to prosecute small drug
dealers so that they may instead direct their efforts to higher-ups, leaving the street dealers to
be prosecuted by state authorities.
191. Id. at 3002.
192. Kaplan, supra note 23, at 178.
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not be used at trial. For example, a prosecutor may decide not to
prosecute even when probable cause to arrest exists, because the accused has passed a lie-detector test. 193
However, pragmatic considerations may lead prosecutors to seek
indictments despite their own serious doubts about the defendant's
factual guilt. Writing about his experience as an Assistant United
States Attorney, Professor John Kaplan notes that tactical considerations sometimes prompted the indictment of both spouses for tax
evasion when they both signed a fraudulent return, even though the
prosecutor felt that only the husband was guilty. 194 In conspiracy
cases, "those on the fringes might be prosecuted despite genuine
doubt as to whether their involvement was sufficiently great." 195
Kaplan concluded that, "as a general principle, a far lower degree of
belief in guilt (or perhaps even none at all) seemed to be required
when the question was whether the subject under consideration
should be joined as a co-defendant with one whom the prosecutor
did believe to be guilty." 196 Apart from those few notable exceptions, it seems reasonable to conclude that a federal prose·cutor will
not knowingly seek indictments against factually innocent defendants. However, prosecutorial assessment of factual guilt may not
always be as reliable as the prosecutor presumes it to be because of
its ex parte nature and the quality of the information relied upon. 197
2. Prosecutorial Screening of Legal Guilt
a. The directed-verdict standard. Current Justice Department
guidelines dictate that the prosecutor should select charges that "adequately reflect the nature of the criminal conduct involved," 198
"provide the basis for an appropriate sentence under all the circumstances of the case," 199 and "can be supported by admissible evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction." 200 The comments
accompanying these standards suggest that the last factor - the
193. Id.
194. Id. at 179.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 179-80.
197. While nearly "all prosecutors assert they would not proceed with a case where they
felt the defendant was in fact innocent," most believe "that defendants do not plead guilty if
they are factually innocent and that the screening process (police and prosecutorial) is sufficiently reliable and error-free so that defendants passing through the screen are in fact guilty."
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at xix.
198. Justice J)epartment Standards, supra note 109, at 3003.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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should be measured by the di-

Experience indicates that many considerations can influence the
strength ofa prosecution. Foremost among these [is] the weight of the
evidence that will be available and admissible at trial. . . . At a minimum, the prosecutor should have reason to believe that he will have
sufficient admissible evidence at trial to sustain a conviction - the
standard set forth in Rule 29(a), F.R.Cr.P., to avoid a judgment of acquitta1.201

Those guidelines, as well as some impressionistic accounts of federal
prosecutorial screening,202 seem to support Costello's reliance on the
prosecutor to screen legal guilt. While trials may not occur frequently, the possibility of having to prove a compelling case of legal
guilt at trial forces the prosecutor to review the legal sufficiency of
the recommended charges.
However, these guidelines do not compel the prosecutor to decline prosecution when there is insufficient evidence of legal guilt to
satisfy the directed verdict standard at the time of indictment. The
comment accompanying the guideline explains that the prosecutor
"should not . . . recommend in an indictment charges which he cannot reasonably expect to be able to prove at trial."203 Accordingly,
prosecutors can use the indictment as an evidence-gathering device
because they may reasonably believe that the sanctions imposed by
the indictment will induce defendants to incriminate themselves or
others in return for a plea-bargain. By failing to require legally sufficient charges at the time of indictment, the guidelines permit the
government to impose the indictment's sanctions against the accused
before it has established a minimum case of legal guilt.
I have already suggested that indictment without some preliminary showing of legal guilt undermines basic accusatorial principles
like the presumption of innocence204 and the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination.205 The Justice Department guidelines ex201. Id. at 3002.
202. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 23, at 182.
203. Justice .Department Standards, supra note 109, at 3003 (emphasis added).
204. If one shares Professor Packer's view that the presumption of innocence is a normative doctrine that requires the government to treat the accused as innocent until legal guilt is
adjudicated at trial, then the government should be required to make some preliminary showing of convictability before it is permitted to impose the indictment's serious economic, moral,
and physical sanctions against the accused. See note 77 supra.
205. The defendant's privilege against self-incrimination promotes a fair state-individual
balance by requiring the government to prove the defendant's guilt through its independent
efforts. Permitting the government to indict the accused upon a minimal showing of factual
guilt dilutes this principle because it allows the government to use the indictment's sanctions to
induce self-conviction in return for some expected concession from the state. See note 29
supra.
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pressly authorize that practice. Of course, the existence of loopholes
in the guidelines does not mean that prosecutors will always exploit
them. Left to regulate themselves, many conscientious prosecutors
will not seek indictments unless they already have sufficient admissible evidence to meet the directed-verdict test. Indeed, recent studies
of state prosecutorial screening practices indicate that prosecutors
dismiss a significant percentage of complaints because critical witnesses will not be available to testify at trial. 206 Nevertheless, the
possibility for abuse clearly exists under the present guidelines.207
b. The likelihood-of-conviction standard. Once satisfied that the
government's case will eventually include sufficient admissible evidence to reach the jury, the prosecutor must evaluate the likelihood
of securing a conviction on that evidence.208 That complex prediction requires the prosecutor to anticipate flaws in the government's
case as well as defenses that the accused might raise at trial. Does
the evidence dispel any reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt?
Will the fact-finder believe the government's witnesses? Will any
nonevidentiary factors lead a jury to acquit the accused? .Negative
answers to any of those questions might lead to a decision not to
prosecute. For example, a prosecutor may screen out cases where
the jury probably would not convict because the case boils down to
one witness's word against another's, the government's witnesses are
reluctant to testify, or the case rests on the testimony of an admitted
accomplice who is receiving some concession for testifying. 209 In
close or controversial cases, some prosecutors may use the grand
jury's reaction to its evidence to make that prediction.
While most prosecutors claim that they would not seek an indictment unless there was a high probability of securing a conviction at
trial, recent studies of state prosecutorial practices suggest otherwise. 210 Foremost among the reasons for defective screening oflegal
206. A recent L.E.A.A. study in 13 jurisdictions, K. BROSI, A CROSS-CITY COMPARISON OF
FELONY CASE PROCESSING 14-18 (1979), found that prosecutors did not prosecute more than
half of all felony arrests referred to them. The major reasons for those dismissals were poor
evidence and problems with witnesses. See 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2318 (1979) for a brief
summary of the report's findings.
207. Former Attorney General Bell announced publicly that the Justice Department was
drafting a new policy governing prosecutions dictating that no prosecution should be recommended unless the evidence presented to the grand jury would be at least likely to produce a
conviction. "We will not go forward, absent highly unusual circumstances, where we have
only enough evidence.to withstand a motion to dismiss the prosecution at the close of what
would be the government's case at trial." Address by the Honorable Griffin B. Bell, University
of Georgia Law School (Apr. 28, 1979). See also 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2279 (1979).
208. Id.
209. See Kaplan, supra note 23, at 183.
210. See, e.g., L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 101; Alschuler, supra note 25.
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guilt is the possibility of conviction through plea-bargaining. Many
state prosecutors find nothing wrong with charging and convicting a
defendant whom they believe is factually guilty even though the government lacks sufficient admissible evidence to convict at trial. 211
Not surprisingly, they view the doctrine of legal guilt as a technicality that interferes with their own view that justice is done when criminal sanctions are applied to defendants they believe to be factually
guilty.212 Others accept the doctrine's validity but equate it with the
exclusionary rule and the trial's formal proof requirements. 213 In
their view, defendants waive214 its requirements when they plead
guilty because the doctrine applies only to the criminal trial itself.
Given this prosecutorial ambivalence about the validity of legal
guilt requirements and their applicability to proceedings other than
trial, it is not surprising that prosecutors see nothing wrong with securing the guilty plea of a defendant who could not be convicted at
trial. As one national evaluation of state prosecutorial plea-bargaining practices noted:
When prosecutors say they would never intentionally convict an "innocent person" they virtually always mean one kind of innocence. A
prosecutor personally convinced that a defendant did not in fact commit the crime probably will drop the prosecution. On the other hand,
many prosecutors personally convinced that a defendant committed
the crime, but who also believe it questionable that the government
could prove its case at trial, may not dismiss the case . . . .
Few prosecutors interviewed by project staff are willing to dismiss a
case solely because it may be difficult to prove at trial. On the contrary, virtually all prosecutors regard these weak cases as prime targets
for plea negotiations.21 5

Thus, a prosecutor may seek an indictment when the evidence of
211. L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 62-63; Specter, Book Review, 76 YALE L.J. 604,
606-07 (1967).
212. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 108.
213. Id.
214. But see notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text. See also notes 29 & 71 supra.
While certain formal proof requirements like the rules of evidence are designed to promote an
accurate and reliable determination of guilt in an adversarial forum, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that legal guilt requirements that preclude the state from establishing a defendant's guilt are not necessarily waived by the guilty plea. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61,
62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (citations omitted):
Neither Tollett v. Henderson . . . nor our earlier cases on which it relied . . . stand for
the proposition that counseled guilty pleas inevitably "waive" all antecedent constitutional violations . . . [I]n Tollett we emphasized that waiver was not the basic ingredient
of this line of cases . . . . A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt
. . . . Here, however, the claim is that the State may not convict petitioner no matter how
validly his factual guilt is established. The guilty plea, therefore, does not bar the claim.
See also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974).
215. L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 101 (footnotes omitted).
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guilt is marginal and then offer an attractive bargain to induce a
guilty plea. Moreover, the absence of any effective limits on
prosecutorial discretion in filing charges permits the prosecutor to
enhance the government's plea-bargaining position by charging the
defendant with more serious crimes than the evidence or the facts of
a particular case warrant. 216 To prompt a plea in weak217 cases,
some prosecutors engage in bluffing tactics where they puff the
strength of the case before offering an attractive bargain. These
prosecutors regard this practice as legitimate and skillful bargaining
even in cases where the prosecutor knowingly lacks sufficient evidence of legal guilt to reach the jury.218
Nor is the possibility of securing a guilty plea the only factor that
may bias the prosecutor's screening of legal guilt. A law enforcement agency's pressure to prosecute a serious offender may lead the
prosecutor to seek an indictment in order to preserve interoffice harmony when the agency can develop no better case against the accused.219 In conspiracy cases, tactical considerations might prompt
prosecutors to seek indictments ~gainst marginally involved participants.220 In politically motivated prosecutions, the government may
ultimately be more interested in the sanctions generated by the in216. Prosecutorial overcharging is encouraged not only by plea-bargaining but by the fact
that the defendant cannot be convicted at trial for more serious crimes than those contained in
the formal accusation. Accordingly, prosecutors will charge defendants with the most serious
crimes that the evidence could support.
The practice of "charging up" because you can convict "down" but not "1,1p" is the
more rational bureaucratically because that early in the process probably no one believes
that the final outcome will depend on a precise evaluation of the evidence. . . . Having
in mind that a negotiated plea of guilty is the probable outcome, the prosecutor has no
reason at the outset to make a difficult calculation of what crime the defendant actually
committed and should be convicted for. Although in theory the indictment or information is a solemn accusation, in practice it is not meant to reflect that kind of careful determination.
L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 57-58.
217. Estimating the strength of the prosecution's case is not a simple matter. The accuracy
of the estimate depends upon the prosecutor's experience and the point in the process when the
estimation is made. Recent empirical studies have "shown that the prosecutor's estimate is not
highly correlated with the observed probability of conviction for criminal cases going to trial."
PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 19. Moreover, what may appear to be a strong case immediately after arrest may tum out to be a weak one if critical testimony is lost or suppressed.
The L.E.A.A. Study described five types of weak cases: (1) where evidence linking the
defendant to the crime is weak; (2) where evidence of the requisite intent is in doubt or an
applicable defense may exculpate the accused; (3) where critical evidence needed to establish
guilt may be suppressed; (4) where evidence necessary to go to trial is absolutely unavailable
(e.g., the critical witness has died); and (5) where such evidence is theoretically unavailable
(e.g., the critical witness is not in the court's jurisdiction). LE.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at
106-07. These last two categories describe "the ultimate in a weak case," that is, "no case at
all." Alschuler, supra note 25, at 65, because the prosecutor does not have sufficient evidence
of legal guilt to reach a jury. See note 71 supra.
218. LE.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 110-13.
219. See Kaplan, supra note 23, at 181-82.
220. See id. at 179.
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dictment including the public damage to the indictee's reputation
than in any resulting conviction.221 Any one of these factors may
lead a prosecutor to seek an indictment despite the unlikelihood of
conviction at trial.
Obviously, federal prosecutors are subject to similar pressures.
Like their state counterparts, they must choose between the concrete
reality of applying criminal sanctions to someone who has probably
committed a crime and the abstract ideal of convicting only the legally guilty defendant. "For the working prosecutor who hears of
the injuries and damages to victims everyday the choice is not difficult. Securing a half loaf . . . (the conviction of a defendant whom
the prosecutor presumes is factually guilty) . . . at the expense of
upholding the pure ideals of the law is a natural choice."222 The
choice may prove irresistible in prosecutions of indigent defendants
who in all likelihood will plead guilty anyway because they lack the
resources to battle the government on equal footing.
At the very least, prosecutors' ambivalence about legal guilt requirements and their capacity to circumvent most of them by pleabargaining, suggest the need for a more neutral pretrial screener of
legal guilt. Since some factually and legally innocent defendants will
pass through the grand jury's leaky sieve, the prosecutor's pre-indictment screening decisions and post-indictment bargaining practices
raise the possibility that factually and legally innocent defendants
will plead guilty. Whether that possibility can become a reality de221. By 1970, all the pieces were in place; all that was required was a Justice Department willing to abuse its prosecutorial responsibility. The Nixon administration supplied
that ingredient. From 1970 to 1973, the ISD [Internal Security Division] conducted over
100 Guy Goodwin-supervised grand juries in eighty-four cities of thirty-six states, calling
some 1,000 to 2,000 witnesses by subpoena, returning some 400 indictments. The indictments were often merely proforma, to cover the real investigative purposes of the grand
juries. The normal conviction rate on grand jury indictment is 65 percent; less than 15
percent of the 400 ISD indictments were convictions or pleas to lesser charges. Targets
included the Back [sic] Panther party, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Daniel Ellsberg, the Los Angeles antidraft movement, the Catholic Left, Mayday, the Puerto Rican
independence movement, the American Indian movement, the Movimiento Chicano, the
women's movement, Irish unification supporters, labor unions, radical lawyers, and legal
workers.
Reform ofthe Grand Jury System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong,,
2d Sess. 214 (1976) (footnotes omitted) (excerpts from M. HALPERJN, J. BERMAN, R,
BOROSAGE & C. MARWICK, THE LAWLESS STATE (1976)). Considerable commentary has addressed how the Justice Department's Internal Security Division used the investigatory powers
of the federal grand jury to harass enemies of the Nixon administration and gather political
intelligence information about their activities. See generally 1977 Hearings pt. 1 & pt. 2, supra
note 108; Comment, Federal Grand Jury Investigation of Political .Dissidents, 1 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 432 (1972).
222. L.E.A.A. STUDY,-supra note 26, at 108-09; 110-15. Some studies have suggested that
prosecutors would face this choice less frequently if better procedures for maintaining the custody of evidence were adopted. See PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 73.
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pends upon the plea-bargaining roles played by the defense attorney
and the court.
III.

THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA-BARGAINING POSTURE

As shown above, 223 the Supreme Court has assumed that the trial
adequately protects our system's legal guilt requirements. A defendant who is factually innocent or believes the state cannot prove legal
guilt may choose to stand trial. If the defendant voluntarily forgoes
that option upon the advice of competent counsel, the Court has assumed that the plea reliably demonstrates factual guilt224 and intelli- .
gently surrenders the right to contest legal guilt at trial. 225 I shall
examine the roles played by the defense attorney and the trial court
during plea bargaining to demonstrate the lack of foundation for either of those assumptions. 2 26
A.

The .Defense Attorney

If a defendant voluntarily and intelligently enters a plea upon the
advice of competent counsel, the courts consider such a plea "an admission of factual guilt so reliable that . . . it quite validly removes
the issue of factual guilt . . . . A guilty plea, therefore simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt."227 The Supreme
Court also treats guilty pleas as reliable indicators of defendants' legal guilt: it assumes that a competent defense attorney will evaluate
whether the government's evidence can satisfy the trial's stringent
proof requirements before advising a client to plead. In McMann v.
Richardson,228 the Court emphasized the defense attorney's importance:
In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the defendant and his counsel
must make their best judgment as to the weight of the State's case.
Counsel must predict how the facts, as he understands them, would be
viewed by a court. If proved, would those facts convince a judge or
jury of a defendant's guilt? On those facts would evidence seized without a warrant be admissible? Would the trier of fact on those facts find
223. See notes 114-83 supra and accompanying text.
224. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam).
225. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970). See also Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,363 (1978) ("Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by
other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to
prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.").
226. The following analysis relies heavily on the findings of a recently published national
study of state plea-bargaining practices, L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26.
227. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (emphasis deleted).
228. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
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a confession voluntary and admissible? 229

Despite the Court's heavy reliance on defense attorneys to protect factually and legally innocent defendants from pleading guilty,
it has not adequately defined what constitutes effective assistance of
counsel in the plea-bargaining context.230 More importantly, few
courts have confronted the possibility that the realities of the criminal process may prevent defense counsel from giving minimally
competent legal assistance. For example, the courts have assumed
that defense attorneys will be "devoted solely"231 to the interests of
their clients without considering whether the attorneys' relationship
with prosecutors and judges may lead them to adopt a more cooperative attitude towards the institutional norms of the criminal justice
system.
One of those norms is the system's preference for plea-bargaining
as the dominant mode of guilt determination. Since the criminal justice system would collapse if more defendants contested their culpability, the system "encourages"232 defendants to plead by making it
clear they will be punished more severely if convicted after trial. Ne229. 397 U.S. at 769-70. See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1970).
230. At a minimum, defense counsel should evaluate the strength of the prosecution's case
to predict the likelihood of conviction. Some courts require that counsel conduct a complete
factual and legal investigation to determine appropriate defenses. See, e.g., United States v.
Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But cf. United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283
(D.C. Cir. July IO, 1979) (examining whether claimed inadequacy constitutes "a serious incompetency that falls measurably below the performance ordinarily expected of fallible lawyers" and whether it probably "affected the outcome at trial." Slip op. at 21. Applying that
standard, the court concluded that the defendant did not satisfy his burden of proving that
counsel's failure to investigate possible witnesses to support an alibi defense probably affected
the outcome of the trial. Slip op. at 34); Alschuler, The JJefanse Attorney's Role in Plea-Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1265-67 (1975) (noting that a number of courts have disputed that
an effective defense counsel must examine possible defenses before entering a plea of guilty).
The Supreme Court has refused to vacate guilty pleas when a defense counsel mistakenly
concluded that a coerced confession would be admissible at trial, McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970), or where defense counsel failed to investigate the possibility that the indictment was returned by a grand jury that had been unconstitutionally selected, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). In both cases the Court concluded that the attorney's advice was
"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 411 U.S. at 266
(quoting 397 U.S. at 771). The Court emphasized that consideration of such factors as "the
expectation or hope of a lesser sentence, or the convincing nature of the evidence against the
accused . . . might well suggest the advisability of a guilty plea without elaborate consideration of whether pleas in abatement . . . might be factually supported." 411 U.S. at 268.
For a recent critique of the Court's failure to articulate criteria for measuring counsel's
competency, see Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminal JJefanse Rqresentation, 15 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 109 (1977). 'See also Brown Transport Corp. v. Alcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014
(1978) (White and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
231. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1948).
232. "While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may
have a 'discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of
these difficult choices [is] an inevitable' - and permissible - 'attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages guilty pleas.'" Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973)).
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gotiated determinations of guilt permit the prosecutor, the defense
attorney, and the court-to process a high volume of cases efficiently
while giving the defendant an apparent concession in charge or sentence as fair consideration.233 In the vast majority of cases, an indigent defendant's attorney will urge submission to the systemic
pressures to plead. Numerous studies234 have shown that both private and public defense attorneys suffer from a "bum-out" syndrome. High caseloads, sketchy information, and uncoopera~ive
clients often make attorneys cynical about their clients' factual guilt
or innocence.235 Although the public is convinced that clever defense attorneys manipulate legal technicalities to free guilty
criminals, many defense lawyers presume their clients are guilty of
some crime and justify their failure to investigate the facts or the law
by assuming that a plea-bargain is the best they can do. 236
Moreover, plea-bargaining often serves a defense attorney's own
interests. The economics of private practice and the limited re-.
sources of public defender agencies require criminal defense attorneys to handle a high volume of cases. Plea-bargaining makes that
volume possible. Indeed, prosecutorial overcharging followed by a
"sweet deal" that dismisses the inflated charges can create the impression that the defense attorney has effectively represented the client's interest. 237
A defense attorney might also consider how an adversarial stance
in one case may affect future clients. Theoretically, the defense lawyer has an adversarial relationship with the prosecutor. In practice,
the defense lawyer "may feel constrained to go along with the system
because of potential retaliation should accepted norms be
breached."238 Uncooperative defense attorneys who file too many
suppression motions may find the prosecutor unwilling to offer attractive bargains or informal discovery privileges in future cases.239
233. Recent empirical studies of plea-bargaining have suggested that many defendants
who plead guilty are not getting real b!1rgains because they are receiving sentences that approximate the penalties they would have received if they had been convicted at trial.. See
PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 20.
234. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 168. See also A. RosETT & D. CRESSEY,
JUSTICE BY CONSENT 126-27 (1976).
235. One study found that many defense attorneys "appear to assume that a defendant is
guilty of something, thus enhancing a rate of guilty pleas as well as reinforcing a 'presumption
of guilt throughout the system.' . . . Certainty as to factual guilt appears to override investigation into legal guilt." L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at xxxiii. See generally Skolnick, Social
Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 52, 60-62 (1967).
236. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 167.
237. See L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 57-58.
238. L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 189.
239. ''The inescapable reality, insufficiently appreciated, is that the discretionary power of
public officers to confer privileges or to be lenient is always intrinsically a discretionary power
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Conversely, defense counsel who do not insist on time-consuming
legal technicalities may be rewarded for their cooperation.240
Even when defense attorneys resist those pressures and zealously
perform their adversarial role, they often cannot obtain the information needed to make an informed judgment about a client's factual
guilt or the likelihood of conviction at trial. While some courts have
held that a competent defense attorney should conduct a thorough
factual and legal investigation,241 many defense attorneys lack the
necessary time or resources to make such an inquiry.242 Thus, they
must rely primarily on information gained from the client and from
the limited243 pretrial discovery rights afforded to them. For example, federal defendants are not entitled to see the statements or the
grand jury testimony of government witnesses until after the witnesses testify at trial. 244 In most cases, the defense cannot even get a
list of the government witnesses.245 Unless a preliminary examination was held before the indictment, a defense attorney must rely on
informal discovery devices, which may convey inaccurate informanot to confer a privilege or not to be lenient and is susceptible to many kinds of abuse, including the worse sort of discrimination, favoritism, or caprice . . . ." K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE 231-32 (1969).
240. See generally A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note
26, at 183; Skolnick, supra note 235, at 62-64.
241. E.g., United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973), See generally
ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PLEAS OF GUILTY, § 3.2 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PLEA STANDARDS].
242. Court appointed attorneys received fees which did not permit the hiring of investigators. Privately retained counsel could hire investigators only in certain kinds of cases
where the clients had the needed fiscal resources. Public defenders usually had a limited
investigative support service which could only be used on a selective basis. Where investigations occurred they were restricted to felony cases.
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 180.
243. Most of the states have . . . limited a defendant's discovery by a variety of doctrines that had their origins in the halting and cautious growth of discovery. The most
co=on of these doctrines holds that the question of whether to grant discovery is in the
discretion of the trial court. . . . In addition, many states deny discovery of particular
categories of information - for example . . . the statements of prospective witnesses, and
the transcript or minutes of grand jury testimony.
Nakell, Criminal .Discovery for the .Defense and the Prosecution - The .Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C. L. REv. 437, 474-75 (1972).
Recognizing this problem, the American Bar Association has reco=ended that the defendant be given sufficient information to make an informed decision to plead. ABA PROJECT
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCE•
DURE BEFORE TRIAL § l.la(ii) (Approved Draft 1970). Some states have recently responded
to this problem by providing far more liberal discovery privileges. See Appendix note 9 iefra,
But cf. United States v. Wolczik, 26 CRIM. L. REP. 2287 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (prosecutor not
required to disclose exculpatory evidence to defense counsel during plea bargaining).
244. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). Some federal courts have interpreted the Jencks
Act to permit them to order disclosure of witnesses' statements before trial. See 8 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE f 16.10(2] (2d ed.1978).
245. The federal rules of criminal procedure do not mandate disclosures of a list of the
government's witnesses. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2). See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~
16.03(3] (2d ed. 1978).
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tion, to determine whether the government has a strong case.246
The preceding description of the defense attorney's role suggests
that the Supreme Court has relied too heavily on the defense counsel
to protect the system's legal guilt requirements during plea-bargaining. First, a counseled guilty plea does not reliably demonstrate the
defendant's factual guilt in all cases. The defense attorneys' presumptions of guilt and their inability to investigate factual or legal
defenses may lead them to advise factually innocent defendants to
plead guilty. Without adequate advice from counsel, such defendants may even believe they are guilty.247
It is not unlikely that a large number of defendants are unaware of the
exculpatory nuances of the law under which they believe they have
committed a crime. This is especially true where individual elements
of the crime are each independent preconditions to conviction and
each necessary of proof, or where the acts themselves are measured in
fine degree when assessing whether a crime has taken place.248

Nor can we rely on the attorney's advice to ensure that the defendant
is intelligently surrendering the right to contest legal guilt at trial. At
a minimum, the defense attorney should have enough information to
predict the likely outcome at trial. But defense attorneys' access to
the state's case is often so limited that they may not even realize that
the prosecutor lacks sufficient evidence to reach a jury. Indeed, recent empirical studies suggest that defense attorneys often advise clients to plead guilty to charges that the government could not have
proven at trial. 249
Increased reliance on the guilty plea to secure convictions, combined with the growing realization that innocent defendants might
be pleading guilty, prompted the courts to supervise plea-bargaining
more actively. The next Subsection examines judicial review at the
246. One of the major sources of informal discovery is the prosecutor, who will often disclose some evidence to induce a plea when the case for legal guilt is compelling. Problems
arise, however, when the prosecutor has a marginal case. Alschuler and others have documented the co=on prosecutorial practice of bluffing in weak cases. Alschuler, supra note 25,
at 65-67. See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 10-15, and notes 217-22 supra and accompanying text. The prosecutor gives the defense counsel whatever evidence formal discovery procedures require and then exaggerates the strength of the government's case, offering an
attractive bargain to induce a plea. Some prosecutors regard that practice as legitimate and
skillful bargaining even when it secures the conviction of legally innocent defendants.
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 110-15.
247. See Barkai, Accuracy Inquiriesfar All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas
But Innocent .Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 88, 96 (1977).
248. Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1975).
249. See PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 20. Using regression equations to predict what
would have occurred if pleading defendants in the District of Columbia Superior Court had
gone to trial, the study concluded that "defendants who enter guilty pleas (a) frequently forgo
a reasonably good chance of acquittal at trial but (b) do not always receive demonstrable
sentence concessions from the prosecutor or the judge in return." Id. See note 300 i'!fra and
accompanying text for further discussion of this study's findings.
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plea hearing and concludes that it does not prevent innocent defendants from pleading guilty or even ensure that their pleas intelligently surrender their right to contest legal guilt at trial.
B.

Judicial Review of the Plea

I.

Voluntariness

Courts deciding whether to accept a plea consider whether the
defendant offered it " 'voluntarily.' " 25° For a plea to be voluntary,
the defendant must understand (1) the nature of the charge,251 (2)
the consequences of the plea,252 (3) the rights waived by choosing to
plead,253 and (4) the permissible inducements to the plea.254 Courts
also assessed the voluntariness of the plea by determining whether
any impermissible pressures might have induced the defendant to
plead guilty. Impermissible pressures include violence, threats of violence, improper inducements, deception, and trickery. 255
One of the most important inducements to plead guilty is the sentencing di.fferential between conviction by plea and conviction by
trial: The defendant knows that more severe punishment often follows conviction by trial than follows a guilty plea to the same offense. Rejecting arguments that this sentencing differential
unconstitutionally burdens the defendant's right to contest culpability at trial, the Supreme Court has concluded that this differential is
a permissible inducement that does not render the plea involuntary.256
The voluntary nature of the plea becomes suspect, however,
when one considers the bargaining power of each party. The prosecutor can enhance the government's position by bringing or threatening more serious charges than the particular case warrants. 257 The
prosecutor may also offer the most attractive bargains in the weakest
cases. When the prosecutor applies those pressures to an indigent
250. E.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969).
251. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976); FED. R. CRIM. P. l l(c).
252. See FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(c). The consequences that must be understood are only
those that flow directly from the plea. Bell v. North Carolina, 576 F.2d 564, 565 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 956 (1978).
253. Rights waived include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront
adverse witnesses, and the right to a trial by jury. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243
(1969).
254. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
255. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
256. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). Some state trial courts effectuate
this sentencing differential by assigning judges who typically give stiff sentences to conduct
trials and judges who give more lenient sentences to take pleas.
257. See L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 57-58.
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defendant who cannot make bail before trial, they may prove
irresistible.258
Several factors enhance the prosecutor's bargaining position when the
defendant is in custody. If the prosecutor believes that the defendant
has already been incarcerated for a sufficient period of time and is willing to recommend a "time-in" sentence, the defendant will invariably
agree to plead guilty to obtain immediate freedom. Even if the prosecutor does not agree to a "time-in" sentence, an incarcerated defendant, frightened and demoralized by the prospect of an indefinite
period of confinement, may be willing to enter a plea and accept a
fixed period of imprisonment.25 9
Since the courts have either ignored or legitimized those pressures, a
determination that the plea "is voluntary and not the result of force
or threats or of promises"260 obscures the fact that "the plea agreement is the source of the coercion and already embodies the involuntariness."261
The coercive aspects of plea-bargaining might be less offensive if
we could say with some assurance that they only occur after the government has independently developed some reliable evidence of the
defendant's factual and legal guilt. But Sections I and II have indicated that no such showing is required before indictment. The state
may indict a defendant without making even a prima facie showing
of legal guilt and then exploit the leverage it gains from the indictment to induce a guilty plea. Thus, the minimal screening standards
used in the pretrial screening process help tip the balance of advantage betweep. the state and the accused decidedly in the state's favor.
This fact alone raises serious questions about the accuracy of a determination of guilt negotiated by two parties with such unequal bargaining power. Concern about the accuracy of the guilty plea has
prompted the courts to assess whether the defendant understands the
basic elements of the crime and whether there is a factual basis for
the plea.
258. Numerous studies have documented that defendants who remain in custody before
trial are much more likely to be convicted than those defendants who secure pretrial release.
One study found that the defendant's pretrial status as a detainee had a far higher correlation
to an unfavorable disposition than factors such as the defendant's previous record or employment record. Rankin, 17ze Effect of Pretrial .Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641, 652-53 (1964).
The Rankin study found that 64% of those defendants jailed awaiting trial were eventually
sentenced and sent to prison compared to 17% of those defendants who were out on bail before
trial; 47% of those bailed were not convicted compared to 27% of those who were detained
prior to disposition. Id. at 642.
259. White, A Proposalfar Reform ofthe Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439,
444 (1971).
260. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(d).
261. Langbein, supra note 12, at 14 (emphasis original). See also Thaler, Punishing the
Innocent: 17ze Needfar .Due Process and the Presumption ofInnocence Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis.
L. REv. 441,457.
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Intelligence

As the Supreme Court explained in McCarthy v. United States, 262
a guilty plea "is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal
charge."263 Therefore, "it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the
facts." 264 The intelligence requirement is designed to protect innocent defendants from pleading to crimes they did not commit by ensuring that the defendant understands at least the "essential
elements"265 of the crime.
The facts in McCarthy illustrate how potentially innocent defendants might mistakenly conclude that they are guilty. McCarthy
pleaded guilty to a charge that he "willfully and knowingly" attempted to evade tax payments. The trial judge personally examined
McCarthy to determine whether he was entering the plea voluntarily, with an understanding of the rights he was waiving and the consequences that could follow. 266 The court ordered a presentence
investigation and continued the case for sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, McCarthy claimed his "failure to pay taxes was 'not
deliberate' and that they would have been paid if he had not been in
poor health."267 After examining the presentencing report and concluding that "'the manner in which [the petitioner's] books were
kept was not inadvertent,' " 268 the judge imposed a one year sentence.
The Supreme Court reversed McCarthy's conviction because of
the trial court's failure to inform the defendant personally of the nature of the charge, as required under rule 11.269 While its holding
rested on an improper method for determining the intelligence of the
262. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
263. 394 U.S. at 466.
264. 394 U.S. at 466.
265. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 640 n.6 (1976). The Court in Henderson
affirmed the lower court's judgment vacating the defendant's second-degree murder plea entered upon advice of competent counsel. The record indicated that no one had explained to
the defendant (who had substantially below average intelligence) that second-degree murder
required an intent to kill. 426 U.S. at 642. In a footnote, Justice Stevens added that since
[t]here is no need in this case to decide whether notice of the true nature, or substance, of
a charge always requires a description of every element of the offense; we assume it does
not. Nevertheless, intent is such a critical element of the offense ofsecond-degtee murder
that notice of that element is required.
426 U.S. at 647 n.18. Accord, United States v. Hedgecoe, 420 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Steele, 413 F.2d 967, 969 (2d Cir. 1969), overruled on other grounds, Manley v.
United States, 432 F.2d 1241, 1245 (2d Cir. 1970).
266. 394 U.S. at 461.
267. 394 U.S. at 461.
268. 394 U.S. at 462.
269. 394 U.S. at 467.
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plea,270 the Court emphasized that judicial review of the plea was
designed to produce a reliable record of the defendant's guilt. Since
the trial judge had failed to explain that the charge required proof of
a specific intent and McCarthy had denied that he had acted deliberately, the possibility existed "that if . . . adequately informed [McCarthy] would have concluded that he was actually guilty of one of
two closely related lesser included offenses, which are mere misdemeanors."271
Thus, judicial inquiry into the intelligence of the plea provides
some minimal protection of factually innocent defendants by ensuring that they understand the essential elements of the crime. However, the intelligence inquiry does not require the courts to determine
whether the defendant understands that some affirmative defense
might apply, nor does it assess whether the government has sufficient
admissible evidence other than the defendant's admission to prove
the essential elements of the crime.

3. Factual Basis
Even if defendants understand the essential elements of a crime,
they may not realize that the questioned conduct does not fall within
the statute. To deal with that problem, rule 11 requires the court to
find a "factual basis"272 for the plea before it can enter judgment on
it. The factual basis inquiry protects factually innocent defendants
by requiring a judicial determination "that the conduct which the
defendant admits constitutes the offense charged."273 Whether that
inquiry adequately protects legally innocent defendants depends
upon the evidentiary standard used to measure factual basis,274 the
sources of information relied upon, and the scope of the judicial inquiry that occurs when the court is alerted to the possibility that an
270. 394 U.S. at 464 n.9.
271. 394 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted).
272. See FED. R. CRIM. P. l l(f). While the voluntariness inquiry is constitutionally required for all guilty pleas, the Court has not held that the factual basis requirement is mandated by the Constitution. But see Barkai, supra note 247, at 112 (noting that language in
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969), suggests that the factual basis inquiry is a
federal constitutional requirement for a valid plea because "the voluntariness and factual basis
requirements are inextricably linked").
State courts are constitutionally required to establish a factual basis before accepting guilty
pleas from defendants who protest their innocence. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25
(1970). See text at notes 287-97 iefra, for discussion of Alford. For a listing of states that use
some form of a factual basis requirement, see Barkai, supra note 247, at 89 n.6. The majority
of states have not applied a factual basis requirement for misdemeanors. Id. at 93 n.30.
273. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, Advisory Comm. Notes (1966).
274. For example, if factual basis is measured by a probable cause standard, a judicial
determination of a factual basis for the plea would not safeguard legally innocent defendants
or indicate whether there was compelling evidence of factual guilt. It would simply repeat the
screening performed by the magistrate, prosecutor, and grand jury.
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innocent defendant might be pleading guilty.275 Unfortunately, rule
11 inadequately addresses those issues. It neither defines any evidentiary standard for measuring factual basis,276 nor restricts the
sources of information that the court can rely upon to determine its
presence. Left without guidance, courts have relied upon sources
such as the defendant's own admissions, 277 presentence reports, 278
the prosecutor's synopsis of his case,279 statements or testimony from
government witnessses,280 grand jury testimony, 281 and even the
judge's personal knowledge of the case.282 Most trial courts have
failed to identify a particular evidentiary standard to measure an adequate factual basis. Some appellate courts appear to use a probable
cause standard,283 others demand evidence of the "essential elements,"284 while a growing number refer to a probability-of-conviction standard. 285 The lack of clarity in defining a minimum standard
of proof for measuring factual basis prompted one commentator to
conclude:
A federal court standard of proof for factual basis is virtually nonexistent. The subjectivity inherent in rule 11, which merely states that a
court must satisfy itself that a factual basis exists, and the deference
given to a trial court's discretion in accepting or rejecting pleas have
275. See Barkai, supra note 247, at ll8.
276. The Advisory Committee Notes that accompanied the factual basis amendment to
rule 11 noted that the court could determine a factual basis by inquiry of the defendant or the
attorney for the government, or by examining the presentence report. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11,
Advisory Co=. Notes (1966).
277. Courts will often give a synopsis of the charges including the specific acts and intent
alleged and then ask the accused if the allegations are true. See, e.g., Ruiz v. United States,
494 F.2d I (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899 (1974). Some appellate courts have criticized
that co=on practice, especially in cases involving complex questions of fact or law. See
United States v. Untiedt, 479 F.2d 1265, 1266 (8th Cir. 1973) (reading the indictment and
asking the defendant whether he committed acts charged does not properly establish factual
guilt). But see Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 413-14 (3d Cir. 1973) (adequacy of the
procedure depends upon the facts of the particular case).
278. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463 n.6 (1969); FED. R. CRIM, P. 11,
Advisory Co=. Notes (1966); ABA PLEA STANDARDS, supra note 241, § 1.6. But cf. United
States v. Zampitella, 416 F. Supp. 604 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (trial judge's possession of the
presentence report does not satisfy rule I l's factual basis requirement); Barkai, supra note 247,
at 137 (''The principal disadvantage in the use of . . . presentence reports is that the sources of
the factual basis will not have any personal knowledge of the alleged crime."),
279. See Ruiz v. United States, 494 F.2d I, 3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 899 (1974)
(factual basis demonstrated by defendant admitting truth of facts alleged in prosecutor's synopsis of case).
280. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 466 F.2d 533, 534 (per curiam)(Sth Cir. 1972).
281. See United States v. Romanello, 425 F. Supp. 304, 309-10 (D. Conn. 1975).
282. See United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80, 87 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1032
(1975).
283. Sec People v. Hudson, 7 Ill. App. 3d 800, 803, 288 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1972).
284. See notes 262-71 supra and accompanying text.
285. See United States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 958
(1971); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d ll3, ll9-20 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
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resulted in an "I-know-it-when-I-see-it" approach . . . .28 6

Despite the absence of any general standard for measuring factual basis, the lower courts have consistently required a stronger
showing of factual basis for "equivocal" guilty pleas than for "unequivocal" ones. Most courts characterize a plea as equivocal when
the defendant refuses to admit culpability at the plea hearing. In
North Carolina v. A!ford,281 the Supreme Court considered whether
such a plea could be accepted despite the pleader's protestation of
innocence. Charged with a capital offense, Alford pleaded guilty to
second-degree murder to avoid the death penalty, but he insisted
that he was innocent at the plea hearing. 288 Before accepting Alford's plea, the judge established its factual basis by considering the
sworn testimony of a police officer and two other witnesses. The
judge found that their summary of the prosecution's case presented
sufficient evidence to support a first-degree murder conviction. 289
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of accepting
such a plea despite the defendant's denial of culpability. The Court
explained that
while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of
crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the
imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to
admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.290

Such equivocal pleas could be accepted as long as they were voluntary, intelligent, and supported by a "strong factual basis."291 While
the Court did not define the evidentiary standard to measure a
"strong factual basis," it referred with approval to the state judge's
determination from live testimony that the prosecutor had sufficient
evidence oflegal guilt to warrant a first-degree murder conviction.292
The Court seemed to be suggesting that formal proof requirements
should apply in establishing the factual basis for an equivocal guilty
plea.
At minimum, A!ford's definition of "a strong factual basis" requires a trial court to review the legal sufficiency of the government's
286. Barkai, supra note 247, at 123 (footnote omitted).
287. 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The Court made it clear that it found no difference between a
plea where the defendant protested innocence and a plea where a defendant did not admit
culpability. 400 U.S. at 37.
288. 400 U.S. at 28.
289. 400 U.S. at 28.
290. 400 U.S. at 37.
291. 400 U.S. at 37-38.
292. 400 U.S. at 37-38.
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evidence before accepting a plea.293 That standard serves three distinct p~rposes. First, it protects factually innocent defendants, since
judicial verification of a "strong factual basis" demonstrates that the
government has more than a probable cause basis for believing in
the defendant's factual guilt. The Court felt that a convincing demonstration of a defendant's factual guilt was needed to negate the
protestation of innocence and thereby guard against the spectacle of
an unjust conviction.294 Second, it protects legally innocent defendants who could not possibly be convicted at trial because the government lacks sufficient evidence of legal guilt to reach the jury.
Finally, a judicial determination that the government's evidence
could satisfy a trial's formal proof requirements indicates that the
defendant has intelligently surrendered the right to contest legal guilt
at trial. As the Court noted in Alford, the strong factual basis for the
plea indicated that the defendant "had absolutely nothing to gain by
a trial and much to gain by pleading. Because of the overwhelming
evidence against him, a trial was precisely what neither Alford nor
his attorney desired."29s
Alford reflects the Court's view of the plea as an alternative
mechanism for resolving criminal disputes. Accordingly, the plea's
legitimacy depends in part on the fact that the plea reflects the trial's
probable outcome. The defendant's failure to admit culpability does
not defeat the plea's legitimacy as long as there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the defendant would have been convicted
at trial. 296 However, most federal and state courts have assumed that
293. In Alford, the state trial court actually conducted a mini-trial proceeding before accepting Alford's plea, hearing live testimony from government witnesses before finding that
the government's evidence was legally sufficient to warrant a conviction. Thus, the North
Carolina judge could assess the credibility of the government's witnesses and predict the likelihood of Alford being convicted on that evidence. In effect, the judge was doing more than
testing the legal sufficiency of the charges; he was independently adjudicating disputed facts,
At least one commentator has suggested that such mini-adjudication of guilt be required
before Alford-type pleas are accepted. See Uviller, supra note 17, at 126. I suggest in Section
IV that the grand jury should perform that mini-adjudication for all federal prosecutions.
294. 400 U.S. at 37-38. To "minimize the adverse effects of Alford pleas on public perceptions of the administration of justice," the Justice Department has advised its prosecutors that
they "may wish to ask leave of the court to make a proffer of the evidence . . . [they) could
produce at trial to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Justice J)eparlmenl
Standards, supra note 109, at 3005. Actually, demonstrating a strong factual basis for the plea
cannot "verify the accuracy of the resultant judgment of conviction any more than a jury
verdict can be verified." Uviller, supra note 17, at 126. Instead, it demonstrates that the de•
fendant has intelligently capitulated his right to contest his legal guilt at trial. Id. I agree with
Professor Uviller's analysis, but it raises an interesting question. If the real function of the
strong factual basis standard is to demonstrate that the defendant has intelligently surrendered
the right to contest legal guilt, why shouldn't it apply to all guilty pleas regardless of whether
the defendant admits culpability? See text at notes 298-300 infra.
295. 400 U.S. at 37.
296. 400 U.S. at 38.
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such strict judicial scrutiny of the legal sufficiency of the government's evidence is unnecessary when the defendant admits culpability at the plea hearing. Therefore, they have only applied A!ford's
strong factual-basis standard to those rare pleas where the defendant
protests innocence or refuses to admit guilt.297
In the vast majority of cases, however, a defendant's "voluntary"
admission of culpability at the plea hearing is part of the price the
defendant pays for the plea-bargain. When a defendant offers such
an ''unequivocal" plea by admitting culpability, the courts will usually establish the plea's factual basis by correlating the admitted facts
with the essential elements of the crime. Most courts agree that the
defendant's admission alone satisfies the factual basis requirement298
as long as the defendant receives notice of the essential elements of
the crime.
Judicial treatment of unequivocal guilty pleas reflects the
Supreme Court's dual assumptions that the defendant's admission
reliably demonstrates factual guilt and that the presence of competent counsel ensures that the plea intelligently surrenders the right to
contest legal guilt at trial. Section III has demonstrated why these
assumptions are not always correct. The defendant's admission of
culpability does not necessarily demonstrate factual guilt because defense counsel may have failed to explore the applicability of an affirmative defense that would justify or excuse the defendant's
criminal conduct.299 Since the defendant's admission does not indicate whether the government had sufficient indepenq.ent proof of legal guilt to warrant a conviction, it cannot possibly demonstrate that
the defendant has intelligently surrendered the right to contest legal
guilt at trial. Thus, if the chief risk of an equivocal guilty plea is that
an innocent defendant might plead guilty, several aspects of our pretrial system - the absence of an independent adjudication of factual
or legal guilt before indictment, prosecutorial overcharging, the coercive aspects of plea-bargaining, and the defense attorney's limited
297. See, e.g., Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, I 19-20 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United
States v. Webb, 433 F.2d 400, 403 (1st Cir. 1970). Of course, trial courts will still retain the
discretion to reject the defendant's guilty plea. See Barkai, supra note 247, at 125.
298. Alford requires state courts to establish a factual basis before accepting an equivocal
plea. Many states require a factual basis for unequivocal guilty pleas as well. See Barkai,
supra note 247, at 89 n.6. A recent national study of 25 states found that "in approximately
three fourths of the jurisdictions visited, judges determined factual basis and accuracy of the
plea by simply asking the defendant if he committed the offense to which he had pied."
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 282.
299. See Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923, 931 (5th Cir. 1975); Barkai, supra note
247, at 128-29.
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ability to prepare a defense or predict the trial's outcome - render
many allegedly unequivocal guilty pleas equivocal in fact.
By distinguishing between unequivocal and equivocal guilty
pleas, the courts have permitted most defendants to convict themselves by their own admissions without requiring any government
showing of legal guilt. While we cannot calculate how many factually innocent defendants are convicted through plea-bargaining,
some studies have concluded that a significant percentage of defendants who plead guilty would not have been convicted at trial. As
the author of one such study concluded:
These findings mean that plea-bargaining is expected to increase the
convictions of the factually guilty by reducing the number of criminal
cases that are nolled. As such, plea-bargaining is consistent with the
crime control perspective. Plea-bargaining also increases the conviction of the legally innocent by (1) increasing the conviction of persons
who otherwise would have been dismissed and (2) by substituting
guilty pleas for trials. In this instance, plea-bargaining works against
the normative prescriptions of the due process model. The conflict is
clearly not moot: on the contrary, even though the estimates are approximations, they indicate that conviction of the legally innocent is
likely to incI":ease significantly along with conviction of the factually
guilty.300

Those findings support my conclusion that our criminal justice system cannot rely solely on the defense attorney and on judicial review
of the plea-bargaining process to ensure that the defendant's plea
intelligently surrenders the right to contest legal guilt at trial.
At the very least, the preceeding analysis demonstrates the need
for a factual basis inquiry that tests the legal sufficiency of the government's proof.301 But this reform alone would not cure the
300. PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 72.
301. To provide greater protection to both the factually and legally innocent defendant,
Professor Barkai has proposed that the courts use a directed verdict standard to measure factual basis for all pleas. See Barkai, supra note 247, at 140.
The choice of the directed verdict standard implies that only admissible evidence may be
considered for factual basis purposes. This concern for the quality of proof. , , relates to
the definition of factual and legal innocence. Concern for the admissibility of evidence
would benefit not only the factually innocent defendant, but also the defendant who, although having committed the offense, would be acquitted at trial because of the inadmis:
sibility of the evidence. Since trial - for which the plea is a substitute - would protect
this category of defendants, the plea should do so as well.
Id. at 140-41.
See also U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMN. ON CRIM. JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3.7(8), at Ct.-55 (1973), which precludes acceptance ofa plea if the "admissible evidence is insufficient to support a guilty verdict
on the offense for which the plea is offered, or a related greater offense." Under MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.4(3) (1975), unless a prior judicial determination of
reasonable cause was made at the preliminary hearing, the court cannot accept a guilty plea
until it satisfies itself that reasonable cause exists. Reasonable cause requires more than a
testing of the legal sufficiency of the evidence accomplished by the directed verdict test. While
the directed verdict standard requires the judge to consider the evidence in the light most
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problems described in the first three Sections of this Article. If the
state can satisfy a directed-verdict (or likelihood-of-conviction) test
for factual basis by relying on the defendant's bargained-for admissions, it can still sidestep its accusatorial obligation to develop wellfounded charges against the defendant. 302 Accordingly, A!ford's
strong factual basis standard, which tests the legal sufficiency of the
government's independent proof oflegal guilt, should be applied to
all guilty pleas. However, strengthening the factual basis inquiry in
this manner would still allow the state to bring charges that were not
supported at the time of the formal accusation by sufficient evidence
oflegal guilt to support a conviction.303 To ensure a fair accusatorial
process before guilt is negotiated, the pretrial process must provide
greater protection of the system's legal guilt requirements before the
plea hearing.

I, II, AND III
Our criminal justice system has relied primarily on the trial to
vindicate values at the ideological heart of an accusatorial system.
The presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, lay
participation in the adjudication of guilt, the privilege against selfincrimination, formal proof requirements designed to protect factually and legally innocent defendants - all make their entrance at
trial. Judicial analysis of the pretrial process reflects this reliance on
the trial. With the exception of the prosecutor, courts view pretrial
screeners as making .only interim determinations of factual guilt.
SUMMARY OF SECTIONS

favorable to the government, see United States v. Amato, 495 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1013 (1974), to find reasonable cause the court must determine that there is
sufficient credible evidence to support a guilty verdict. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.5 (1975).
Since Professor Barkai views the factual basis requirement as a safeguard for the defendant, he would permit any accused who is notified of a deficiency in the factual basis to waive
its protection. "Possible sources of the deficiency could be conflicting facts, inference of a legal
defense, a claimed defense, a denial of guilt, a missing element, necessity of inferring specific
intent, inadmissible evidence, or a violation of a constitutional right." Barkai, supra note 247,
at 141 n.329. I believe this waiver rule makes sense as long as the deficiency does not negate
the legal sufficiency of the charges, because defendants should be permitted to conclude that a
plea is in their best interests.
302. For example, Professor Barkai observed that the most reliable method of establishing
the factual basis for defendant's plea "is by direct interrogation of the defendant." Barkai,
supra note 247, at 135. That conclusion is valid ifwe are using the factual basis inquiry only
to assess factual guilt. However, that narrow inquiry does not demonstrate whether the government has shouldered its accusatorial burden of gathering reliable evidence of factual and
legal guilt before it pressured the defendant to plead guilty.
303. Professor Uviller has suggested that "[n]o defendant should [be] called upon to plead
except to a well-founded charge," which he defines as one "where the credible and admissible
evidence is legally sufficient to support a verdict of guilt." Uviller, supra note 17, at 124.
Howev!)r, he would not require that the prosecution's case meet that test before the plea hearing. He concedes that his "suggestion tolerates a guilty plea to a case sufficient at the time of
plea though the charge was lodged at a time when the case suffered gaps in proof." Id.
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Moreover, the courts rely on the trial to ensure that the most powerful pretrial official, the prosecutor, does not abuse that office's investigatory and accusatory powers. Thus, Calandra 304 refused to apply
the exclusionary rule to the grand jury because its application at trial
sufficiently deters improper police behavior. Similarly, Costel!o 305
assumed that the need to prove legal guilt at trial would deter a prosecutor from indicting individuals who could not be convicted.
By confining most legal guilt safeguards to a stage of the process
that most defendants never reach, the courts have seriously diluted
the basic values of our accusatorial system. The first three Sections
of this Article have demonstrated how the collapse of the adjudicatory model for determining guilt has transformed the pretrial process
into far more than an interim screening system. In most cases, pretrial screening decisions by law enforcement officials, the magistrate,
the prosecutor, and the grand jury are the only formal determinations of guilt that are made. Instead of presuming innocence, the
pretrial process presumes guilt. Instead of providing a neutral forum
to adjudicate a defendant's guilt, the pretrial process relies on the ex
parte determination of factual guilt made by the police and the prosecutor. The indictment imprints that presumption of guilt, and the
guilty plea insulates it from those legal guilt requirements at trial
that are meant to vindicate the defendant's constitutional rights. 306
Lay participation in the adjudication of guilt is limited to the grand
jury, which is dominated by the prosecutor. While in theory the
state must develop its case independently, in practice it may use all
its permissible pressures to induce the defendant to plead guilty
before it ever has to present reliable evidence of factual and legal
guilt to an independent adjudicator. As a result, our accusatorial
system "has become more dependent on proving guilt from the defendant's own mouth than any European 'inquisitorial system.' " 307
Of course, it is far easier to describe the problem than to suggest
304. 414 U.S. 338 _(1974). See notes 162-69 supra and accompanying text.
305. 350 U.S. 359 (1956). See notes 142-53 supra and accompanying text.
306. A guilty plea not only waives the government's obligation to prove factual guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, it may also effectively waive the right to appeal various
pretrial motions made and lost before the plea, see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973),
But if. Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 n.2 (1975) (per curiam) (guilty plea does not
necessarily bar a defendant from raising post-plea claim that a legal guilt requirement like the
double jeopardy clause precludes the state from establishing factual guilt in any forum). Judicial approval of "conditional" guilty pleas alleviates some of these defects because the defendant retains the right to appeal certain pretrial rulings affecting his fourth and fifth amendment
rights. See Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 93 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1980). While the conditional plea provides greater protection of those legal guilt requirements, this reform does not
ensure that a reliable and independent adjudication of guilt will be made before application of
the criminal sanction.
307. Alschuler, supra note 13, at 42.
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solutions that stand a chance of enactment. But any attempt to reform our system must begin with a sound analysis of the system's
defects. If we cannot rely solely on the trial to protect our system's
legal guilt requirements, reform proposals must address the basic
question of how our system should protect those accusatorial principles that the trial was designed to vindicate. Section IV suggests that
present reform proposals inadequately answer that question.
IV.

EXISTING REFORM PROPOSALS

One's prescriptions for reform depend upon one's diagnosis of
the problem. Not surprisingly, reformers disagree about the diagnosis and treatment for our system's present ills. For purposes of discussion, I shall distinguish between those proposals that radically
remodel our criminal process and those that build on existing institutions.
A. Radical Proposals for Systemic Reform

I. Abolish Plea-Bargaining308
Since our accusatorial system has relied primarily on the adversarial trial to protect its legal guilt requirements, the most obvious
reform would be to abolish plea-bargaining and guarantee trials for
all defendants. 309 However, when one considers that the trial has not
been used to process most cases in this century,310 such a reform
hardly seems feasible. We simply cannot afford to provide for trials
308. "Plea bargaining is defined as the defendant's agreement to plead guilty to a criminal
charge with the reasonable expectation of receiving some consideration from the state."
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 1-2. That definition includes both explicit bargaining,
where defendants bargain for express considerations from the state such as charge reductions
or sentencing recommendations, and implicit bargaining, where no specific consideration is
negotiated but defendants realize that they will be punished more severely if they go to trial
than if they plead guilty. See D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 60 (1966).
That definition of plea-bargaining recognizes that while defendants entertain reasonable
expectation of securing some consideration for the plea, they may not get one. See PROMIS
STUDY, supra note 33, at 43; Shin, .Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the Sentencing
and Parole Processes, 1 J. CRIM. JusT. 27, 36-42 (1973) (actions of parole board may negate
bargain by delaying release date). Given the widespread practice of prosecutorial
overcharging, charge reductions often create the appearance of a bargain when in fact the
defendant receives a sentence no different from what would follow conviction at trial.
Finally, that definition of plea-bargaining does not specify which criminal justice official
makes the explicit or implicit offer. For example, prosecutors who claim they have abolished
plea-bargaining in their jurisdiction are actually referring to explicit prosecutorial bargaining
with defense counsel for charge or sentencing considerations. But implicit plea-bargaining still
occurs as long as defendants believe they may be treated more leniently if they plead guilty.
See L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 7.
309. See Note, The Unconstitutionality ofPlea-Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1395411 (1970); U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMN. ON CRIM. JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
COURTS 46-49 (1973).
310. See Alschuler, supra note 13, at 5. See generally R. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL
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in all cases unless we are willing to commit far more resources than
are presently allocated to our criminal justice system. 311 If a jurisdiction that relies on plea-bargaining to secure ninety percent of its
convictions decided to cut that reliance to eighty percent, the number
of trials would double312 and trials are far more expensive and time
consuming than guilty pleas for all parties concemed.313 In large
urban districts like New York City,314 the criminal justice system
would collapse if plea-bargaining were abolished.
Even if we could abolish plea-bargaining,315 we should not.
Guilty pleas reduce the delay between arrest and punishment, avoid
costly trials in uncontested cases, and increase the finality with which
the criminal sanction is imposed. Moreover, plea-bargaining would
not subvert our system's legal guilt requirements if sufficient safeguards were provided in the pretrial process to ensure that the parties bargained on equal footing and the resulting plea reliably
approximated the trial's probable outcome. 31 6
2. Inquisitorial Reforms - The Investigatory Magistrate and the
Non-Adversarial Trial

Those who would abolish plea-bargaining see the adversarial
PROSECUTION 149-92 (1929); Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW &
SocY. REv. 247 (1979); Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REV. I (1927).
311. To suggest that we cannot afford trials in all cases does not mean the rise of pleabargaining as the dominant method of guilt determination can be explained purely in economic terms. See, e.g., Langbein, Understanding the Short History ofPlea Bargaining, 13 LAW
& SocY. REV. 261 (1979).
312. See Burger, Stale of the Judiciary, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 931 (1970).
313. For example, a California study found that state jury trials took 24.2 hours on the
average and cost the state over $3,000. Guilty pleas, which require far less preparation time
for defense counsel and prosecution, were processed in about 15 minutes and cost $215. See
PROMIS STUDY, supra note 33, at 51.
314. However, recent statewide data compiled in a national study on plea-bargaining suggest that "the population of the jurisdiction may not be related to the guilty plea rate."
L.E.A.A. STUDY, supra note 26, at 18. Substantial differentials in the guilty plea rates of different jurisdictions with comparable populations within the same state suggest that higher trial
rates might be possible without increasing costs. Id. at 23.
315. Reports of the death of plea-bargaining in certainjurisdictions have been greatly exaggerated. In many jurisdictions, explicit charge or sentencing bargaining by the prosecutor's
office has been sharply curtailed but implicit bargaining still occurs. See id. at 8-15.
316. See Church, supra note 65. Church argues that plea-bargaining need not subvert
rational sentencing goals or coerce the defendant to waive the right to trial if the system includes four requirements:
(1) The defendant must always have the alternative of a jury trial at which both verdict
and sentence are determined and can be justified solely on the merits of the case.
(2) The defendant must be represented throughout negotiations by competent counsel.
(3) Both defense and prosecution must have equal access to all available information
likely to bear on the outcome of the case should it go to trial. (4) Both should possess
sufficient resources to take the case to trial if an acceptable agreement does not result from
the negotiations.
Id at 512-13.
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trial as the solution to our current problems. Other scholars see the
adversarial process as the cause of our present ills, not their solution.317 They charge that instead of admitting that the adversarial
trial is too cumbersome to process a high volume of cases with limited resources, our system preserves the accusatorial model in form
while relying in substance upon an inadequate nontrial procedure plea-bargaining. One consequence of this "subterfuge"318 is that our
informal procedures provide less protection of our system's legal
guilt requirements than could be achieved by developing a more
workable system to adjudicate guilt. While our formal system reflects accusatorial values, our informal procedures rely primarily on
the official determination of guilt made by state officials, a basic
characteristic of inquisitorial systems.319 But the dominant official in
our system is the prosecutor,320 whereas inquisitorial systems rely
more on judicial officials to ensure that guilt will be determined in a
manner that satisfies the substantive and procedural goals of the systems. 321
Proponents of the inquisitorial model suggest that we explicitly
abandon the adversarial system and replace it with some of the best
features of continental criminal procedure. Professor Weinreb has
proposed that we strip the police of all investigatory powers beyond
those incidental to their peace-keeping and emergency functions. 322
He would also divest the prosecutor of all investigatory, accusatory, and adjudicative duties. 323 A judicial officer, the investigatory
magistrate,324 would assume all of those powers. Patterned after
France's juge d' instruction, the investigating magistrate would conduct an official inquiry to determine whether the accused is guilty,
considering any probative evidence and questioning the accused in a
noncoercive manner. A defense attorney and the prosecutor would
317. See L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 82; Langbein, supra note 12, at 20-21.
318. Langbein, supra note 12, at 20-21:
But subterfuges are intrinsically overbroad, precisely because they are not framed in a
careful, explicit, and principled manner directed to achieving a proper balance between
repression and safeguard. The upshot is that the criminal justice system is saddled with a
lower level of safeguard than it could and would have achieved if it had not pretended to
retain the unworkable formal system.
319. See notes 4-5 supra.
320. Our criminal justice system has relied on the trial to check the prosecutor's broad
powers. The trial also insured a proper division of responsibilities, as the prosecutor would be
responsible for the charging decision, the jury would adjudicate the defendant's guilt, and the
judge would determine the appropriate sentence. Plea-bargaining merges all of these functions
and delegates them to the prosecutor. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 18.
321. Id
322. L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 118-19.
323. See note 320 supra.
324. L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 122-31.
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suggest witnesses or lines of inquiry. Thus, instead of two partisan
investigations designed to produce evidence favorable to a particular
party, one official investigation would determine the truth. 325 The
magistrate would prepare a complete evidentiary record Or dossier)
to substantiate all :findings. Prosecutorial discretion in filing charges
would be eliminated as the magistrate would make all charging decisions. Instead of a prosecutor bringing the most serious charges that
could possibly apply, the magistrate would formally accuse only if
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt for the
specific crime charged.326
Once the magistrate concluded the investigation and filed
charges, Weinreb and Langbein327 suggest that the case should proceed quickly to a nonadversarial trial. Plea-bargaining would be
abolished. 328 The charge would reflect the crimes for which the state
sought conviction, and a defendant's confession would not negate
the state's obligation to adjudicate guilt fairly and carefully at trial.
A presiding judge would direct the presentation of evidence. The
defense attorney and the prosecutor would advise the court by suggesting witnesses, lines of inquiry, and ways to interpret the evidence. A mixed panel of professional and lay members would then
adjudicate the defendant's guilt.329
If such inquisitorial safeguards function as advertised, they are
attractive because they provide for lay participation in a neutral
body that adjudicates the defendant's guilt. However, I must agree
with Dean Norval Morris that these proposals do not offer a politically realistic solution to our present dilemma because their enactment would require a radical restructuring of our entire criminal
process. 330 Although our system already contains inquisitorial elements,331 these inquisitorial reforms would alter the traditional legal
roles of the American prosecutor332 and the defense counsel by dras325. Id at 133.
326. Id at 134-37.
327. See Langbein, supra note 12, at 22. See generally J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIM·
INAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977); Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 38.
328. See L. WEINREB, supra note 12, at 138.
329. Id at 137-44.
330. Morris, supra note 41, at 1368-69.
331. See Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal
Procedure, 26 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1009, 1018 (1974).
332. For example, the effectiveness of West Germany's compulsory prosecution rule,
which requires the prosecutor to bring charges for which there is a sufficient factual and legal
basis, rests in part upon the special career role and training of the West German prosecutor.
The prosecutorial staff is "a career service with strictly meritocratic promotion standards."
Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining- How the Germans l)o It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204,
211 (1979). "German prosecutors undergo periodic departmental review on a variety of fac-
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tically curtailing their powers and importance. Moreover, the career
patterns and training of our judiciary would have to change because
we presently have no analogue to the career role of the European
judiciary.333 As Morris has remarked, "the outcry from those who
have settled themselves into careers based on the old procedural system would coalesce with the force of general institutional inertia to
make such reforms unlikely."334
At the very least, proponents of such radical change bear the burden of persuading the body politic that the inquisitorial safeguards
function as described. The current academic controversy over those
safeguards' effectiveness in controlling police investigations and limiting prosecutorial discretion suggests that this burden has not yet
be~n met.335 While proponents insist that their description of inquisitorial procedures is not idealized,336 other scholars have concluded
that the pure inquisitorial model describes the continental systems'
processing of most cases no more accurately than the due process,
accusatorial model describes our system's performance.337
tors including dispatch in handling caseloads (~eluding dismissals as well as prosecution);
intra-office relations; legal analysis and drafting; and avoidance of judicial rebuke and citizen
complaint." Id. at 217. Citizen complaints may occur where the victim of a crime challenges
the prosecutor's decision not to prosecute. The victim of the crime may first obtain departmental review of the prosecutor's no-go decision. If the department supports the prosecutor, the
citizen may then appeal to the courts to compel the prosecution. The prosecutor's desire to
keep his personnel record free of citizen complaints or judicial rebuke provides a strong incentive to abide by the compulsory prosecution rule.
While Langbein concedes that the American system lacks "the procedural institutions" that
would permit adoption of a compulsory prosecution rule, he stresses the absence of a "workable trial procedure" as the major procedural obstacle to implementing such a rule. Id. at 212.
However, the American system also lacks the institutional analogue to the West German
prosecutorial system itself. Moreover, serious constitutional questions concerning the separation of powers doctrine would be posed by any reform that empowered American courts to
compel the prosecutor to bring a prosecution. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v.
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
333. Morris, supra note 41, at 1369.
334. Id.
335. Compare Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977), with Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 38.
336. Professor Langbein has cited West Germany's system as an example of how "advanced industrial societies can institute efficient criminal procedures that nevertheless provide
for lay participation and for full adjudication in every case of serious crime." Langbein, supra
note 12, at 21. Although no plea-bargaining occurs for serious crimes, confessions are still
tendered "not because they are rewarded, but because there is no advantage to be wrung from
the procedural system by withholding them." Id. at 22. While such confessions abbreviate the
time of the trial, trials without confessions do not take appreciably greater time because the
procedure is "shorn of all the excesses of adversary procedure and the law of evidence." Id.
337. See Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 335. The authors contend that the pure inquisitorial model greatly exaggerates the role of judicial supervision in the pretrial process for most
cases. In France, the juge d'instruction's examination is mandatory only for serious crimes. In
the vast majority of criminal prosecutions for less serious offenses called de/its, the prosecutor
has the discretion to order a judicial examination but rarely exercises it. The prosecutor can
also circumvent the mandatory examination for serious crimes by treating them as de/its. For
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That discrepancies may exist between the inquisitorial model and
its day-to-day functioning should not be surprising. With the exception of Professor Herbert Packer's crime control model,338 models of
example, the authors report that in 1971 only 14.5% of all crimes and de/its were considered by
ajuge d'instruction. Id at 250-51. Moreover, they claim that the inquisitorial model exaggerates the degree of judicial control exercised over the police's investigation for those cases that
receive judicial examination. They suggest that in most cases the investigation is completed by
the police befqre the case is sent to the juge d'instruction. Even where the investigation has not
been completed before it is sent to the juge d'instruction, a judicial examination
generally means only that a judge must formally authorize certain aspects of the criminal
investigation in advance - for example, the length of the detention, the interrogation, the
search, the medical tests. But ... this authorization often occurs after the fact and confirms the validity of "informal" measures already taken by the police. The judge's investigative role, therefore, is essentially reactive and interstitial.
Id at 250. Thus the "overwhelming proportion of de/its is likely to proceed to trial with a
dossier that is little more than a police report," id at 255, because the judges do not carefully
screen the dossiers to determine whether the charges were supported by sufficient evidence,
Id at 263. Given these findings, the authors contend that pretrial judicial supervision in most
cases does not function as effectively as its proponents suggest. Id. at 263-64. Indeed, they
conclude that "[i]n Continental systems, as in ours, truth is pursued in most cases in much the
same way: police gather facts, put them into a file, and through processes of acquiescence and
consensus, the file and the prosecutor's characterization of it usually govern the result." Id. at
280-81.
Goldstein and Marcus also argue that the absence of careful judicial pretrial screening is
not cured by the nonadversarial trial that follows. While the inquisitorial model assumes that
the court will aggressively pursue the truth, "genuinely probing trials take place only in those
few cases in which the defendant actively contests the charges against him." Id. at 265. For
the majority of cases where the defendant admits guilt or does not contest culpability, the
nonadversarial trial offers a public recapitulation of the dossier's findings. Id. at 266. In
France, the presiding judge at the correctional court that hears all de/its, id. at 250-5 I, need not
call witnesses if their statements are contained in the dossier. Id. at 266 & n.26. In Germany,
the defendant can secure a noncustodial sentence by admitting the commission of a minor
offense. The defendant can then be dealt with by a "penal order'' that allows the court to
convict without any trial at all. "At least one-half of all criminal cases are disposed of by this
direct analogue of the American guilty plea." Id. at 267. In other words, implicit bargaining
can and does occur because defendants know that they can receive more lenient treatment
when their cooperation enables the prosecutor to handle the case summarily. Bui see
Langbein, supra note 332. Langbein argues that the analogy between American plea-bargaining and the nonpenal order is exceedingly misleading. First, the nonpenal order only applies
to those misdemeanor prosecutions where imprisonment is not an issue. Second, it lacks the
most coercive aspect of American plea-bargaining: the sentencing differential bet~een conviction by plea and conviction after trial. While the West German prosecutor is not formally
precluded from recommending a stiffer penalty after trial than that offered in a penal order
that the accused rejected, interviews with German defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges
provide no evidence that such a sentencing differential exists. Id. at 215.
338. As Professor Goldstein points out, Packer's crime control model "is less a procedural
model than a ge_neral tendency to resist legal restraints in the pursuit of highly desired ends."
Goldstein, supra note 331, at 1015. Its major goal is to repress criminal conduct by applying
the criminal sanctions to defendants that the police and prosecutor determine are probably
factually guilty. While it describes some central themes of how our pretrial process determines
guilt in most cases, it does not present a completely accurate picture.
While factual guilt concerns predominate, pretrial officials will consider legal guilt requirements at least informally. Even if the legality of police conduct in securing evidence is not
litigated, defense counsel may use the possibility of raising a successful suppression motion to
get a more lenient bargain from the prosecutor. Although the prosecutor is not required to
present a prima facie case of legal guilt to the grand jury, many conscientious prosecutors will
not seek indictments unless they can satisfy such a standard. Courts can rely on a defendant's
admission to an offense to satisfy the factual basis requirement, but a few courts have inquired
into possible constitutional violations, see Clicque v. United States, 514 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.
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criminal procedure usually describe how guilt is adjudicated when a
case receives the full process of the system. But no system of justice
has the resources necessary to vindicate the principles of its full process in all prosecutions. The inquisitorial principles of compulsory
prosecution and judicial supervision, as well as the accusatorial principle of an adversarial adjudication, demand the impossible. "Inevitably, adjustments must be made in the way in which the principle is
to be applied; where formal law or ideology does not permit these
adjustments, informal processes are created that do." 339
Our present models of criminal procedure inadequately describe
how informal processes compromise the system's principles. Accordingly, institutional reform cannot be simplistically reduced to a
choice between alternative models. The strong inquisitorial themes
in our pretrial system should not compel us to borrow inquisitorial
safeguards or to purify our accusatorial model by requiring adversarial trials in all cases.
Since any criminal justice system must compromise principles
that would be vindicated through its full process, the critical question for reformers is how to mold a more summary process of guilt
adjudication that accommodates the competing concerns of repressing criminal conduct and respecting individual rights. The next
Subsection and Section V propose reforms that use existing pretrial
procedures to provide greater protection of our system's legal guilt
requirements without sacrificing some of the valuable benefits of
plea-bargaining such as speed, efficiency, and finality.

B. Reforming Pretrial Procedures
To protect accusatorial values, the government should be required to present reliable evidence of a defendant's factual and legal
guilt to a neutral screener when it files charges. Such a requirement
would limit the prosecutor's discretion in filing charges. It would
also prevent the state from imposing the indictment's moral stigma,
economic sanctions, and potential loss of liberty upon defendants
who could not be convicted at trial. Finally, this requirement would
preclude conviction without adjudication because the state would be
forced to make an independent and reliable demonstration of the
defendant's guilt before securing the defendant's conviction through
plea-bargaining.
Because few people take the grand jury's screening function seri1975), or affirmative defenses, see Carreon v. United States, 578 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir. 1978),
before accepting the plea.
339. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 335, at 280.
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ously,340 most commentators341 have selected the preliminary hearing as the ideal forum to effectuate these types of reforms. The
magistrate would protect defendants who could not be convicted at
trial by applying a "reasonable cause"342 standard. A .finding of reasonable cause would be an adequate substitute for full adjudication
at trial because the adversarial hearing would permit the defendant
to expose flaws in the prosecution's case. The magistrate would also
be able to determine whether the state had complied with other relevant legal guilt requirements. 343 Finally, the preliminary hearing
would offer the defendant an opportunity to discover the prosecution's case, preserve the testimony ofwitnesses,344 and, if transcribed,
provide an evidentiary foundation for a subsequent guilty plea.
This reform would require major changes in how most jurisdic340. See notes 385-86 infta and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.1 (1975) (defendant's right to preliminary hearing cannot be preempted by indictment); Anderson, The Pre•
liminary Hearing - Better Alternatives or More of the Same?, 35 Mo. L. REV. 281, 284-86
(1970); Graham & Letwin, supra note 18; Robison, The .Determination of Probable Cause in
Illinois- Grand Jury or Preliminary Hearing, 7 LoY. CHI. L.J. 931 (1976); Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis ofSection JOJ
ofthe Federal Magistrates Act of1968, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1361, 1368-79 (1969); Comment, The
Preliminary Examination in the Federal System: A Proposalfor a Rule Change, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 1416 (1968).
342. To find reasonable cause, the magistrate must find sufficient evidence to support a
guilty verdict and find it credible. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 330.6(3) (1975). Therefore, reasonable cause is a more stringent screening standard than the
directed-verdict test that requires the screener to consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government.
Both the directed verdict and reasonable cause standards protect legally innocent defendants because they evaluate the legal sufficien_cy of the government's evidence. I believe the
reasonable cause standard should be used because it empowers magistrates to make their own
credibility judgments. Since the preliminary hearing will be the only opportunity for adjudication of most defendants' legal guilt in information jurisdictions, the presiding official should be
able to resolve factual disputes that involve credibility questions. See Jones v. Superior Court,
4 Cal. 2d 660, 666, 483 P.2d 1241, 1244-45, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289, 293-94 (1971) (magistrate can
properly dismiss rape charges when he believes defendant's testimony that the prosecutrix had
consented despite contrary account given by prosecutrix); Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass.
843, 853, 298 N.E.2d 819, 826 (1973). C.f. Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Needfar J)ue
Process and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 441. Thaler proposes a "probable guilt" hearing whose purpose "is to obtain a more accurate determination of
legal guilt before an accused can be further detained for trial." Id. at 473-74. At this hearing,
"the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial likelihood of
conviction." Id. at 474.
Unlike my proposal, which seeks to improve the quality of pretrial adjudication of legal
guilt for all prosecutions, Thaler is more concerned with protecting the due process rights of
defendants who are incarcerated before trial. Therefore, his probable guilt hearing does not
replace the preliminary hearing and is only held for those who remain incarcerated after their
bail has been determined. Id. at 481-82.
343. For example, the magistrate could rule on suppression motions before the start of the
preliminary hearing. If evidence was suppressed, the magistrate would not consider it in deter•
mining whether the government had sufficient evidence to hold the defendant for trial. See
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.3 (1975); Note, supra note 60, at 780.
344. See notes 60-62 supra.
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tions conduct their preliminary hearings. As Section I noted, the
federal preliminary examination presently screens only factual
guilt.345 Unrestricted by rules of evidence, the hearing determines
only whether there is probable cause to hold the defendant for further action. While most states use the preliminary examination as
their major pretrial screening device, many use the same probablecause-to-arrest standard employed at the federal level346 and therefore do not apply the rules of evidence to the hearing.347 Obviously,
the preliminary hearing cannot protect legal guilt requirements if it
applies such a minimal factual guilt standard.
Accordingly, most state jurisdictions would have to adopt the following reforms if they wished to use the preliminary hearing as a
legal guilt screening device:
(1) Apply the rules of evidence, with certain limited exceptions, to the
hearing. 348
(2) Permit the defense to raise suppression motions before or during
the hearing so the magistrate's screening decision is not influenced by illegally seized evidence.349
(3) Require the prosecutor to present credible350 evidence on every
element of the crime (the reasonable-cause standard).351
345. See text at notes 94-98 supra.
346. The quantum of evidence of the screening standard applicable to the preliminary
hearing is usually stated in terms of probable cause but is not further defined. Because the
same term is used to state the standard applicable to arrests and because the hearing often
serves the function of reviewing the legality of the arrest in addition to screening cases for
trial, the two standards are often confused and many courts apply the arrest standard to
the preliminary hearing.
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.5, at 596-97 (1975). See generally
Note, The Rules of Evidence as a Factor in Probable Cause in Grand Jury Proceedings and
Preliminary Examinations, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 102, 119-24.
347. See Comment, Preliminary Examination - Evidence and .Due Process, 15 KAN. L.
REV. 374, 376-77 (1967). Cf. F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, M. MELLI & H.
GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 563 (1969) (citing an American Bar Foundation report that concludes that rules of evidence are generally applied regardless of whether
they are formally required by law).
348. See Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 849 n.6, 298 N.E.2d 819, 824 n.6 (1973);
Note, supra note 60, at 779-80. While the rules of evidence should generally apply so the
magistrate can evaluate legal guilt, exceptions could be made. For example, hearsay evidence
may be admitted if the magistrate determines that it is reliable, that it would be unduly burdensome to produce the primary evidence at the hearing, and that competent evidence would
be presented at trial to provide the testimony furnished by the hearsay. See MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(4) (1975). See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. §§
180.60(8), 190.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979) (permitting the admission of certain scientific reports). However, mere inconvenience should not by itself justify admitting a hearsay account
of a critical government witness's testimony that is contested by the defendant. Otherwise, the
defendant's confrontation rights would be easily nullified.
349. See State v. Jacobsen, 106 Ariz. 129, 130, 471 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1970); Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 815, 330 P.2d 39, 41 (1958); People v. Walker, 385 Mich. 565, 57475, 189 N.W.2d 234, 238-39 (1971). See also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.3 (1975).
350. See note 356 infra.
351. See note 342 supra.
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Permit defendants to cross-examine the government's witnesses,352 subpoena witnesses,353 and present testimony in their
own behalf,354 including evidence of an affirmative defense. 355
(5) Permit dismissal of the charges if the magistrate disbelieves the
prosecution's essential witnesses.356
The major obstacles to implementing these reforms are their expense, the pretrial delay they might generate, and the administrative
burdens they would impose on prosecutors, defense counsel, and the
courts. While proponents of these reforms can point to the successful experience of those states357 that use their preliminary hearing to
screen legal guilt, essential differences between state and federal pretrial screening systems make these reforms far less feasible for the
federal system.
(4)

I. State Reform -

Remodeling the Preliminary Hearing

Since most states already rely on the preliminary hearing to
screen most criminal prosecutions,358 using it and not the grand jury
to protect legal guilt requirements before trial makes considerable
352. Most jurisdictions permit defendants to cross-examine government witnesses, but
some do not permit them to confront witnesses not called by the prosecution. Note, supra note
60, at 778 n.28.
353. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(5) (1975). Bui see
Note, The Preliminary Hearing - An Interest Analysis, 51 IOWA L. REV. 164, 170 (1965)
(While the accused has the right to introduce witnesses in his own behalf, a controversy exists
as to whether the accused has the right to have witnesses summoned. To circumvent the problem, some courts have held that magistrates lack authority to subpoena witnesses).
354. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 866 (West 1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.1; MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(5) (1975); Note, supra note 60, at 781.
While many jurisdictions permit the defendant to offer testimony, this right may be negated in practice. Some magistrates end the hearing at the close of the government's case
because they are satisfied that the government has established probable cause. See id. at 77778 n.27. This proposal would prohibit that practice as the magistrate would be required to
consider all evidence including any presented by the defendant. See Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 851, 298 N.E.2d 819, 824 (1973).
355. See Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 879-80, 428 P.2d 304, 312-13, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 440, 448-49 (1967) (entrapment); Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 851, 298
N.E.2d 819, 825 (1973); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.4(5) (1975);
Note, supra note 60, at 781.
356. Defendants' right to cross-examine government witnesses or introduce evidence on
their own behalf, including affirmative defenses, would serve little purpose if the magistrate
was precluded from making any credibility judgment. See Note, supra note 60, at 782-83. See
also Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 851, 298 N.E.2d 819, 825-26 (1973). The hearing should not only assure the legal sufficiency of the charge but also preliminarily adjudicate
the defendant's guilt. Thus, magistrates must have the power to dismiss a charge where they
disbelieve testimony that would satisfy a directed-verdict standard.
357. Massachusetts has adopted all of these reforms. See Myers v. Commonwealth, 363
Mass. 843, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973). California's preliminary examination approximates this
model.
358. See note 43 supra. Even in those jurisdictions that require prosecution by indictment
for all felonies, defendants usually receive a preliminary hearing before their case is considered by a grand jury. While most state courts have held that the return of the indictment
eliminates the need for the preliminary hearing, see, e.g., Lataille v. District Court, 366 Mass.
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sense. Since preliminary examinations already take place in most
cases, requiring them for all prosecutions would not impose intolerable financial or administrative burdens.359 Furthermore, the grand
jury's screening function would be duplicated only in the few cases
that were initiated by indictment. Therefore, the only significant obstacles to this reform would be the timing of the hearing and the
added costs of expanding the hearing's scope, both of which appear
surmountable.
a.

Timing

Most jurisdictions require a preliminary examination soon after
arrest360 so that the magistrate can promptly determine the legality
of the defendant's custody. At first glance, this seems to pose a problem: the later the hearing, the less fourth amendment protection it
provides,361 but a hearing held promptly after arrest might prevent
the prosecutor from preparing an adequate case of legal guilt. Nevertheless, both these timing concerns may be accommodated. The
fourth amendment could be satisfied by the magistrate's ex parte
finding of probable cause for arrest at the defendant's initial appearance.362 A defense attorney wishing to challenge the arrest could
525, 320 N.E.2d 877 (1974); State v. Boykin, 113 N.J. Super. 594, 274 A.2d 620 (Law Div.
1971),
[S]tate prosecutors generally do not follow the common federal practice of "mooting"
almost all scheduled preliminary hearings by obtaining a prior indictment. In many jurisdictions that practice would not be feasible since the grand jury is not available for
prompt consideration of requested charges . . . . In other jurisdictions, where grand jury
review would be available at the same point as the preliminary hearing, the hearing presumably is not mooted because of its significant screening role.
Y. KAMISAR, w. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 43, at 975.
Accordingly, my proposal to use the preliminary hearing to screen legal guilt applies to all
those indictment jurisdictions where preliminary hearings are held before indictment in the
majority of prosecutions. To avoid duplicated screening, the defendant's election to receive a
preliminary hearing should waive the right to grand jury screening unless indictment by grand
jury is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived. See MODEL CoDE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.1(3) (1975).
359. The California Supreme Court has held that all indictees are entitled to post-indictment preliminary hearings to insure that indictees receive the same procedural rights accorded
to defendants who are charged by an information followed by a preliminary hearing. Hawkins
v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d 916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978). In a concurring
opinion, Justice Mosk noted that such a requirement would not be unduly burdensome to the
state because only 3.9% of felony filings were prosecuted by indictment in California. "The
actual duplication of prosecutorial effort and administrative burden resulting from providing
indicted defendants with a preliminary hearing would thus be minimal." 22 Cal. 3d at 606,
586 P.2d at 930, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
360. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 276 § 38 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1968) (the hearing
must be held "as soon as may be" after the defendant's initial appearance); Wis. STAT.
§ 970.03(2) (1977) (hearing must be held within 10 days of the defendant's initial appearance if
in custody; within 20 days otherwise).
361. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
362. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123-25 (1975).
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still do so at the preliminary examination. Moreover, in routine state
prosecutions,363 neither the prosecutor nor the defense attorney
should need more than twenty days to prepare for the preliminary
hearing.
b. Administrative burdens

A more serious objection is that this proposal would convert the
preliminary examination into a mini-trial, imposing intolerable administrative burdens on the courts and generating further delay. But
the fear of turning preliminary hearings into mini-trials is unfounded: tactical considerations would usually lead defense attorneys to use the hearing as a discovery mechanism.364 Most
defendants do not present a defense at the preliminary hearing because they do not want to disclose their case to the prosecutor or
expose their witnesses to searching cross-examination. 365 The experience of those few jurisdictions that use their hearings to screen legal guilt suggests that the added costs and delay are tolerable.366
363. A more serious objection might arise in complex criminal prosecutions: an early
hearing that screens legal guilt may deter prosecutors from arresting any suspects until they
have developed a prima facie case. But since the prosecutor will probably be involved in the
investigation of such complex cases, this delay really does not prejudice the prosecutor.
364. See F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATI, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL TRIALS
18-19 (1971).
365. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 197 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Myers v.
Co=onwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 856, 298 N.E.2d 819, 829 (1973); 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 5.102(3], at 5.1-12 (rev. 2d ed. 1979).
366. For example, California municipal courts handled 48,601 felony filings in 1965-1966.
16,200 cases were disposed of by guilty pleas or dismissals without any hearing. 31,896 involved hearings at which the defendant did not contest the state's evidence. People v. Gibbs,
255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 743 n.2, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 n.2 (1967).
·
Admittedly, these statistics do not conclusively demonstrate the preliminary hearing's suitability for screening legal guilt for several reasons. First, they refer to a time period when
indicted defendants had no right to a preliminary hearing. Accordingly, California could expect at least a 4% increase in the number of hearings after its decision that mandated postindictment preliminary hearings. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 586 P.2d
916, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1978). But this minimal increase in the number of hearings conducted
is not the only cost. California prosecutors often use indictments in complex criminal prosecutions with multiple defendants. 22 Cal. 3d at 606, 586 P.2d at 930, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 449 (Mosk,
J., concurring). Therefore, "the relatively small number of indictments might yield a disproportionate increase in consumed court time because complex cases ... would require relatively lengthy adversary hearings." 22 Cal. 3d at 606, 586 P.2d at 930, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 449
(Mosk, J., concurring).
Justice Mosk suggested that those additional burdens might be offset by the fact that these
hearings "would likely yield a greater number of dismissals or guilty pleas as the parties would
have a superior opportunity to appraise the relative strengths and weaknesses of their portions." 22 Cal. 3d at 606, 586 P .2d at 930, 150 Cal. Rpir. at 449 (Mosk, J,, concurring). Moreover, the rules governing the conduct of the preliminary hearing can alleviate this concern.
For example, hearsay testimony could be used under certain limited circumstances to remove
undue inconvenience or unnecessary delay. See note 347 supra. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PRE•
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.4(6) (1975) (court can promote expeditious hearing by limiting length of examination and the number of witnesses to be called).
Even if these safeguards limiting the scope of the hearing prove ineffective and the result-
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2. Federal Reform

Using the federal preliminary examination to screen legal guilt
faces similar objections of expense, administrative burden, and pretrial delay, but the objections carry far greater force. Unlike most
states, the federal system relies primarily on the grand jury, and not
the preliminary hearing, to screen prosecutions because the fifth
amendment367 requires that all federal prosecutions for felonies
commence by indictment.368 In contrast to most states,369 only about
twenty percent of federal prosecutions involve preliminary examinations because370 most defendants are indicted before the hearing is
ing administrative burdens are not offset by an increase in dismissals or guilty pleas, increasing
the scope of the hearing would probably not impose intolerable costs and delay. Expanding
the hearing's scope might demand more preparation time by the prosecutor and the defense
attorney and increase the time spent at the hearing by all participants. But a significant increase in the number of hearings would be far more expensive because of the increased need
for prosecutors, defense counsels, and judges.
I have not discovered any empirical data that compares the expense and duration of preliminary hearings that screen factual guilt (probable cause) with those that screen legal guilt
(directed verdict). My own observations as a criminal defense attorney in Massachusetts
before and after Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973), lead me to
conclude that the additional time and expense is not unduly burdensome. Before Myers, some
district court judges conducted the preliminary hearing like its federal counterpart. Police
officers gave hearsay summaries of the prosecution's witnesses over the defense counsel's objections. Some judges would end the hearing before the defense had an opportunity to crossexamine witnesses or introduce testimony. After Myers, those practices were clearly illegal.
Accordingly, preliminary hearings in these courts were somewhat longer because the court
could not end the hearing prematurely after testimony of one government witness. However,
defense counsel rarely raised affirmative defenses. Indeed, defense testimony was rarely offered. Post-Myers hearings were somewhat longer than pre-Myers hearings because defense
counsel had a greater opportunity to discover the prosecution's case.
367. See note 45 supra.
368. The fifth amendment requires indictment for all "infamous" crimes. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 7(a) equates an infamous crime with an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a), Advisory Comm. Note I. All crimes punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year are felonies; all other crimes are misdemeanors. While the fifth amendment does not require indictments for misdemeanors,
prosecutors may commence prosecutions for misdemeanors by either indictment or information. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
The indictment requirement for felonies cannot be waived in a capital case. See Smith v.
United States, 360 U.S. I (1959). Defendants are permitted to waive the indictment requirement for other felonies, see Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
816 (1947), and defendants who have decided to plead guilty frequently do waive,indictment.
See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 7.03(1), at 7-9 (rev. 2d ed. 1979). The prosecutor may
proceed by filing an information for any misdemeanor and any noncapital felony in which
indictment has been waived. Id. ~ 7.02, at 7-7.
369. Many states permit the prosecutor to proceed on an information that will be followed
by a preliminary hearing. See note 43 supra. Even in some jurisdictions that require an indictment for all felonies, the defendant-receives a preliminary hearing before the grand jury
considers the case. See note 358 supra.
370. In fiscal year 1976, 24,991 criminal prosecutions were commenced by indictment,
12,278 were commenced by information where indictment was waived, and 11,543 were commenced by information. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, Table 37,254 (1977). Preliminary examinations were conducted in only 5,502
cases. Id. at 122. In the Southern District of New York, 1,129 original criminal prosecutions
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held and the indictment obviates the need for the hearing.371 Therefore, a reform that mandates preliminary hearings for all federal
prosecutions would be far more expensive for the federal system
than for the states. While some defendants would decide to plead
guilty before the hearing, it is unlikely that the hearing's stiffened
standard of proof will increase the number of pleas that are presently
made before the hearing. Indeed, a more rigorous standard of proof
should encourage defendants to delay bargaining until the government passes this preliminary hurdle. 372 Any significant rise in the
number of hearings held would require a tremendous increase in the
prosecutorial, defense, and judicial resources presently expended.
This proposal would also clash with Congress's commitment to guarantee federal defendants a speedy trial: 373 pretrial delay would be
lengthened by the increased number of preliminary examinations374
(including misdemeanors and petty offenses) were filed, id at 358, Table DIAC, and only one
preliminary examination was conducted, id at 293, Table 51.
371. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
312. Contra, Note, supra note 60, at 791. The Note argues that the federal preliminary
hearing should screen legal guilt. Though conceding that "the expense might well be intolerable," if every felony defendant in the federal system were given such a hearing, the author
suggests that most defendants who now plead guilty before trial would probably plead guilty
before this hearing was conducted. Id That prediction is based on the author's belief that the
government will have little to gain by bargaining once the prosecutor "has gone to the trouble
of producing sufficient evidence to avoid a direct acquittal and has generally memorialized its
case." Id
That argument ignores several reasons why defendants would exercise their right to a preliminary examination. First, if the hearing is held promptly after arrest and before the case is
sent to the grand jury, many defense attorneys will use the hearing as a discovery device to
determine the strength of the government's case. Second, although the government may pass
this directed-verdict hurdle at the hearing, conviction at trial is not a foregone conclusion.
Witnesses might change their testimony; evidence might be lost or suppressed. Moreover, a
magistrate's determination at this early stage that there is sufficient evidence of legal guilt to
support a conviction does not mean that the same evidence will convince a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Finally, the strength of the prosecution's case is not the only factor that
fosters plea-bargaining. A defendant's plea after the hearing will still spare prosecutors considerable effort and expense preparing for trial. Admittedly, the defendant's negotiating position will be weaker after the prosecutor passes this hurdle, but an incentive to bargain remains.
373. 18 u.s.c. §§ 3161-3174 (1976).
314. See note 370 supra. Proponents of reform measures such as H.R. 94, which calls for
preliminary hearings in all federal prosecutions, have suggested that such a reform is a compromise. They insist that requiring preliminary hearings in all cases would be less time-consuming than those grand jury reform bills that "have suggested 'mini-trials' at which a
defendant would have the right to object to the sufficiency of the evidence[,] the admissibility
of the evidence, and other legal improprieties before the grand jury . . . ." 1977 Hearings, pt.
2, supra note 108, at 1593 (Memorandum by Alfred M. Little and Martin H. Belsky). Supporters assert that H.R. 94 would not mandate such mini-trials but would rather apply the existing
machinery, (the preliminary examination) to insure that the prosecutor has sufficient admissible evidence to proceed to trial. Id That argument overlooks that the existing machinery is
rarely used and that using it for most federal prosecutions would dramatically increase pretrial
delay.
Ironically, the proponents of H.R. 94 have retained the hearing's probable cause to arrest
standard even though they intended the hearing to screen legal guilt. Id at 1593-94.
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and by the expanded scope of the hearing. 375
Finally, the reform inflicting these costs would duplicate the
grand jury's screening function for most federal prosecutions. Since
passage of a constitutional amendment abolishing the indictment requirement is unlikely,376 most federal prosecutions would have to
pass through both the grand jury and the preliminary hearing. Two
full-dress presentations of the prosecution's case are hard to justify.377 If the preliminary hearing preceded the grand jury and the
prosecutor's case satisfied the hearing's stringent legal guilt standards,378 why should the prosecutor repeat379 that performance
before a lay body that applies a less stringent factual guilt standard?
375. I discounted this problem at the state level because of the routine nature of most state
criminal prosecutions. However, the adversarial presentation of a prima facie case of legal
guilt for many complex federal crimes (e.g., antitrust, tax, fraud prosecutions) could prove
time-consuming. See 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 108, at 794 (testimony of Bruce Babbitt,
Arizona Attorney General), which states in part:
The second area of specific concern is the provision of Section 9 requiring a preliminary
hearing, in addition to the present Fifth Amendment requirement of a grand jury indictment for all infamous crimes. The clear effect of this will be to tum the present two step
criminal process into a three tiered proceeding. In complex paper cases this extra step,
interposing an additional adversary proceeding, will burden both prosecution and courts
to the breaking point.
Our office has prosecuted and is presently prosecuting complex fraud cases, often involving the reconstruction of several years of business transactions and accumulated
financial records. These cases routinely require a year or more of investigation by many
investigators and lawyers aided by the grand jury's subpoena power . . . . After indictment, this type of case will then require several months of trial time.
. . . In our experience, complex paper cases cannot be effectively handled through the
preliminary hearing route.
Absent the strictures of the Fifth Amendment, many federal cases would probably be
more suitable for a preliminary hearing than grand jury action. I believe that in many
types of cases both prosecutors and defense counsel would generally agree that the preliminary hearing is a superior alternative.
But in some areas, particularly complex financial cases, the preliminary hearing, as a
form of mini-trial, is not feasible. The largi: case involving multiple defendants, scores of
witnesses and literally rooms of paper is a new phenomenon that presents special
problems. Few jurisdictions outside the Federal government have experience in this area.
The apparent lack of objection from many states to the preliminary hearing proposal of
H.R. 94 should not be interpreted as endorsement based on experience with this type of
prosecution.
376. Resolutions have been introduced calling for constitutional amendments. H.R. 62
would eliminate the constitutional requirement of the grand jury but permit Congress to authorize investigatory grand juries and to require indictments in certain cases. H.R. 61 would
eliminate the indicting grand jury but permit retention of the investigatory grand jury. 1977
Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 108, at 1003. These resolutions have attracted little support in
Congress.
377. See 1977 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 108, at 722 (statement of Benjamin R. Civiletti,
Asst. Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice).
378. H.R. 94 makes even less sense since the bill does not purport to change the hearing's
minimal probable cause standard. 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 108, at 1593-94 (memorandum by Alfred M. Nittle and Martin H. Belsky).
379. There would not be duplication in every prosecution because more defendants would
waive indictment once the prosecution had passed the preliminary hearing's more stringent
hurdle. But cf. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE
OF CRIMINAL CASES§ 156 (2d ed. 1971) (generally recommending against waiver even when
indictment is a virtual certainty).
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Conversely, the value of the grand jury would be seriously diminished if a magistrate could veto its :findings after seeing an identical
evidentiary presentation.
Proponents of this reform respond in two ways, neither of which
resolves the dilemma. First, they argue that no duplication in
screening occurs because the grand jury merely rubberstamps the
prosecutor's decision. 380 That argument assumes the grand jury's institutional incapacity to screen the prosecutor's case. It thus begs the
basic question of whether the grand jury could be reformed to perform a valuable screening function, thereby avoiding duplicated
screening. Second, they suggest that when the grand jury functions
properly, it serves different purposes from the preliminary examination. The grand jury is an ex parte proceeding that allows the community to check oppressive executive power by interjecting
community notions of justice. In contrast, the preliminary examination's adversarial format and professional magistrate promote a
more accurate determination of factual guilt and weed out those
cases where proof of legal guilt is unlikely. 381 But that argument
overlooks the fact that neither the grand jury nor the preliminary
hearing presently screens legal guilt. It compares the grand jury's
present limited screening function with a reformed preliminary hearing that would screen legal guilt. Although the two proceedings
would then appear to serve different screening purposes, they would
still require two dress-rehearsals of the prosecution's case. Moreover, the preliminary hearing's stringent review should deter badfaith prosecutions, thereby rendering the grand jury's function of
checking oppressive executive action fairly superfluous. 382
Unlike many states, the federal system has a choice: it could use
either the constitutionally compelled grand jury or the preliminary
hearing to screen legal guilt. Skepticism about the grand jury's ability to perform an independent screening function coupled with our
system's preference for adversarial rather than ex parte proceedings
have led reformers to choose the preliminary hearing. In an ideal
world with unlimited resources, I would make the same choice. But,
in a federal system that rarely conducts preliminary hearings, this
reform would be a step in the wrong direction. Instead of adding
another major procedural step in an already cumbersome pretrial
380. See Note, supra note 60, at 802.
381. Id. at 803.
382. The grand jury could still serve an equitable function by refusing to indict when it
believed that justice would not be served by a literal application of the criminal law. See
United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616,629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting); United
States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
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process, federal reform efforts should consider how the grand jury
and some limited form of judicial review could be used to preclude
conviction without adjudication.
V.

REFORMING THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY'S ACCUSATORY
FUNCTION

Section IV concluded that the pretrial process should provide for
a preliminary adjudication of a defendant's factual and legal guilt
before the state secures a conviction through plea-bargaining. This
Section evaluates whether the federal grand jury can be reformed to
perform that function. Subsection A examines how some federal
courts have revitalized the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to improve the quality of grand jury screening. Expanding on the reforms
suggested in those cases, Subsection B offers several proposals that
would enable the grand jury to vindicate some of the accusatorial
values embodied in the concept of legal guilt.
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct .Doctrine

While the grand jury was enshrined in our Constitution because
of its reputed ability to protect the innocent from unfounded prosecution,383 few scholars take its screening function seriously today. 384
Critics of the grand jury argue that inexperienced and untrained citizens cannot possibly screen out unwarranted prosecutions in an ex
parte proceeding where they hear only the government's side of the
case and depend on the prosecutor for all legal advice and direction.
Relying on empirical studies indicating that the grand jury rarely
refuses to indict, 385 those critics have concluded that the grand jury
can serve no useful accusatorial function. 386
The question often overlooked in these broadside attacks is
whether the grand jury's tendency to rubberstamp the prosecutor's
decisions stems from some inherent institutional defect or from some
383. Supporters of the grand jury have often responded to critics' charges by pointing to its
historic role as an independent buffer between the state and the innocent accused. However,
recent accounts of the grand jury's history both in England and in this country indicate that
the grand jury extended its protection in a highly politicized manner. See, e.g., L. CLARK, THE
GRAND JURY 16-18 (1975); Schwartz, .Demythologizing the Historic Role ofthe Grand Jury, 10
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 701 (1972).
384. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 46; Antell, supra note 48.
385. See, e.g., Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L. REV. 101, 217, 295
(1931). Cf. Dession, From Indictment to Information - Implications ofthe Sh!ft, 42 YALE L.J.
163, 178-79 (1932) (arguing in part that grand jury's high rate of concurrence with prosecutor's
decisions merely demonstrates excellent pretrial screening by prosecutor).
386. In 1976, federal grand juries returned approximately 23,000 indictments and reported
only 123 no true bills. 1977 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 108, at 738 (testimony of Benjamin R.
Civiletti, Asst. Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice).
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other cause that can be remedied without turning its ex parte inquiry
into a full-fledged adversarial hearing. One cannot answer this question by pointing to the grand jury's past failures, because the courts
have not given the grand jury an opportunity to prove its institutional value. 387 As Section I suggested, the courts have weakened
the grand jury's capacity to perform a valuable accusatory function
by assigning it a minimal factual guilt screening standard and by
granting the prosecutor complete control over the quality of evidence
presented to it.
Recognizing this problem, some federal courts have cautiously
begun to supervise the prosecutor's evidentiary presentation to the
grand jury. To do so, they have used a revitalized prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to circumvent Costello's prohibition against directly evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the
grandjury.388 Seizing upon Justice Black's caveat that an indictment
must be returned by an "unbiased" grandjury, 389 some lower courts
have posited a series of evidentiary duties that the prosecutor owes
the grand jury to ensure the return of an "unbiased" indictment.
When the prosecutor violates those duties, these courts will find
prosecutorial misconduct, which may justify dismissal of the indictment.390 While the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine is not new, the
courts had traditionally applied it only when the prosecutor had acted outrageously toward a witness391 or had unfairly pressured the
grand jury into returning a true bill.392 This Subsection examines
the courts' expanded application of the doctrine to determine
whether it offers a principled standard for system-wide reform.
387. See text accompanying notes 170-79 supra. Admittedly, one cannot say for certain
whether the grand jury would reliably adjudicate the defendant's factual guilt once these disabilities were removed. However, I believe a lay body can perform a valuable fact-finding
function like its counterpart at trial if appropriate safeguards are enacted. We should give the
grand jury an opportunity to prove its value before we give up on the one lay body that participates in federal criminal prosecutions.
388. See text at note 164 supra.
389. 350 U.S. at 363.
390. See, e.g., United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Hawaii 1978), ajfd., 607
F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
391. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313 (D. Idaho 1908) (indictment dismissed
because prosecutor badgered defendant's witnesses in his questioning, entered grand jury
room during its private deliberations, and urged them to indict). Bui see United States v.
Bruzgo, 373 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1967) (court criticized prosecutor for threatening one grand jury
witness with jail and calling her a "racketeer'' but refused to dismiss the defendant's indictment). q: United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979) (vacating judgment on sentence and remanding case so that district court could determine whether prosecutorial
misconduct tainted grand jury which returned indictment).
392. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 163 F. 313 (D. Idaho 1908).
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Excessive Use of Hearsay Evidence

Costello legitimated a common prosecutorial practice in routine
cases of presenting the government's case through the hearsay testimony of federal law enforcement agents. 393 That practice saves time
and minimizes inconvenience to government witnesses. It also prevents the grand jury from predicting the likelihood of conviction by
precluding any assessment of the credibility of the government's trial
witnesses. Finally, such a practice permits the prosecutor to secure
indictments when there may be insufficient legally admissible evidence to warrant a conviction at trial. Concern about the quality of
grand jury screening under such circumstances prompted the Second
Circuit to reevaluate Costello's approval of indictments based exclusively on hearsay testimony.
The first signs of judicial dissatisfaction came in a dissenting
opinion by Judge Friendly in United States v. Payton. 394 Judge
Friendly noted that the use of government agents to summarize
voluminous financial records in Costello made sense because their
hearsay testimony would be admissible at trial once the proper expert foundation had been established.395 To require presentation of
that foundation to the grand jury would have converted its ex parte
inquiry into a prolonged mini-trial. Moreover, "the agent's lack of
direct knowledge must have been apparent" to the Costello grand
jurors.396 Judge Friendly concluded, however, that Costello did not
justify the use of hearsay testimony in routine prosecutions where
more reliable evidence was readily available. Relying on Justice
Burton's concurring opinion in Costello, he suggested that the prosecutor who presents hearsay evidence .
must make clear to the jurors the shoddy merchandise they are getting
so they can seek something better if they wish, thus pressing the prosecution for more reliable evidence - particularly important in these
narcotics prosecutions where there is often a problem of the reliability
of an agent's identification.397

Echoing Judge Friendly's concern, a three-judge panel in United
States v. Umans 398 observed that excessive reliance on hearsay testimony "tends to destroy the historical function of grand juries in as393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
(1967).

See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~ 6.03(2), at 6-44 (rev. 2d ed. 1979).
363 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 993 (1966).
363 F.2d at 1000 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
363 F.2d at 1000.
363 F.2d at 1000.
368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 389 U.S. 80
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sessing the likelihood of prosecutorial success."399 Writing for the
panel, Circuit Judge Waterman warned government prosecutors that
"[h]earsay evidence should only be used when direct testimony is
unavailable or when it is demonstrably inconvenient to summon witnesses able to testify to facts from personal knowledge." 400
Apparently the courts' sanctionless warnings did not have their
intended effect. Two years after Umans, Judge Weinstein noted in
United States v. Arcuri 401 that "[t]he practice revealed in the case
before us, where the indictment was handed down some two months
after the decision in Umans, suggests the need for a stronger rule and
more uniformly applied sanctions to enforce it."402 Accordingly, he
announced a prospective rule that indictments would be dismissed
without a showing of prejudice to the defendants "if it is clear that
hearsay alone was deliberately relied upon when better evidence was
readily available for presentation to the grand jury."403 Judge Weinstein justified this stringent best-evidence requirement by explaining
that the government's practice of offering only hearsay testimony obstructed the grand jury's screening functions. While Judge
Friendly's Payton dissent had emphasized that the excessive use of
unreliable hearsay testimony weakens the grand jury's ability to
screen factual guilt, Judge Weinstein emphasized how it impairs the
grand jury's ability to evaluate the likelihood of a conviction at trial.
To make that prediction of legal guilt, the grand jury must be given
the opportunity to judge the credibility of the government's principal
trial witnesses.
The practice - as in the instant case - of relying on hearsay rather
than upon the testimony of eye-witnesses is pernicious for two reasons.
First, it habituates the grand jury to rely upon "evidence" which appears smooth, well integrated and consistent in all respects. Particularly because neither cross-examination nor defense witnesses are
available to them, grand jurors do not hear cases with the rough edges
that result from the often halting, inconsistent and incomplete testimony of honest observers of events. Thus, they are unable to distinguish between prosecutions which are strong and those which are
relatively weak. All cases are presented in an equally homogenized
form. A grand jury so conditioned is unable to adequately serve its
function as a screening agency. It cannot exercise its judgment in refusing to indict in weak cases where, technically, a prima facie case
may have been made out. It is, moreover, unlikely to demand addi399. 368 F.2d at 730.
400. 368 F.2d at 730.
401. 282 F. Supp. 347 (E.D.N.Y.), qffd., 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
913 (1969).
402. 282 F. Supp. at 351.
403. 282 F. Supp. at 351.
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tional evidence.4 04

A year later, in United States v. Leibowitz,405 the Second Circuit
applied a far less rigorous standard of review in considering the
same prosecutorial practice condemned by Judge Weinstein. Instead
of calling its chief trial witness, who would have testified about the
critical events underlying the indictment from personal knowledge,
the prosecutor called an FBI agent who presented a hearsay summary of the government's evidence.406 Without even a passing reference to Arcuri, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal
to dismiss the indictments. The court attempted to rebut the government's argument that its Umans warning was inconsistent with Costello. After noting that the Second Circuit had consistently upheld
indictments based upon hearsay testimony despite its Umans admonition, Judge Hays concluded that indictments based exclusively on
such testimony should not be dismissed, "unless it appears that dismissal is required to protect the integrity of the judicial process."407
He then identified two seemingly independent criteria for determining when judicial integrity was at stake: (1) where the grand jury "is
misled into thinking it is getting eye-witness testimony from the
agent whereas it is actually being given an account whose hearsay
nature is concealed,"408 or (2) where "the defendant could show that
there is a high probability that with eye witness rather than hearsay
testimony the grand jury would not have indicted."4 09
The differences between Judge Weinstein's suggested rule in
Arcuri and the Leibowitz rule for improper use of hearsay are striking. To predict the likelihood of conviction, a grand jury must consider the evidence that the government intends to use at trial. Arcuri
promotes that legal guilt screening function by forcing the prosecutor to present the best available evidence. On the other hand, Leibowitz offers only minimal protection of the grand jury's factual guilt
screening function by encouraging prosecutors not to mislead grand
jurors about the quality of the evidence they are considering. Even
when that occurs, Leibowitz leaves open the possibility of sustaining
indictments where the defendant fails to convince the court that the
404. 282 F. Supp. at 349.
405. 420 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1969).
406. 420 F.2d at 41.
407. 420 F.2d at 42.
408. 420 F.2d at 42.
409. 420 F.2d at 42. Applying this test to the facts before it, the court found that the
district court had correctly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss because the grand jury
knew it was receiving hearsay evidence and probably would have indicted Leibowitz if it had
considered the government's best evidence.
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grand jury would not have issued the indictment had it heard the
best evidence available.
Not surprisingly, federal prosecutors continued their hearsay
presentations to grand juries after Leibowitz. Defendants' challenges
to these practices met with little success until 1972 when a threejudge panel decided United States v. Estepa, 410 the only reported
Second Circuit decision to reverse a conviction and dismiss an indictment solely because of the prosecutor's hearsay presentation to
the grand jury. The only witness before the Estepa grand jury was a
police officer who testified about events he did not witness and statements he did not hear.411 The prosecutor did not call any of the
police officers who had more intimate knowledge of the narcotics
investigation and the subsequent arrests for distributing heroin even
though they were available to testify.412 Moreover, except for one
comment, the Assistant U.S. Attorney did not alert the grand jury to
the limits of the testifying officer's knowledge. 413
The court reversed Estepa's conviction and dismissed the indictments because the prosecutor had misled the grand jurors about the
quality of the evidence they were considering.414 In justifying dismissal as a proper exercise of the court's supervisory power, Judge
Friendly pointedly noted that the government's persistent refusal to
heed the Umans warning left the court with little choice.
The many opinions in which we have affirmed convictions despite the
Government's needless reliance on hearsay before the grand jury show
how loath we have been to open up a new road for attacking convictions on grounds unrelated to the merits. We have been willing to allow ample, many doubtless think too ample, latitude in the needless
use of hearsay, subject to only two provisions. We cannot, with proper
respect for the discharge of our duties, content ourselves with yet another admonition; a reversal with instructions to dismiss the indictment
may help to translate the assurances of the United States Attorneys
into consistent performance by their assistants. 415

Estepa and Leibowitz attempted to fashion a rule consistent with
Costello that would trigger judicial intervention only when the prosecutor egregiously impairs the grand jury's ability to screen guilt.
Far from signalling a new judicial willingness to require the prosecutor to present the government's best evidence to the grand jury,41 6
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

471
471
471
471
471
471

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

1132 (2d Cir. 1972).
at 1134.
at 1134.
at 1134-35.
at 1137.
at 1137.
Post-Estepa cases reflect the Second Circuit's continued unwillingness to dismiss in-
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Este_pa merely expressed the court's pique with federal prosecutors
who continued to violate the minimal obligations placed on them by
Leibowitz. The ironic result is a rule that accomplishes little417 but is
nonetheless inconsistent with Costello. Before an indictment can be
dismissed under Leibowitz, a court must determine whether the
grand jury would have indicted the defendant had it heard the government's trial witness instead of a hearsay ac9ount. That inquiry
requires the trial judge to evaluate the sufficiency and quality of the
other evidence presented to the grand jury. Yet, Costello suggested
that "dismissal of the indictment is not required by the court's interests in reliable fact finding," 418 and Justice Black specifically rejected
Costello's request that the Court use its supervisory powers to promote judicial inquiry into the evidentiary bases of indictments.419
Indeed, the Second Circuit has recently suggested that cases like Calandra may have undermined Este_pa's validity.420
2. Indictments Based in Part on PeJJ"ured Testimony
Since most federal courts understood Costello to bar judicial inquiry into the sufficiency or quality of evidence relied upon by the
indicting grand jury, they have usually refused to dismiss indictments based in part on perjured testimony, as long as the grand jury
heard some other competent evidence. For example, in Coppedge v.
dictments because of the prosecutor's undue reliance upon hearsay testimony before the grand
jury. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1973):
Estepa was thus not intended to modify broadly the rule recognizing the acceptability of
hearsay evidence in grand jury proceedings. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359 . . . . Rather, it was intended as manifest warning that it is impermissible to have
law enforcement officers who have no first-lrand knowledge of the subject the grand jury
is investigating testify as if they possessed that knowledge.
490 F.2d at 489.
417. Under Leibowitz, the defendant m~t demonstrate that there was a high probability
that the grand jury would not have returned an indictment had it heard the government's trial
evidence. See text at note 409 supra. In cases where the grand jury did not request the government's best evidence from the prosecutor after being notified of the "shoddy merchandise" it
was getting, a district court judge will probably conclude that the grand jury would have indicted the defendant even if it had considered the government's best evidence. At the appellate level, this prejudice requirement imposes an insurmountable burden on a defendant whose
legal guilt has been convincingly demonstrated at trial. How can an' appellate court say that
the grand jury would not have indicted the defendant if it had received the government's trial
evidence when that evidence convinced the trial's fact-finder to convict the defendant? Obviously, at this stage any defect in the presentation of evidence before the grand jury could be
considered harmless error. See note 521 infra and accompanying text. For the vast majority
of criminal defendants who plead guilty after indictment, Estepa offers little protection besides
insuring that the grand jurors were not misled about the quality of evidence they were considering.
418. United States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854,, 863 (E.D.N.Y.(975).
419. 350 U.S. at 364.
,
420. See United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1001 n.29 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1015 (1978).
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United States421 then Circuit Judge Burger relied on Lawn v. United
States,422 an early progeny of Coste/lo, in affirming a district court

judge's refusal to dismiss an indictment that was based in part on
perjured testimony. Judge Burger interpreted the unbiased-grand
jury requirement to mean only that a grand jury would be tainted if
"it was improperly constituted, or . . . its members were necessarily
biased."423 Apparently, the grand jury's consideration of some competent evidence apart from the perjured testimony indicated that it
was not "necessarily biased."424 While Judge Burger conceded that
the prosecutor should not present unreliable witnesses to the grand
jury, he concluded that Coste/Io's progeny precluded invalidation of
the indictment because "the critical and final place to detect perjury
is the trial." 425
Increasing judicial discomfort over Coste/Io's reliance on the trial
to cure errors before the grand jury has prompted some federal
courts to reject Coppedge's approach. 426 Thus, a Ninth Circuit panel
· ruled in United States v. Basurto 4 ~1 that the "Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment is vio1ated when a defendant has to stand trial
421. 311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 946 (1963).
422. 355 U.S. 339 (1958), discussed in text at notes 154-57 supra.
423. 311 F.2d at 132.
424. 311 F.2d at 131-32.
425. 311 F.2d at 132.
426. In United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979), the court vacated the judgments of sentence and remanded the case to the district court for determination of whether
prosecutorial misconduct before the first grand jury tainted the second grand jury's consideration of the case. The prosecutor in Serubo did not present perjured testimony to the first grand
jury. Instead, he badgered witnesses who were uncooperative, commented unfavorably about
some witnesses' credibility, tried to connect the defendants with organized crime without
presenting any evidence to support the charge, and attacked the testimony of witnesses who
did not link the defendants with organized crime. 604 F.2d at 815. In commenting on the
appropriateness of dismissing indictments, the court noted that the trial itself was not a sufficient deterrent to curb prosecutorial abuse before the grand jury.
We recognize that dismissal of an indictment may impose important costs upon the
prosecution and the public. At a minimum, the government will be required to _present its
evidence to a grand jury unaffected by bias or prejudice. But the costs of contmued unchecked prosecutorial misconduct are also substantial. This is particularly so before the
grand jury, where the prosecutor operates without the check of a judge or a trained legal
adversary, and virtually immune from public scrutiny. The prosecutor's abuse of his special relationship to the grand jury poses an enormous risk to defendants as well. For
while in theory a trial provides the defendant with a full opportunity to contest and disprove the charges against him, in practice, the handing up of an indictment will often
have a devastating personal and professional impact that a later dismissal or acquittal can
never undo. Where the potential for abuse is so great, and the consequences of a mistaken
indictment so serious, the ethical responsibilities of the prosecutor, and the obligation of
the judiciary to protect against even the appearance of unfairness, are correspondingly
heightened.
We suspect that dismissal of an indictment may be virtually the only effective way to
encourage compliance with these ethical standards, and to protect defendants from abuse
of the grand jury process.
604 F.2d at 817.
427. 492 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974).
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on an indictment which the Government knows is based partially on
perjured testimony, when the perjured testimony is material, and
when jeopardy has not attached." 428 Writing for the majority, Judge
Ferguson rejected Judge Burger's reasoning in Coppedge that the
trial could cure any error made by the grand jury.429 Indeed, the
facts in Basurto strongly support Judge Ferguson's point because the
perjured testimony caused Basurto to be indicted for violating a statute with a mandatory minimum sentencing provision. Without that
perjured testimony, he would have been indicted under a newer statute with far more flexible sentencing provisions.430 As in Coppedge,
the prosecutor did not learn of the perjury until after the return of
the indictment.431 He immediately informed the defense attorney
who promptly moved to dismiss the indictment. The trial court denied the motion and Basurto was convicted by a jury that knew of
the witness's perjury before the grand jury.432
. In reversing Basurto's conviction, the court insisted that its ruling
was consistent with Costello because it rested on prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury that violated due process, and not on
the quality of evidence received by the grand jury.433 The court held
that the prosecutor had a constitutional duty to inform the grand
jury of the perjured testimony immediately, so that an accurate superseding indictment could have been returned before jeopardy attached.434 Relying on a series of Supreme Court decisions that had
established the prosecutor's constitutional duty not to use perjured
testimony knowingly at trial to obtain a tainted conviction,435 the
Basurto panel concluded that this duty implied a concomitant obligation not to allow a defendant to "stand trial on an indictment . . .
based in part upon perjured testimony."436 To say the least, that implication is strained. The Basurto conviction, where the prosecutor
alerted the defense attorney before trial about the perjured grand
jury testimony and revealed the perjury to the trial jury in his open428. 497 F.2d at 785.
429. The consequences to the defendant of perjured testimony given before the grand
jury are no less severe than those of perjured testimony given at trial, and in part may be
more severe. The defendant has no effective means of cross-examining or rebutting perjured testimony given before the grand jury, as he might in court.
497 F.2d at 786.
430. 497 F.2d at 784.
431. 497 F.2d at 784.
432. 497 F.2d at 784.
433. 497 F.2d at 785.
434. 497 F.2d at 785.
435. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935).
436. 497 F.2d at 786.
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ing remarks,437 hardly reflects the injustice promoted by a prosecutor
who knowingly used perjured trial testimony to obtain a conviction.438
The Ninth Circuit's analysis is striking for its refusal to acknowledge in theory what it was doing in practice. The court unconvincingly distinguished Costello by emphasizing that its ruling in Basurto
rested on prosecutorial misconduct and not on the quality of the evidence presented to the grand jury. Subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions, however, have indicated that the prosecutor's duty to inform
the grand jury that it had considered perjured testimony only arises
when, as in Leibowitz, that testimony impairs the grand jury's factual
guilt screening function. 439 To limit judicial review of the evidence
presented to the grand jury, post-Basurto decisions have authorized
dismissal of an indictment only in flagrant cases440 where the perjured testimony "creates a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not
otherwise exist."441 If the perjured testimony does not meet that narrow definition of materiality, the prosecutor has no obligation to inform the grand jury of the perjury or to seek a dismiss~! of the
437. 497 F.2d at 784-85.
438. Indeed, Circuit Judge Hufstedler could not accept the majority's strained due process
analysis. In her concurring opinion, she justified the panel's decision as an appropriate exercise of the court's supervisory power to protect the integrity of the administration of justice.
497 F.2d at 793. She argued that the court could impose a duty on the prosecutor to inform the
grand jury that it had considered material perjured testimony to promote the grand jury's
ability "to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge
was founded on credible testimony." 497 F.2d at 794 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59
(1906)). So informed, the grand jury could take corrective action, but Judge Hufstedler observed that the prosecutor should specifically request that the tainted indictment be dismissed.
497 F.2d at 794.
439. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Bowers, 534 F.2d 186, 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
942 (1976). See also United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
818 (1978). "[W]e believe that [B=rto~] requirement that the prosecutor has an obligation to
immediately inform the court and opposing counsel is weakened if not destroyed by the
Supreme Court decision in United Stales v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) . . . ." 566 F.2d at 655.
The panel noted that Agurs had held that the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence at trial did not constitute constitutional error unless "the omitted evidence creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." 566 F.2d at 656. The Bracy panel applied the
Agurs standard to the prosecutor's failure to disclose perjured testimony before the Bracy
grand jury and concluded that the prosecutor had not violated that standard "where incomplete disclosure of the perjured testimony before the grand jury in no way suggested an absence of guilt on the part of the appellants." 566 F.2d at 656.
440. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 944 (1978) ("(O]nly in a flagrant case, and perhaps only where knowing perjury,
relating to a material matter, has been presented to the grand jury should the trial judge dismiss an otherwise valid indictment returned by an apparently unbiased grand jury. To hold
otherwise would allow a mini-trial as to each presented indictment contrary to the teaching of
Mr. Justice Black in Costello.").
441. United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 656 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 818
(1978). Since the perjured testimony in Bracy did not meet this standard, the court refused to
find constitutional error.

February 1980]

Reforming the Federal Grand Jury

549

indictment. In other words, the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct
depends upon whether it impaired the grand jury's screening function.442 Thus, like the Second Circuit's attempt to regulate the prosecutor's use of hearsay, the ironic result is a rule that accomplishes
very little but is nevertheless inconsistent with Costello .443

3.

The .Duty To .Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

The grand jury cannot possibly screen out unwarranted prosecutions when the prosecutor fails to present exculpatory evidence that,
if believed, would negate the defendant's guilt. Despite that obvious
truth, most courts have refused to dismiss indictments when the
prosecutor did not disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.
Relying on Supreme Court decisions like Costello, Blue, Holt, and
Calandra, the lower courts initially ruled that the prosecutor had no
obligation to disclose such evidence to the grand jury.444 Those
courts assumed that the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence was
triggered by the adversarial context oftrial.445 Therefore, they found
no prosecutorial duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury because its sole function is to determine ex parte ''whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person."446
Even those courts that have recognized a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence have emphasized the difficulty of implementing
such a rule. Some courts have examined the problem of what evidence should be deemed· exculpatory at this early stage of the pro442. As one co=entator noted, "[b]ecause the federal courts, in addressing the issue of
grand jury abuse, have typically weighed evidence demonstrating guilt against the nature of
the prosecutorial misconduct, the decisions establish no consistent standard for dismissal."
Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1980). Compare United States v. Scheufler, 599 F.2d 893, 895-97 (9th Cir.
1979), and United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 1979), with United States v.
Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939,943 (N.D. Ill. 1979), and United States v. Sousley, 453 F.
Supp. 754, 758 n.l (W.D. Mo. 1978).
443. For example, the panel in Bracy noted that "if the suppression of evidence results in
constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the
prosecutor." United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 656 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
818 (1978). Yet Costello rejected the argument that the court should use its supervisory power
to regulate the character of the evidence presented to the grand jury.
444. See, e.g., United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 828 (1976); Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933
(1968) (prosecution not obligated to disclose evidence in its possession that would have undermined the credibility of three of its grand jury witnesses).
445. See, e.g., United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d 1133, I 135-36 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 934 (1976); Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 933 (1968).
446. United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828
(1976) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974)).
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ceedings.447 Others have expressed concern about how to assess the
significance of the withheld evidence without reviewing the quality
and sufficiency of the other evidence considered by the grandjury, 448
an inquiry that Costello prohibited. Finally, some courts have suggested that Costello precludes the lower courts from using their supervisory powers to regulate the prosecutor's discretion over grand
jury evidence absent some extraordinary situation where judicial action is required "to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and
to avoid any fundamental unfairness."449
The first major departure from the consensus view came in a
state decision, Johnson v. Superior Court. 450 The facts in Johnson
starkly illustrate the grand jury's inability to act as a protective
screen when the prosecutor has complete control over what evidence
it considers. Johnson and his codefendant, Sherman, were arrested
for a series of drug offenses. Johnson had agreed to cooperate with
Sherman in a sale to two undercover agents and then had followed
him to a motel where Sherman had made the sale.451 At his preliminary hearing, Johnson testified that he had agreed with a local district attorney to provide information concerning narcotic deals and
he had accompanied Sherman only to gather such information.452 If
believed, that exculpatory evidence would have negated the requisite
mens rea for the offenses. The magistrate dismissed all charges
against him when the state offered no evidence to rebut his claim.453
The district attorney then asked a grand jury to indict Johnson on
the same charges. In presenting his case to that grand jury, the district attorney did not reveal Johnson's exculpatory testimony at the
preliminary examination. Instead, he presented the testimony of the
arresting officers and gave the grand jury the erroneous impression
that Johnson had refused to comment on the charges upon the order
of his attorney.454 The grand jury indicted Johnson on all three
charges.
447. See United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1040(0. Md. 1976),a.ff'd., 602 F.2d
653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en bane); cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3662 (1980).
448. 415 F. Supp. at 1041-42.
449. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977). See also note 440 supra.
450. 38 Cal. App. 3d 977, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1974), ajfd. on statutory grounds, 15 Cal. 3d
248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975) (en bane) (there is no published court of appeals
opinion at 38 Cal. App. 3d 977 because the Supreme Court of California granted a hearing on
the case).
451. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
452. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 742-43.
453. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
454. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
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Although the magistrate's dismissal did not bar the prosecutor
from seeking an indictment for the same offense,455 the Third District California Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecutor's failure
to disclose Johnson's exculpatory testimony precluded the grand jury
from independently evaluating Johnson's guilt.456 In a sweeping
opinion, Associate Justice Friedman argued that the absence of the
adversarial safeguards that courts often associate with due process
does not "exclude a special institutional variety of due process, indigenous to the grand jury, imparted to it by 'the law of the land'
and investing it with a fundamental fairness peculiar to itself."457
Justice Friedman then identified the grand jury's protective function
of safeguarding accused persons against unfounded charges "an attribute of due process inherent in grand jury proceedings."458 Thus,
the court concluded that the prosecutor violated Johnson's due process right to a fair and independent grand jury evaluation of probable cause when he made a "twisted presentation"459 of evidence.
The Court of Appeals opinion in Johnson recognizes that the
grand jury's ex parte nature imposes special responsibilities on the
prosecutor to ensure " 'that justice shall be done.' " 460 Unlike some
of the earlier federal cases that had assumed that the prosecutor's
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence was triggered by the adversarial context of trial, 461 Johnson recognized that the absence of adversarial safeguards in grand jury proceedings provided the most
compelling reason for imposing a duty on the prosecutor to disclose
exculpatory evidence. As Justice Friedman observed, "if the prosecutor does not produce the evidence, no one will. The grand jury
can perform its central function as an independent adjudicator of
probable cause only if the prosecutor's duty ... includes an affirmative obligation to produce evidence in his possession or control
which tends to negate guilt.''462
455. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 745 (citing People v: Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 666, 511 P~2d 609,
611, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657, 659 (1973)).
456. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
457. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
458. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
459. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
460. United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)).
461. See note 445 supra. But c.f. United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir.
1979) (prosecutor not obligated to search for and submit evidence negating guilt when not
requested to do so by the grand jury; but if "aware of any substantial evidence negating guilt
he should . . . make it known to the grand jury, at least where it might reasonably be expected
to lead the jury not to indict").
462. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 749 (citations omitted). The court concluded that the prosecutor
must disclose exculpatory evidence even if his other evidence establishes sufficient proof of
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The California Supreme Court accepted the lower court's duty
analysis, but rested its holding on statutory grounds. 463 Justice Clark
interpreted a statute requiring a grand jury to consider "evidence
within its reach that will explain away the charge"464 as imposing a
duty on the prosecutor to disclose such exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury.465 Justice Clark refused to construe the statute as a mere
admonition to the grand jury to consider such evidence if it so desired,466 because such an interpretation would undermine the statute's purpose of promoting the grand jury's protective function.
Since the "grand jury cannot be expected to call for evidence of
which it is kept ignorant,"467 the court held that "when a district
attorney seeking an indictment is aware of evidence reasonably tending to negate guilt, he is obligated under section 939.7 to inform the
grand jury of its nature and existence, so that the grand jury may
exercise its power under the statute to order the evidence produced."468
Despite the absence of an analogous federal statute, several federal courts have used Johnson's reasoning to support their conclusion
that the federal prosecutor must disclose exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury.469 Whether those decisions will improve the quality of
probable cause because the "reviewing court cannot know what the grand jury might have
decided had the prosecutor set out the complete array of available evidence."
463. 15 Cal. 3d 248, 255, 539 P.2d 792, 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32, 36 (1975) (en bane). However, the California Supreme Court accepted Judge Friedman's constitutional analysis in a
later decision, People v. Backus, 23 Cal. 3d 360, 392-93, 590 P.2d 837, 856, 142 Cal. Rptr. 710,
729 (1979) (defendants have a due process right to an independent evaluation of the evidence
by the grand jury that is violated if prosecutor's presentation of the evidence substantially
impairs the grand jury's ability to reject unfounded charges).
464. CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1970).
465. 15 Cal. 3d at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
466. 15 Cal. 3d at 254, 539 P.2d at 795-96, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36.
467. 15 Cal. 3d at 251, 539 P.2d at 794, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
468. 15 Cal. 3d at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
469. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Provenzano, a reputed Mafia boss, was charged with conspiracy to offer kickbacks lo influence
trustees of a labor pension fund. 440 F. Supp. at 562. The government's only evidence of
Provenzano's participation in the conspiracy was the eyewitness testimony of a government
informer, Goldfarb, who testified before the grand jury that he was present al a meeting between the defendants and heard Provenzano make an allegedly incriminating statement about
the need to offer some kickbacks. 440 F. Supp. at 563-64. The government's case against
Provenzano rested on Goldfarb's testimony because its own surveillance of the building where
the alleged meeting occurred did not produce any evidence that Provenzano was in the building. 440 F. Supp. at 566.
Events after Goldfarb's grand jury testimony raised serious questions about the reliability
of his identification and his general credibility. After the original grand jury indicted
Provenzano, Goldfarb told the prosecutor he had not actually looked at Provenzano but had
just heard the statement. 440 F. Supp. at 563. Goldfarb had never seen or met the defendant
before this meeting. Moreover, he was not sure that the statement about the alleged kickbacks
related to the proposed mortgage loan noted in the indictment. 440 F. Supp. at 564. Finally,
Goldfarb was the government's chief witness at an unrelated trial where all the defendants
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prosecutorial and grand jury screening depends in part on how
courts define the prosecutor's duty. Because the courts have failed to
specify what screening functions should be served by the grand jury,
there is considerable confusion in the case law as to what constitutes
exculpatory evidence for purposes of grand jury screening. Does the
duty extend to evidence that suggests that the defendant did not
commit the proscribed act? 470 Should the duty encompass any evidence that creates a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt,
regardless of whether it negates a material element of the crime471 or
establishes some affirmative defense? 472 Must the prosecutor be personally aware of this exculpatory evidence before the duty attaches?473 Must the prosecutor actually present the evidence or
merely notify the grand jury of its existence?474 Once notified, is the
were acquitted, suggesting that the trial jury had entertained some doubts about his credibility.
440 F. Supp. at 565. Despite Goldfarb's doubts about the accuracy of his testimony, the prosecutor submitted the transcript of his grand jury testimony to a new grand jury that returned a
superseding indictment against Provenzano. The government did not call Goldfarb to testify
before this second grand jury and did not inform the grand jurors that Goldfarb had expressed
doubts about the validity of his identification. 440 F. Supp. at 565.
Judge Bonsal dismissed the superseding indictment because the prosecutor's failure to disclose the exculpatory material prevented the second grand jury from making "an independent
evaluation of the case." 440 F. Supp. at 565. He dismissed the original indictment because the
prosecutor's failure to disclose Goldfarb's substantial recantation of his testimony to the original grand jury precluded it from screening out unwarranted prosecutions. Judge Bonsal explicitly rejected Costello's assumption that the trial was the only proper forum to cure such
evidentiary defects and concluded that it would make little sense to hold Provenzano for trial
on the basis of evidence which would not support a conviction. 440 F. Supp. at 566.
See also United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed at note
461 supra; United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Hawaii 1978), qffd., 607 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977)
(indictment for intentional failure to report taxable income dismissed in part because prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory testimony that, if believed, negated intent); United States v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 579, 586 (W.D. Tex. 1977). But see United States v. Lasky,
600 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting duty to disclose exculpatory evidence).
470. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), which is
discussed in note 469 supra.
471. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977).
472. See, e.g., United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 579, 586 (W.D. Tex.
1977) (suggesting that the prosecutor is not required to inform a grand jury of possible defenses to be asserted at trial). See also People v. Snow, 72 Cal. App. 3d 950, 956-59, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 427, 430-32 (1977), overruled on other grounds, People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583
P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978) (evidence suggesting defendant's insanity does not constitute exculpatory evidence for purposes of grand jury screening).
473. Most federal courts have not required the prosecutor to seek out exculpatory evidence. See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed in note 461
supra; United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d I 133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
934 (1976). However, the prosecutor may have a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in the
possession of his investigative agents. See People v. Trolia, 69 Ill. App. 3d 439,388 N.E.2d 35
(1979).
474. Most courts simply require the prosecutor to inform the grand jury of its existence.
See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979); People v. McAlister, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 918, 926, 126 Cal. Rptr. 881, 886, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976).
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grand jury obligated to call for that evidence?475 And finally, how
will violations of this duty be detected476 and what remedies should
apply?
Whether Johnson will improve grand jury screening depends on
how the courts answer those questions. An overly broad definition
of exculpatory evidence may impose impossible administrative burdens on the prosecution and elongate the grand jury proceedings
into a mini-trial.477 An unduly narrow definition may eliminate the
rule's practical force. Even if those difficult questions are resolved,
implementing the Johnson duty and detecting its violation will be
exceedingly difficult unless other grand jury reform measures are approved. I shall suggest some tentative answers to those questions in
Subsection B.
4.

Resubmission of Cases to Subsequent Grand Juries

Problems concerning perjured testimony, exculpatory evidence,
and the excessive use of hearsay testimony often arise when the prosecutor presents a new grand jury with transcripts of testimony given
to another grand jury that had been previously involved in the case.
Resubmission often occurs when the prosecutor requests a superseding indictment from the second grand jury to cure defects that
tainted the first grand jury's indictment.478 Recently, a few federal
courts have considered whether a prosecutor who presents the second grand jury with hearsay testimony (the transcripts) or fails to
inform it of the evidentiary problems that tainted the first grand
jury's proceedings is guilty of misconduct justifying dismissal of the
superseding indictment.
United States v. Gallo 419 and United States v. Chanen 480 exemplify the varied outcomes engendered when courts use the
prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to circumvent Costello. In Gallo,
a crucial witness, Jerome Buckley, admitted during his second ap415. See People v. McAlister, 54 Cal. App. 3d 918, 926-27, 126 Cal. Rptr. 881, 886, cerl,
denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976) (interpreting CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1970), the court
concluded that a grand jury is not obligated to pursue potential exculpatory evidence once
notified of its existence).
_.
476. Unless defendants are given greater access to the grand jury's transcript, detection of
prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury will be haphazard at best. See Holderman, 71
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I, 18, 30 (1980).
411. See United States v. International Paper Co., 457 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Texas 1978)
(prosecutor need not disclose all evidence that could be characterized as exculpatory).
478. Alternatively, the first grand jury may have been acting solely in its inquisitorial capacity to gather evidence of alleged criminal activity. In such cases, the prosecution may submit the transcripts of testimony given to the first grand jury to a second, accusatory grand jury.
479. 394 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1975).
480. 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
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pearance before a grand jury that part of his original testimony was
untrue.481 That grand jury returned an indictment, but the prosecutor sought a superseding indictment to correct technical defects in
the first that were unrelated to Buckley's retracted perjury. The
prosecutor presented the transcript of Buckley's complete testimony
to the second grand jury482 and told them that the new indictment
merely cured the technical defects of the first.
District Judge Zampano dismissed the superseding indictment on
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. The judge held that the prosecutor's use of the Buckley transcripts prevented the second grand
jury from making "the charge on its own judgment"483 because it
could not personally evaluate Buckley's credibility. Citing both
Umans4 84 and Estepa,485 Judge Zampano found that the prosecutor
should have: (1) alerted the grand jury to the hearsay quality of the
evidence it was considering;486 (2) informed the grand jurors that
Buckley was available for live testimony if they wanted to evaluate
his credibility for themselves; 487 (3) alerted the grand jurors to the
perjurous portions of Buckley's testimony488 (citing Basurto);489 and
(4) presented the second grand jury with available corroborating evidence from the first grand jury proceedings.490 Judge Zampano's
analysis of what evidentiary duties the prosecutor owes the grand
jury far exceeds Estepa's minimal obligation not to mislead the
grand jury.491 In effect, the court dismissed the superseding indictment because the prosecutor had not given the second grand jury his
best evidence.
In Chanen, the Ninth Circuit considered similar resubmission
problems but concluded that they did not demonstrate prosecutorial
481. 394 F. Supp. at 312.
482. 394 F. Supp. at 313.
483. 394 F. Supp. at 314 (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 219 (1960)). But
ef. United States v. Schlesinger, 598 F.2d 722, 726 (2d Cir. 1979) (Because of a defec!. in the
first indictment, the prosecutor sought a superseding indictment from a second grand jury that
was unfamiliar with the case. The prosecutor gave a hearsay account of the allegations in the
first indictment, summarized the testimony of witnesses before the grand jury, and then offered
to have transcripts of their testimony read to the second grand jury. Relying on Costello, the
court refused to dis~ss the superseding indictment).
484. 368 F.2d 11§ (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 389 U.S. 80
(1967). See text at notes 398-400 supra.
485. 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972). See text at notes 410-20 supra.
486. 394 F. Supp. at 315.
487. 394 F. Supp. at 315.
488. 394 F. Supp. at 315.
489. 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974). See text at notes 427-43 supra.
490. 394 F. Supp. at 315.
491. See text at notes 419-20 supra.
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misconduct justifying dismissal of the resulting indictment. The
prosecutor in Chanen had presented the first grand jury with the live
testimony of five witnesses but had not sought an indictment.492
Four months after the first grand jury was discharged, the government requested and received an indictment from a second grand
jury, which heard an FBI agent's summary of the witnesses' testimony before the first grand jury.493 A district court judge dismissed
that indictment because only hearsay testimony had been offered
and no court reporter had transcribed it.494 Six months later, with a
court reporter present, the government obtained another indictment
by reading the first grand jury's transcript to a third grand jury.
These transcripts contained references that the witnesses had submitted false affidavits and the prosecutor advised the third grand jury
that these witnesses had made prior inconsistent statements.495 The
district court again dismissed the indictment because the third grand
jury did not have the same opportunity as the first to evaluate live
testimony.496
The Ninth Circuit reversed that last dismissal. Unlike Gallo, the
Chanen panel believed that both Costello and the separation of powers doctrine should usually preclude the courts from interfering with
the prosecutor's decision as to "what evidence to present to the grand
jury and how to present it."497 Accordingly, the court held that it
ould not use its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment where
the prosecutor failed to present the government's best evidence to the
grand jury unless such a sanction was necessary "to preserve the in~ egrity of the judicial process and to avoid any fundamental unfairness."498 Unfortunately, the court failed to articulate any standard
to identify when prosecutorial conduct jeopardized these interests. It
reviewed earlier prosecutorial misconduct cases499 and found that
492. 549 F.2d at 1308.
493. 549 F.2d at 1308.
494. 549 F.2d at 1308.
495. 549 F.2d at 131 I.
496. 549 F.2d at 1308-09.
497. 549 F.2d at 1313.
498. 549 F.2d at 1313. The court insisted that this caveat was not'.fu:onsistent with Costello because the court would only dismiss indictments because of prosecutorial misconduct
and not because of concern about the qualitative or quantitative sufficiency of the evidence
presented to the grand jury. 549 F.2d at 1309 n.3. However, the court's discussion and application of the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to the facts before it demonstrated that one of
the primary criteria for determining improper prosecutorial conduct is whether the prosecutor's evidentiary presentation impaired the grand jury's screening function.
499. "Almost every court dealing with the issue raised here has confronted a novel set of
facts. The range of prosecutorial conduct capable of inspiring allegations of unfairness appears unlimited. Indeed, the facts of this case are unlike those of any other we have been able
to find." 549 F.2d at 1309. But see note 502 infra.
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they provided no clear standard to distinguish permissible from impermissible conduct. Nevertheless, it concluded:
Although the holdings of all these cases may be difficult to reconcile, we believe that they make it plain that the manner in which the
prosecution secured the indictment in the present case cannot serve as
the basis for a dismissal. Reading transcripts of sworn testimony,
rather than presenting live witnesses, simply does not constitute, on the
facts of the case, "fundamental unfairness" or a threat to "the integrity
of the judicial process."500

The court buttressed this question-begging conclusion by noting that
the prosecutor had alerted the third grand jury about possible credibility problems.501
What seems clear from the preceding analysis of prosecutorial
misconduct cases is that the doctrine does not offer any intelligible,
principled way of deciding whether a prosecutor's conduct is inimical to the integrity of the judicial process. Federal courts often use
the doctrine to circumvent Costello and dismiss indictments when
they are convinced that the prosecutor's presentation of evidence has
produced a miscarriage of justice. Defining such a miscarriage in
this setting depends largely upon the particular court's view of the
grand jury's screening functions. Because the courts have been unable to agree on those purposes or on how they are impaired by the
types of evidence presented to the grand jury, the prosecutorial misconduct cases do not establish a consistent standard for dismissal. 502
Courts which assume that the grand jury should screen factual guilt
will find misconduct only in those rare cases where the prosecutor
deliberately biases the grand jury's determination of factual guilt by
flagrantly abusive conduct. 503 Thus, the Chanen panel, after citing
500. 549 F.2d at 13 I I.
501. 549F.2dat 1311.
502. For example, compare Chanen with United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.
1979), a case involving quite similar resubmission problems. In both cases, the superseding
indictments were based solely on hearsay evidence: the transcripts of testimony given by witnesses to previous grand juries. In both cases, the prosecutor was aware of information that
raised serious questions about the credibility of the witnesses. In Chanen, a government agent
read the transcripts to the indicting grand jury. The transcripts themselves revealed that some
of the witnesses had filed false affidavits and the prosecutor advised the grand jury that two of
the witnesses whose ·transcripts were read had made prior inconsistent statements. In
Samango, the prosecutor left the transcripts with the grand jurors so they could read them.
607 F.2d at 881. The Ninth Circuit found no prosecutorial misconduct justifying dismissal of
the indictments in Chanen but affirmed a district court's dismissal of a superseding indictment
in Samango. While the Chanen panel found that the grand jury had received sufficient notice
of the witnesses' questionable credibility, 549 F.2d at 1311, the Samango court concluded that
the prosecutor should have presented the live testimony of a witness whose veracity was in
question so that the grand jury could "observe [his] demeanor and determine on its own
whether [he] was a credible witness." 607 F.2d at 882.
503. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 944 (1978).
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cases that emphasized the trial as the proper forum to resolve credibility questions, concluded that the grand jury probably would have
indicted Chanen ifit had considered live testimony.504 Courts which
assume that the grand jury should receive sufficient evidence to assess the likelihood of conviction will find misconduct when the prosecutor precludes the grand jury from personally assessing the
credibility of an important government witness whose veracity is in
doubt. 505
Thus, despite its label, the courts have used the prosecutorial
misconduct doctrine in many cases to determine whether the prosecutor's evidentiary presentation impaired the grand jury's screening
functions. As one district court judge observed:
Although the concept of prosecutorial conduct which deprives the defendant of an unbiased grand jury is a useful one . . . the label
"prosecutorial misconduct" is not. The term suggests uncharacteristic,
extraordinary, and reprehensible conduct. Usually, the indiscreet prosecutor is just acting like all prosecutors.506
Since Costello prohibits courts from imposing an obligation on the

prosecutor to present the grand jury with reliable proof of a defendant's factual and legal guilt, the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine is
at best a stopgap measure. It can mitigate the worst excesses generated by Costello but it does not acknowledge that Costello is the
source of the problem. The next Subsection presents a series of reform proposals that address the disease instead of its symptoms.
B.

Reform Proposals

Congress should repudiate Costello and require federal prosecutors to present the grand jury with admissible evidence that would
support a conviction at trial. Specifically, prosecutors should not
present hearsay testimony to a grand jury absent some special justification. They should not present evidence that they know was obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. A
prosecutor who is aware of evidence that, if believed, negates one of
the material elements of the crime or undermines the credibility of
one of the government's critical trial witnesses should present that
504. 549 F.2d at 1311-12. However, the Chanen panel did note the prosecutor had alerted
the grand jury to possible credibility problems.
505. In effect, Gallo and United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979), discussed
in note 502 supra, require the grand jury to make its own credibility judgment by evaluating
the live testimony of a witness with credibility problems. In contrast, Chanen does not mandate such first-hand evaluation of the witness's veracity as long as the prosecutor has not misled the grand jury about the quality of evidence it was considering.
506. United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (D. Hawaii 1978), qffd., 607 F.2d
877 (9th Cir. 1979).
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evidence to the grand jury. If aware of evidence thaf, if believed,
would preclude conviction at trial (such as a possible affirmative defense), the prosecutor should alert the indicting grand jurors to its
existence and inform them of their right to call for such evidence.
These evidentiary requirements would promote a fairer ex parte
evaluation of the government's case. Accordingly, the grand jury
should be instructed that its most important function is to screen out
cases where it believes a jury would not find the government's case
strong enough to support a conviction. Specifically, it should be told
that the prosecutor must introduce sufficient legally admissible evidence of each element of the crime to carry the case to a trial jury
(directed-verdict screen) and to justify a conviction (predictive
screen). To implement that standard, the grand jury should be told
not to indict unless it finds clear and convincing evidence of the defendant's guilt. 507
These reforms will not work unless sanctions are provided for
their violation. The grand jury is a lay body that will naturally turn
to the prosecutor for advice about the applicable legal guilt requirements. While it is the most appropriate body to·perform a predictive
screening function, it does not have the legal expertise to know
whether the prosecutor is actually presenting legally admissible evidence. Accordingly, reform of the grand jury's accusatory function
should include some limited, post-indictment judicial review to ensure that the prosecutor has complied with the applicable legal guilt
requirements. Therefore, I propose that the federal rules be
amended to permit a motion to dismiss an indictment that is not
supported by legally sufficient evidence. The court's review would
be limited to examining the indicting508 grand jury's transcript509 to
507. See note 538 infra.
508. Judicial review of voluminous grand jury transcripts from a prolonged grand jury
investigation could impose a serious burden on the courts. For this as well as other reasons, I
believe that the inquisitorial and accusatorial functions should be performed by different
grand juries. See notes 553-57 infra and accompanying text. Accordingly, the judge would
review the shorter transcript of the indicting grand jury.
509. Federal rule of criminal procedure 6(e)(l) has been amended to require mandatory
recordation of all proceedings before a federal grand jury except its private deliberations and
voting. The amendment added a new provision 6(e)(l) that took effect August I, 1979. See 25
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2255-56 (June 13, 1979). This mandatory recording requirement should
improve the fairness of grand jury proceedings. First, it precludes prosecutors from circumventing the Jencks Act by failing to record a witness's grand jury testimony. Second, it should
deter prosecutors from making improper comments about any grand jury witness that might
bias the grand jury. See 1977 Hearings, pt. I, supra note 108, at 845 (prepared statement of
Rodney Sager, former United States Attorney for Virginia). Third, it promotes the trustworthiness of the testimony given before grand juries because "the restraint of being subject to
prosecution for perjury ... is wholly meaningless ... if the testimony is unrecorded . . . ."
United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d 210,222 (2d Cir. 1971) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1024 (1972). Fourth, it supports the prosecution's case at trial because a grand jury

560

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 78:463

determine whether the prosecutor presented sufficient legally admissible evidence to satisfy the directed-verdict standard. That review
would ensure that prosecutors present the grand jury with a prima
facie case oflegal guilt.510 It intentionally duplicates the grand jury's
directed-verdict screen because lay persons cannot determine the legal admissibility of the evidence presented to them. However, the
court's review of the transcript will not duplicate the grand jury's
more important predictive function. 511 The grand jury's assessment
of the credibility of the government's witnesses should not be disturbed if the directed-verdict standard is met.512 Accordingly, the
court should examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.513
Judicial review could operate as follows: after indictment, the
defendant would receive a transcript of the entire grand jury proceedings.514 The defendant can then use that transcript to prepare a
motion to dismiss. Given access to the grand jury transcript, the defendant would have no valid reason for delaying the motion until
after the trial has started and jeopardy has attached. Accordingly,
failure to challenge the grand jury proceedings in a pretrial motion
should waive those claims. If the defendant moves to dismiss, the
court should evaluate the grand jury transcript to determine whether
the prosecutor presented a prima facie case of legal guilt, measured
by the directed-verdict standard. In making that determination, the
trial court can consider hearsay evidence presented to the grand jury
only if it falls within a specific statutory exception authorizing its use
witness's testimony may be admitted at trial when the witness is unavailable to testify. See
United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (court held
that grand jury testimony of a witness unavailable to testify at trial may be admitted at trial
under federal rule of evidence 804(b)(5) without violating the defendant's right of confrontation where that grand jury testimony possessed strong indicators of reliability). But see United
States v. Gonzales, 550 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977). Finally, if my reforms for the indicting
grand jury are adopted, the government could satisfy the factual basis requirement at the plea
hearing by submitting a copy of the indicting grand jury's transcript. But see note 585 i'!fra.
510. I rejected the use of a post-indictment preliminary hearing to perform this function at
the federal level because the hearing would require a second presentation of the government's
evidence and its adversarial procedures would generate significant administrative costs and
pretrial delay. Judicial review of the indicting grand jury's transcript will impose an administrative burden on the courts that could foster some pretrial delay, but those costs are not comparable to those that would be generated by a mini-trial, adversarial proceeding.
511. Moreover, judicial review of the transcript does not require the time-consuming duplication of another evidentiary presentation.
512. See People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 136, 138 N.E.2d 794, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1956).
513. See People v. Backus, 23 Cal. 3d 360, 391, 590 P.2d 837, 855, 152 Cal. Rptr. 710, 728
(1979) ("A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the grand jury ..• in
determining the sufficiency of the evidence and must draw all reasonable inferences in support
of the indictment or information.").
514. See notes 563-79 i'!fra and accompanying text.

February 1980]

Reforming the Federal Grand Jury

561

or if the grand jury transcript reveals a compelling reason for its
presentation. 515 However, the grand jury's consideration of such incompetent evidence, including hearsay or illegally seized evidence,
will not invalidate the indictment if there is sufficient competent evidence to satisfy the directed-verdict standard. 516
If the court denied the motion to dismiss, its order would be appealable only if the defendant subsequently pleaded guilty.517 The
government would be permitted to appeal a pretrial order dismissing
the indictment,518 but a dismissal without prejudice would permit
the government to cure any evidentiary defect by simply resubmitting519 its case with additional competent evidence to a new520 grand
jury. After conviction at trial, the defendant should not be allowed
to appeal a pretrial order sustaining the indictment because a valid
trial verdict establishes the defendant's legal guilt.521
To implement these reforms without causing undue administrative burdens or pretrial delay, Congress should enact statutes522 em515. See notes 523-29 i'!fra and accompanying text.
516. One possible exception to this rule is where "the extent of incompetent and irrelevant
evidence before the grand jury is such that . . . it is unreasonable to expect that the grand jury
could limit its consideration to the admissible, relevant evidence. . . ." People v. Backus, 23
Cal. 3d 360, 393, 590 P.2d 837, 856, 152 Cal. Rptr. 710, 729 (1979). See United States v.
Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (court dismissed an indictment for immigration offenses despite sufficient evidence of probable cause because a government agent erroneously informed the grand jury that the defendant was involved in illegal transportation of
.firearms).
517. As Professor Robert Dawson has pointed out to me, several alternatives are possible
here. First, the defendant might be given the right to immediate appeal because denial of the
defense motion arguably raises the collateral issue of the power of the government to place the
defendant on trial at all. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (Court held that
under 18 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), a defendant could appeal a denial of a pretrial motion to
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds). Such a proposal, however, would foster serious additional pretrial delay and its chances of being enacted are remote. Second, a defendant could
be authorized to appeal following conviction by plea or trial. One could argue that the trial
verdict does not render the pretrial motion's denial harmless because the defendant never
should have been brought to trial on charges that were not supported by legally sufficient
evidence at the time of the indictment. While an error has occurred, I do not believe it to be of
sufficient magnitude to justify the reversal of a trial verdict that demonstrates sufficient proof
of legal guilt at the time of conviction. I have chosen the third option of allowing appeal after
a guilty plea because I believe some appellate review is necessary to ensure honest application
of the directed-verdict standard at the trial court level.
518. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
519. Of course, federal courts could still dismiss indictments with prejudice when they find
serious prosecutorial misconduct that justifies such a stringent sanction. See note 426 supra.
See also United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310 (D. Conn. 1975). But see United States v.
Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
520. Resubmitting the case to the same grand jury that returned the first indictment would
not ensure an unbiased and fresh evaluation of the prosecution's case. See United States v.
Hinton, 543, F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1976).
521. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. 210.30(6) (McKinney 1971).
522. For examples of model grand jury statutes implementing these reform proposals, see
Appendix.
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bodying the following -principles.
I. Hearsay Evidence
Absent statutory authorization or a compellingjust!ftcationfor its use,
the grandjury should not receive evidence that would be inadmissible at
trial Just!ftcation for the use ofinadmissible evidence should be made on
the record at the time ofitspresentation. However, thefact that the grand
jury received inadmissible evidence should not void an indictment flit also
received sufficient competent evidence to establish a prima fade case of
legal guilt.

This ptjnciple would force the prosecutor to present the government's best evidence unless some special justification warrants the
presentation of hearsay testimony. Thus, the prosecutor could not
prevent the grand jury from judging the credibility of available523
witnesses. 524 However, the rule does not preclude all use of hearsay
because a complete prohibition might stretch some grand jury proceedings into a mini-trial. New York's experience suggests that
grand juries can function efficiently while allowing only legally admissible evidence, as long as suitable exceptions are permitted. 525
523. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION§ 3.6(a) (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS - PROSECUTION FUNCTION] These standards preclude the use
of hearsay except "in appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to su=arize
admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial"),
The Co=entary suggests that the use of hearsay should be avoided unless "cogent reasons"
justify its use. Examples of such compellingjustifications are the need to su=arize available
evidence in cases involving voluminous records, the written statement of a witness who is not
available under circumstances requiring prompt grand jury action, and the hearsay statement
from a seriously injured victim or from a witness whose safety requires concealed identity. For
example, when the government has reasonable grounds to believe that a witness's safety may
be jeopardized by personally appearing before the grand jury, a transcript of the witness's
statement could be read to the grand jury. See United States v. Russo, 413 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.
1969); United States v. Carella, 4ll F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 860 (1969).
However, mere inconvenience in calling a witness does not justify the use of hearsay testimony. See United States v. Narciso, 466 F. Supp. 252, 299 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1977). If the
prosecutor presents hearsay testimony, he should alert grand jurors to this fact and tell them
that they can call the original source of information if they have any doubts about the testimony's validity.
Adoption of this proposal would also prevent prosecutors from circumventing the Jencks
Act requirement that the grand jury testimony of prosecution trial witnesses be disclosed after
the close of their testimony. Prosecutors have sometimes undercut the Act's intent by giving
the grand jury hearsay accounts of their trial witnesses' expected testimony. See 8 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 16.10[2], at 16-149 to 150 (rev. 2d ed. 1979).
524. Several states have adopted statutes that require the grand jury to receive only evidence that would be admissible at trial. See N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-6-11 (Supp. 1979). Bui see
Maldonado v. State, 604 P.2d 363 (N.M. 1979) (statute does not authorize post-indictment
judicial review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury),
525. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979), permits admission of
reports of a physicist, chemist, coroner, medical examiner, firearms identification expert,
fingerprint technician, "or an expert or technician in some comparable scientific or professional field, concerning the results of an examination, comparison or test performed." Section
190.30(3) permits hearsay admission of perfunctory types of testimony involving true ownership of stolen property, qualification of a dealer or expert who evaluated property, the expert
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For example, New York prosecutors can present a hearsay report of
expert findings or a hearsay summary of voluminous records like
those in Coste!lo.s2 6
Although the prosecutor should not use hearsay evidence absent
statutory authorization or special justification, the legal admissibility
of some evidence may remain uncertain until trial. 527 Therefore, the
rule does not invalidate indictments based in part on inadmissible
evidence if the remaining evidence satisfies the directed-verdict standard.528 Moreover, a court could consider hearsay evidence in determining whether the prosecutor presented a prima facie case of legal
guilt if it found a compelling justification for its presentation to the
grand jury and if it determined that legally admissible evidence
would be available at trial to establish the same facts. 529
2.

Illegally Seized Evidence

Prosecutors should not present grand juries with evidence that they
know was obtained in violation of the target defendant's constitutional
rights. s3 o Before ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment
because of insufficient proof of legal guilt, the trial court should rule on
any motions to suppress evidence. Should the court grant a motion to
suppress evidence, it should not consider that evidence aspart ofthe prosecution's proof of legal guilt when evaluating the grand jury transcript.
opinion of its value, and the basis for the opinion. This type of evidence may be introduced by
either written or oral statements under oath. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 190.30(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1979).
526. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW.§ 190.30(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
521. See Note, Exclusion efIncompetent Evidencefrom Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 72
YALE L.J. 590, 596-97 {1963).
528. See People v. Leary, 305 N.Y. 793, 113 N.E.2d 303 (1953); People v. Briggs, 50 Misc.
2d 1062, 272 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1966); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 190.65(1)
(McKinney 1971), construed in People v. Dunleavy, 41 A.D.2d 717, 341 N.Y.2d 500, ajfd., 33
N.Y.2d 573,301 N.E.2d 432,347 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1973). Contra, People v. D'Andrea, 26 Misc.
2d 95, 207 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Kings County Ct. 1960). The one possible exception to this rule
would be in those cases where the nature, extent, and prejudicial effects of the incompetent
evidence presented to the grand jury indicates that the grand jury may not have indicted the
defendant if it had only considered the competent evidence presented to it. See note 516
supra.
529. See generally MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 330.4(4) (1975).
530. The Justice Department has issued a series of internal regulations applicable to all
federal prosecutors who conduct grand jury proceedings. Because the guidelines are designed
primarily for internal administrative purposes, federal courts have held that their violation
does not confer judicially enforceable rights on trial parties. See United States v. Shulman,
466 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979)
(failure of I.R.S. agent to follow internal regulations before recording conversations between
taxpayer and agent not grounds for suppression of recordings). These guidelines prohibit
prosecutors from presenting evidence to the grand jury that the prosecutor knows was unconstitutionally obtained. See I977 Hearings, pt. I, supra note 108, at 712 (statement of Asst.
Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti). See also Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41
(1972).
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Ca!andra's 531 refusal to apply the exclusionary rule to grand jury

proceedings rested to some degree upon the Court's concern that litigation over fourth amendment questions raised by grand jury witnesses would disrupt and delay continuing grand jury investigations.
Moreover, permitting grand jury witnesses to raise fourth amendment objections to questions asked by the prosecutor would promote
"extended litigation of issues only tangentially related to the grand
jury's primary objective."532 Justice Powell's conclusion is defensible if the grand jury screens only factual guilt, because most evidence seized in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights
has probative value. But if the accusatory grand jury's primary objective is to screen legal guilt, it should not consider evidence that
would be excluded at the defendant's trial.
Attributing the latter objective to the grand jury, some proposed
reform statutes require that an indictment be dismissed if a court
finds that it was based in part on evidence seized in violation of the
defendant's constitutional or statutory rights. 533 My objection to
those proposals is that they penalize what may have been a prosecutor's good faith belief that the submitted evidence was legally obtained. Given the complexity of the constitutional principles
involved, dismissal of an indictment seems too high a price for the
prosecutor's error, especially if the other evidence presented to the
grand jury provides sufficient proof of the defendant's legal guilt.
My principle would impose an ethical obligation on prosecutors
not to present evidence to the grand jury that they know was procured in violation of the putative defendant's constitutional rights. 534
In the rare case where a prosecutor knowingly presents illegally
seized evidence, the resulting indictment should be dismissed regardless of any independent proof of legal guilt. However, in the more
typical case where legitimate doubt exists about the constitutionality
of some government evidence-gathering procedure, the grand jury's
consideration of that evidence should not automatically invalidate
the indictment. Instead, the court should disregard that evidence
when it determines whether the government has presented the grand
jury with sufficient proof of legal guilt. To implement this rule, the
531. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
532. 414 U.S. at 349.
533. See S. 1449, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3330C(d)(4) (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, pt.
2, supra note 108, at I 169-70 (providing that the district court shall dismiss an indictment if it
finds that the prosecutor has submitted to the grand jury "evidence seized or otherwise obtained ~by an unlawful act or in violation of the witness' constitutional right or of rights established or protected by any statute of the United States").
534. See note 530 supra.
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court should rule on the defendant's suppression motion before it
reviews the grand jury's transcript.
Admittedly, this principle will not save all defendants from indictment based on illegally seized evidence, because it does not permit suppression motions to be considered before indictment.
However, when prosecutors realize that courts will dismiss indictments based on insufficient proof of legal guilt, they will have more
incentive to evaluate honestly the admissibility of evidence they
present to the grand jury.
3. Exculpatory Evidence

If the prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence that, !f believed,
would negate a material element ofthe crime or undermine the credibility
of a crucial government witness, the prosecutor should present that evidence to the grand jury. Failure to do so should invalidate any indictment, even !f the grand jury received sufficient evidence to meet the
directed-verdict standard If the prosecutor is aware of any exculpatory
evidence (such as a possible affirmative defense) that, !f believed, would
raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt, the prosecutor
should alert the grandjury to its existence and inform them oftheir right
to callfor itspresentation. Ifthe prosecutorfails to do so, the subsequent
indictment should not be dismissed unless the omitted exculpatory evidence is so compelling that it probably would have led the grandjury to
return a no bill Absent special circumstances, the prosecutor should not!fy putative defendants that a grand jury is considering indictments
against them and that they have a right to test!fy before it and to present
the prosecutor with any evidence they consider exculpatory.
As Johnson 535 clearly demonstrated, the grand jury cannot eliminate unwarranted prosecutions if the prosecutor does not present exculpatory evidence that negates the defendant's guilt. Thus, the
American Bar Association has recognized that the prosecutor should
disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury536 and the Justice
Department has amended its manual for U.S. Attorneys to include _
such a duty. 537 But, like the Johnson decision itself, the significance
of these standards is muddied by the failure of the drafters to define
what they mean by "exculpatory'' or to suggest what sanctions
should be triggered by a violation of this duty. 538
535. 38 Cal. App. 3d 977, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1974), ajfd on statutory grounds, 15 Cal. 3d
248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975) (en bane). See text at notes 450-59 supra.
536. ABA STANDARDS - PROSECUTION FUNCTION, supra note 523, § 3.6(b).
537. See U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL§ 9-11.334 (1978) (''when a prosecutor conducting a
grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt
of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a person").
538. Congress has considered some grand jury reform bills that bear the same defects.
Former Congressman Eilberg's comprehensive grand jury reform bill required the prosecutor
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Confusion over the proper scope of the duty and what sanctions
should be imposed for its violation stems from the failure of both
courts and commentators to evaluate the grand jury's screening functions carefully. I have suggested that the grand jury should screen
both factual and legal guilt. Since post-indictment judicial review of
the transcript will ensure that the prosecutor has presented the grand
jury with sufficient evidence to warrant conviction (the directed-verdict screen), the grand jury's most important function is to predict
whether a jury would find that evidence sufficiently credible and
compelling to convict the defendant. Requiring the grand jury to
find clear and convincing evidence of the defendant's guilt ensures a
reliable pretrial adjudication of a defendant's factual and legal guilt
by a lay body for all felony prosecutions.
Viewed from that perspective, any evidence that, if believed,
raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt could be considered exculpatory for purposes of grand jury screening. But, such
a broad standard might force prosecutors to present all evidence that
undermines the reliability or credibility of the government's case or
supports a possible affirmative defense. Imposing such a broad
mandatory duty of disclosure would transform prosecutors into surrogate defense counsel in the grand jury room because they would be
required to anticipate the defense's objections to the state's case.
Forcing the prosecutor to present all evidence that might possibly
defeat conviction at trial would also transform the grand jury's ex
parte inquiry into a prolonged mini-trial. Moreover, the broader the
scope of the duty, the more difficult it will be for prosecutors to determine what evidence in their possession is exculpatory. The government already faces a dilemma when it examines its files to
determine what Brady539 material it possesses that must be disclosed
to the defendant. As Judge Mansfield observed:
[I]n the absence of a preview of the defendant's proposed defenses
before trial, [the government] may often be insufficiently appraised to
to "periodically advise the grand jury of the nature and existence of evidence, as yet not re•
ceived, which might tend to materially affect the credibility of any witness or tend to negate the
guilt of any prospective defendant." H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3329(c) (1977), reprinted
in 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 108, at 978. Although the bill defined exculpatory evidence
broadly, it was completely silent as to what sanction, if any, should result from its violation.
Former Senator Abourezk introduced a bill that required the district court to dismiss an indictment if "the attorney for the Government has not presented to the grand jury all evidence
in his or her possession which the attorney knows will tend to negate the guilt of the person
indicted." S. 1449, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3330(c)(d)3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, pt. 2,
supra note 108, at 1169-70. While the sanction is clear, the bill does not define the scope of this
duty.
539. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), requires the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory
evidence to defense counsel before trial. 373 U.S. at 87-88. See also United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
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be able to select all exculpatory materials from its files. Indeed, the
question of whether certain evidence is "exculpatory," like that of what
evidence is "relevant," is frequently a matter of opinion, which can be
resolved only in the light of all other evidence introduced at trial. 540

Judge Mansfield's point applies with even greater force to the prosecutor's evaluation of the files before presenting a case to the grand
jury. For example, Judge Lacey argued that House Resolution 94's
broad exculpatory evidence standard,541 which required the prosecutor to disclose evidence that might materially affect the credibility of
any witness, would be ''vague and impossible to interpret" 542 in the
grand jury context. "Every complex fact pattern includes inconsistencies, varying observations, differences in recollection or ability to
narrate, and credibility considerations . . . which are not susceptible
to easy analysis at the grand jury stage."543 If the prosecutor chose
not to disclose all possible inconsistencies, the courts would be
forced to examine all of the government's evidence that might have
been presented to the grand jury and speculate about how that evidence might have altered the grand jury's deliberations. Thus, adoption of a broadly defined exculpatory evidence standard could spawn
a great deal of time-consuming and administratively burdensome litigation.
I
Describing the problem is far easier than suggesting a solution
that accommodates the conflicting interests of efficiency and fairness.
Those who oppose a broad definition of exculpatory evidence argue
that such a broad duty to present evidence would duplicate the trial's
function at the grand jury stage. But duplication would rarely occur
since most defendants never receive a trial. On the other hand, if we
had sufficient resources to support a mini-trial proceeding during the
pretrial process, it might make more sense to rely on the preliminary
hearing rather than the grand jury as the appropriate forum because
of its adversarial safeguards.
Accordingly, one must define the exculpatory evidence standard
in a manner that gives the grand jury sufficient information to adjudicate the defendant's guilt reliably without transforming its proceedings into a mini-trial. My tentative suggestion is a standard that
distinguishes between evidence that directly negates a material element of the crime and evidence that suggests a possible affirmative
540.
541.
542.
District
States).
543.

United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
See note 538 supra.
1977 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 108, at 206 (statement of Frederick B. Lacey, U.S.
Judge, District of New Jersey, representing the Judicial Conference of the United

Id
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defense. The prosecutor should be obligated to pr~sent the grand
jury with evidence that suggests either that the defendant lacked the
requisite criminal intent544 or that someone other than the defendant
might have committed the act.545 For example, if aware of witnesses
who would testify to an alibi defense, the prosecutor should present
their testimony to the grand jury. If the government's sole eyewitness to a crime has identified someone other than the defendant or
given a description of the perpetrator that varies significantly from
the defendant's special features, the prosecutor should present that
information to the grand jury.546 If the prosecutor is aware of reliable information that raises substantial doubt about the credibility of
a material witness whose testimony is essential to show that the defendant committed the crime, 547 that information should go to the
grand jury. If the prosecutor fails to present the grand jury with evidence that, if believed, would negate one of the material elements of
the crime, the court should dismiss the indictment. 548 Conversely, if
aware of evidence that suggests grounds for an affirmative defense 549
544. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 977, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1974), q/fd.
on statutory grounds, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975); United States v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Okla. 1977).
545. See United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), discussed in note
469 supra.
546. See United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But cf. People v.
Fills, 87 Misc. 2d 1067, 386 N.Y.S.2d 988 (Sup. Ct. 1976). In Fi/is, the prosecutor failed to
inform the grand jury that the eyewitness, who identified the defendant as one of the men who
shot her husband in her grand jury testimony, had previously stated only that she saw "a man"
shoot her husband. The court refused to dismiss the indictment because this prior inconsistent
statement was not so important that its introduction would have possibly caused the grand jury
to change its findings. 87 Misc. 2d at 1069, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
547. See United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
548. This is not a completely satisfactory standard for several reasons. First, the govern•
ment might have sufficient evidence to reach a jury even if the exculpatory evidence is considered. Accordingly, the court should be given the discretion to dismiss an indictment where the
omitted exculpatory evidence would probably have led the grand jury to return a no bill. See
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1041-42 (D. Md. 1976); People v. Fills, 87 Misc.
2d 1067, 1069, 386 N.Y.S.2d 988, 989 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
Second, in jurisdictions that use the diminished capacity defense, psychiatric evidence of
defendant's mental abnormality is relevant to dispute the defendant's specific intent for certain
crimes. I have argued elsewhere that in most cases, psychiatric testimony introduced under
this partial defense does not really negate the requisite intent as much as it explains why the
defendant entertained it. See Arenella, The /)iminished Capacity and J)iminished Responsibility
J)ej"enses: Two Children ofa /)oomed Marriage, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 826 (1977). Accordingly, I
believe the prosecutor should not be obligated to present such expert testimony to the grand
jury because in most cases it raises questions about mitigating the defendant's culpability
which are more appropriately resolved by the ultimate trier of fact after a complete adversarial
presentation of the evidence.
549. See People v. Snow, 72 Cal. App. 3d 950, 956-57, 140 Cal. Rptr. 427, 430 (1977),
overruled on other grounds, People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318,583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr.
265 (1978) (in dicta, the Snow court observed that Johnson v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d
977, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1974), qjfd on statutory grounds, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 32 (1975), did not require prosecutors to disclose evidence concerning a possible insanity
defense to grand jury).
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or raises credibility issues about one of the government's witnesses,550 the prosecutor need not present such evidence to the grand
jury, but he should alert the grand jurors of its existence so they can
request its production if they desire. Even if the prosecutor fails to
alert the grand jury about this type of evidence, indictments based
on a prima facie case of legal guilt should not be dismissed.
This compromise proposal will have little effect on grand jury
screening in many cases because the prosecutor may not be aware of
exculpatory evidence in the defendant's exclusive possession. To
cure that defect without transforming the grand jury into an adversarial proceeding, the prosecutor should give target defendants551 an
opportunity to testify before the grand jury and to present the prosecutor with exculpatory evidence before the grand jury is asked to
return an indictment.552
550. However, if the evidence seriously questions the credibility of an essential witness
whose testimony is needed to establish one of the material elements of the crime, the prosecutor should be obligated to disclose it. See United States v. Samango, 450 F. Supp. 1097 (D.
Hawaii 1978), qffd., 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979).
551. See H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3329(b)(2)(B) (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings,
pt. 2, supra note 108, at 977. This provision would require the prosecutor to take "reasonable
steps to notify" target defendants of their opportunity to testify or present evidence before their
indictment unless the prosecutor can demonstrate to the court that "notice would result in the
flight of the person, would endanger other witnesses, or would unduly delay the investigation
and prosecution." Id. While federal prosecutors often notify target defendants of their opportunity to testify in white collar and political corruption cases, see United States v. Mandel, 415
F. Supp. 1033, 1040 (D. Md. 1976), the Justice Department opposes mandating such notice
because it believes notice is unnecessary in most cases. Furthermore, it argues that a
mandatory requirement with special exceptions would impair the government's flexibility in
recognizing when notice was appropriate and would spawn unnecessary litigation. 1977 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 108, at 717 (statement of Asst. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti).
See also U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL§ 9-11.252 (1978) (emphasis added):
Where a target is not called to testify pursuant to 9-11.251, supra, and does not request to
testify on his own motion (see 9-11.252, supra), the prosecutor, in appropriate cases, is
encouraged to notify such person a reasonable time before seeking an indictment in order
to afford him an opportunity to testify [subject to the conditions that the witness (1) explicitly waived his privilege against self-incrimination and (2) is represented by counsel or
voluntarily and knowingly appears without counsel and consents to full examination
under oath] of course, notification would not be appropriate in routine clear cases . . . .
While it is beyond the scope of this Article, I believe that putative defendants who elect to
testify before the indicting grand jury should have the right to have counsel accompany them.
Many of the arguments against permitting counsel into the grand jury room stress how such a
procedure might endanger the investigatory grand jury's effectiveness, especially where multiple representation by house counsel is involved. See Silbert, .Defense Counsel in the Grand Jury
-The Answer to the White Collar Criminal's Prayers, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293 (1978). If the
inquisitorial and accusatorial functions are performed by different grand juries as I have proposed, these objections no longer apply. Even if the same grand jury performs both functions,
the experience of those states that permit the witness's counsel in the grand jury room suggests
that counsel's presence has not disrupted or delayed the proceedings. See 1977 Hearings, pt. 1,
supra note 108, at 142; Hixson, Bringing .Down the Curtain on the Absurd .Drama ofEntrances
and Exits- Witness Representation in the Grand Jury Room, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 307, 31820 (1978). See Appendix for a model grand jury statute which provides for presence of counsel
in the grand jury room.
552. Cf. U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 9-11.252 (1978) (leaving to the "sound discretion of
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B!furcating the Grand Jury's Accusatorial and Inquisitorial
'Functions

Separate grand juries should pe,form the investigatory and accusatory
functions so that those reforms designed to improve the quality ofgrand
jury screening will not unduly restrict the grandjury's investigatory powers.

One of the major obstacles to reform of the grand jury's accusatorial function is that such a reform might interfere with the grand
jury's capacity to investigate criminal activity. As Justice Powell
noted in Calandra, the grand jury's investigatory function requires
that its operation be "unrestrained by the . . . procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials." 553 Congress
could improve the quality of grand jury screening without limiting
its investigatory powers by precluding the same grand jury from performing both functions. 554 Thus, an investigatory grand jury could
still operate free of evidentiary restraints. Once it had uncovered
sufficient evidence to warrant indictment of particular individuals,
the prosecutor could then sift out the legally admissible evidence and
present it to a second grand jury that would perform only an accusatory function.
Admittedly, this proposal would require some duplication of labor. Some witnesses who testified before the inquisitorial grand jury
would have to testify again before the accusatorial grand jury.
Moreover, the prosecutor would have to explain the nature of the
government's preceding investigation to the second grand jury.
However, the advantages of such a separation clearly outweigh its
costs.
First, a purely accusatory grand jury can screen guilt more independently. We simply cannot expect the same grand jurors who
have spent months ferreting out criminal activity to suddenly shift
roles and exercise their protective function. 555 During a prolonged
the grand jury" whether to consider testimony of the witnesses suggested by the putative
defendant).
553. 414 U.S. at 338, 343 (1974).
554. Professor Leroy Clark has suggested that the prosecutor alone could perform the
grand jury's inquisitorial function if granted the power to subpoena witnesses outside the
grand jury's presence. Accordingly, he would restrict the grand jury to its accusatorial function. See L. CLARK, supra note 383, at 142. However, he would grant the grand jury investigative power to ''initiate investigations into criminal offenses by any officer of the
government." Id at 145 (emphasis in original).
555. As California Supreme Court Justice Mosk recently observed, the grand jury suffers
from "institutional schizophrenia" because "it is expected to serve two distinct and largely
inconsistent functions - accuser and impartial fact-finder. It seems self-evident that to the
extent it succeeds at one function, it must fail at the other." Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22
Cal. 3d 584, 591, 586 P.2d 916, 920, 150 Cal. Rptr. 435, 439 (1978).
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investigation into alleged criminal activity, grand jurors often grow
to respect and trust the prosecutor who guides their activities. 556
Moreover, the first grand jury might consider inadmissible evidence
that convinces it of the defendant's factual guilt. Under such
circumstances, one can hardly expect grand jurors to admit that
their labors have proved fruitless by refusing to indict. Presenting
whatever legally admissible evidence is uncovered by the first grand
jury to a second grand jury removes those defects. The accusatory
grand jury will not be prejudiced by incompetent .evidence against
the accused nor will it identify as readily with the prosecutor's investigative efforts.
Second, my proposal calling for judicial review of the indicting
grand jury's transcript could impose a serious administrative burden
on the courts if they had to wade through the transcript produced by
a prolonged grand jury investigation. Concise presentation of the
prosecutor's legally admissible evidence to an accusatory grand jury
should reduce the courts' burden by producing far shorter transcripts.557
5. Redrafting Judicial Charges
Judicial charges to the indicting grand jury should emphasize the grand
jury's duty to screen outprosecutions where conviction at trial is unlikely.

Courts should instruct the grand jurors not to return an indictment unless the prosecutor presents them with clear and convincing558 evidence of the defendant's guilt. The instructions should also
556. See United States v. Gramolini, 301 F. Supp. 39, 41 (D.R.I. 1969).
557. A subsequent proposal will call for disclosure to the defendant of the indicting grand
jury's transcript. See notes 563-80 infra and accompanying text. By separating the inquisitorial and accusatorial functions, the prosecutor can limit the defendant's discovery to testimony
that directly relates to the alleged criminal activities, thereby preserving the secrecy of any
confidential background information whose disclosure could prejudice any continuing investigations.
558. Some courts already instruct the grand jury that it should not return a true bill unless
it is "satisfied from the evidence which is submitted to it that a conviction would be warranted
if the evidence were presented to a trial jury where there was no evidence to rebut it." United
States v. O'Shea, 447 F. Supp. 330, 331 (S.D. Fla. 1978), qffd. per curiam, 588 F.2d 199 (5th
Cir. 1979). Alternatively, grand jurors are sometimes told that they should return an indictment when and ff they determine that the evidence, "if unexplained or uncontradicted, would
carry the case to a trial jury and justify the conviction of the accused." 1977 Hearings, pt. 1,
supra note 108, at 350 (quoting the New Jersey Grand Jury Manual for Prosecutors, Final
Draft, 1977). However, grand jurors are rarely told that to justify a conviction at trial the factfinder must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.
Logically, therefore, the grand jury should apply a reasonable doubt standard to the government's presentation. If the government cannot convince the grand jurors beyond a reasonable doubt in an ex parte presentation, how can it convince a petit jury in an adversarial trial?
However, the application of a proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to the indicting
grand jury might convert this ex parte proceeding into a mini-trial. If the grand jurors apply
the standard rigorously, they might call for additional testimony to resolve any doubts they
might have. The prosecutor might feel compelled to present the entire government case to
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emphasize their power to judge credibility559 and to call additional
witnesses, 560 including the putative defendant, 561 if they have any
doubts about the prosecutor's case. They should also be told of their
right to submit their own questions to witnesses after the prosecutor
has screened them to weed out improper inquiries. 562 Finally, they
should be advised of their power to request the presentation of less
serious charges if they believe that the petit jury would not convict
the accused of the requested charge.
6.

Transcripts for .Defendants

After indictment, the defendant should receive a copy ef the transcript ef
all recordedproceedings ef the indicting grandjury that relate to tl1e offenses charged, subject to such reasonable limitations, includingprotective
orders, as the court may impose to prevent abuses. 563
ensure that this standard is met. Accordingly, I have selected the clear and convincing standard as a compromise burden of proof because it protects the accusatorial norm that compelling evidence of the defendant's factual guilt be presented to some independent adjudicator
before the state induces a plea. Whether one views the grand jury as predicting how a trial
jury would act or as providing a substitute lay adjudication in a system with few trials, the
grand jurors should return a true bill only when they are personally convinced of defendant's
factual guilt.
559. See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D. Conn. 1975).
560. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 190.50(3) {McKinney 1971). When presenting
hearsay testimony under the compelling justification exception, the prosecutor should tell the
grand jurors of their right to call the primary source of the testimony.
_ 561. If the target defendant declines to appear, the grand jury should be instructed not to
draw an inference of guilt from the defendant's decision.
562. Because grand jurors are dependent on the prosecutor for their legal advice, some
reformers have called for the appointment of independent counsel to advise the grand jury.
See 1977 Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 108, at 659 (statement of Professor Leon Friedman on
behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union); id at 47 (statement of Doris Petersen on behalf
of the Center for Constitutional Rights). I believe this reform is unnecessary because once
prosecutors realize that their legal advice is recorded and subject to judicial review, it is unlikely that they would deliberately give erroneous legal advice to the grand jury. Even independent counsel are capable of making good faith errors in their legal instructions.
563. If the inquisitorial and accusatorial functions of the grand jury are not separated, I
favor adoption of H.R. 94 § 3334(c) and (d), which provide:
(c) A reasonable time prior to trial, and after the return of an indictment or the filing of
an indictment or the filing of an information, a defendant shall, upon request and under
such conditions and limitations as the court deems reasonable, be entitled to examine and
copy a transcript or electronic recording of (1) the grand jury testimony of all witnesses to be called at trial;
(2) all statements to the grand jury by the court and the attorney for the Government
or special attorney, relating to the defendant's case;
(3) all grand jury testimony or evidence which in any manner could be considered
exculpatory; and
(4) all other grand jury testimony or evidence which the court may deem material to
the defense.
(d) Upon a showing of good cause, the court may, at any time, order that the disclosure
of the recorded proceedings of a grand jury be denied, restricted or deferred, or make
such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by the Government, the court shall
permit the government to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written
statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such a showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and pre-
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Judicial and legislative deference to the need for grand jury secrecy
initially prevented defendants from gaining access to grand jury
transcripts. However, the Supreme Court has significantly weakened
the secrecy rationale's applicability to post-indictment disclosure requests. As the Court observed in .Dennis v. United States, 564 grand
jury secrecy does not justify a per se rule barring a defendant's access
to relevant grand jury testimony that may aid the defense. "In our
adversary system for determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable for the prosecution to have exclusive access to a storehouse of
relevant fact. Exceptions to this are justifiable only by the cle,arest
and most compelling considerations." 565
Decisions like .Dennis, as well as critical commentary about the
reduced need for grand jury secrecy after indictment,566 prompted
Congress to relax rules that had restricted defendants' access to
grand jury minutes. Defendants are now entitled to minutes of their
own testimony under rule 16(a)(l)(A).567 Under the 1970 amendments to the Jencks Act, defendants can inspect the grand jury testimony of the government's trial witnesses for purposes of
impeachment at the close of the witnesses' direct examination. 568
Otherwise, disclosure of grand jury minutes in criminal cases is regulated by rule 6.569 Interpreting an earlier version of that provision570
in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 511 the Supreme Court
concluded that disclosure is committed to the discretion of the trial
judge and the "burden ... is on the defense to show that 'a particularized need' exists• for the minutes which outweighs the policy of
secrecy."572
served in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event
of an appeal by the defendant.
H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3334(c), (d) (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note
108, at 90-91.
564. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
565. 384 U.S. at 873 (footnote omitted).
566. See Knudsen, Pretrial .Disclosure ofFederal Grand Jury Testimony, 48 WASH. L. REV.
423 (1973); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule ofSecrecy, 48 VA. L. REv. 668
(1962).
567. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(A) reads in part, "[u]pon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy . • . recorded testimony of the defendant
before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged."
568. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), (e)(3) (1976) required disclosure of the trial witness's prior statements that relate to the witness's testimony. A 1970 amendment to subsection (e)(3) defined
"statements" to include the witness's grand jury testimony. See 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 16.10[1], at 16-139 (rev. 2d ed. 1979).
569. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(C).
570. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), 327 U.S. 837-38 (1946).
571. 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
572. 360 U.S. at 399-400. See also Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S.
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Most commentators who have evaluated the doctrine of grand
jury secrecy have concluded that the rule's purposes do not apply
with much force once the defendant has been indicted.573 Defenders
of grand jury secrecy have argued that disclosure of transcripts may
prompt some defendants to tamper with the government's witnesses
before trial and may deter future grand jury witnesses from testifying freely. 574 However, some prosecutors from jurisdictions that
grant defendants an automatic right to disclosure have conceded that
those fears have not been borne out. 575 There is simply no evidence
to suggest any higher incidence of obstruction of justice or subornation of perjury in those jurisdictions.576 Moreover, any rule mandating automatic disclosure of the entire grand jury transcript to an
indicted defendant could alleviate such concerns by permitting the
prosecutor to seek a protective order denying, restricting, or deferring disclosure when an abuse may occur.577
Giving the defendant access to the grand jury's transcript soon
after indictment will improve the administration of justice in several
respects. First, _it will save court time that is presently wasted on
litigation about whether the defendant has shown a particularized
need that outweighs any concern for grand jury secrecy. Second, it
will allow defendants to determine whether they have grounds to
challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand
jury (my first proposal). Automatic disclosure of the grand jury tran21 I (1979)(applying a reinvigorated particularized-need standard to civil litigant's request for
transcripts of federal criminal grand jury proceedings).
573. See note 566 supra. The secrecy doctrine is designed to (I) prevent the escape of
target defendants before their indictment; (2) protect the grand jurors' ability to deliberate
freely by preventing target defendants and their associates from influencing their decision; (3)
prevent subornation of perjury; (4) encourage full disclosure by persons who have information
relating to criminal activity; (5) protect the reputation of exonerated target defendants by not
publicizing that they were under investigation. See United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 62829 (3d Cir. 1953). With the exception of(3) and (4), these considerations do not apply once the
grand jury has completed its investigation and returned an indictment.
574. See 1977 Hearings, pt. I, supra note 108, at 722 (statement of Asst. Attorney General
Benjamin R. Civiletti).
575. Id at 331-38 (statement of William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, and
Robert J. DelTufo, Asst. Attorney General of New Jersey and Director of the Division of
Criminal Justice).
New Jersey's criminal discovery rules are probably the most liberal in the nation. We
have totally rejected the notion that the criminal trial is a contest. Accordingly, grand
jury minutes are available to all defendants subsequent to a routine discovery request,
Discovery of grand jury minutes provides an important check on any possible abuses in
the grand jury process. Moreover, full discovery of grand jury minutes provides the basis
for legal challenges to the sufficiency, weight, competency and admissibility of the evidence presented.
Id at 343.
576. Id
577. H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3334(d) (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra
note 108, at 990-91. See note 563 supra.
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script will remove any incentive for the defendant to raise unfounded motions to dismiss in the hope of gaining a glimpse of the
prosecution's case.578 Moreover, if it is true that most prosecutors
will not seek indictments unless they already possess sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for directed acquittal, giving defendants
access to the grand jury transcript will cause them to file fewer motions to dismiss than if they had to file the motion before knowing
what evidence the grand jury actually received. Defense access to
the transcript should also improve the motions themselves by fostering specific allegations of evidentiary defects. Thus, the court's review of the grand jury transcript will be eased because both defense
and prosecution memoranda will point to the criticial portions of the
grand jury testimony needed to establish a prima facie case of legal
guilt. Third, automatic disclosure of the grand jury transcript will
grant the defendant increased discovery of the prosecution's case and
will do so in a far more expeditious manner than a prolonged adversary proceeding such as a post-indictment preliminary hearing.
Fourth, access to the grand jury transcript will also enable the defense attorney to judge the desirability of plea-negotiations with the
prosecutor because the defense will now have enough information to
predict the likelihood of conviction at trial. 579 Finally, disclosure of
the grand jury's transcript is necessary to ensure detection of any
prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury.580
CONCLUSION

All of the proposals in Section V promote greater protection of
our system's legal guilt requirements during the pretrial process
without unduly burdening an already overtaxed criminal justice system. Their desirability depends in part on one's view of the purposes
served by the pretrial process. Those who believe that the criminal
trial provides adequate protection of our system's legal guilt requirements will dismiss them as misconceiving the grand jury's basic
charging function. They will argue that these reforms transform the
grand jury's ex parte inquiry into a preliminary mini-trial proceeding that adjudicates the defendant's guilt and thereby duplicates the
trial's function. 581 As Sections I, II, and III have indicated, I believe
that objection rests on a theoretical model of our criminal justice
system that no longer comports with reality. Since pretrial proce578.
579.
580.
581.

But see note 582 infra.
See notes 241-49 supra and accompanying text.
See Holderman, supra note 442, at 18-19.
See Silbert, supra note 551, at 294.
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dure is the only procedure most defendants get, the preliminary adjudication of legal guilt fostered by my reforms will be the only triallike proceeding most defendants will receive.
A second objection to these reforms is that they will spawn timeconsuming pretrial litigation that will increase the courts' administrative burdens and generate significant pretrial delay. 582 Under my
proposals, the grand jury's ex parte evaluation of the government's
case might be slower because, absent some compelling justification,
the prosecutor will be obligated to present the government's chief
trial witnesses to the grand jury.583 Courts will spend some additional time evaluating the indicting grand jury's transcript to determine whether the prosecutor presented a prima facie case. 584 No
matter how narrowly the exculpatory duty standard is defined, it is
reasonable to expect litigation over subsidiary questions, such as
whether the prosecutor was aware of exculpatory evidence not
582. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 229-30 (statement of Russell E. Smith, U.S. District Judge, Montana):
There is another consideration which should be weighed. Those looking on the administration of criminal law but not participating in it may tend to think that points are raised
and argued because, in the mind of the lawyer, the points have some real basic merit. If
that was ever true, it is not true today. The modem American lawyer acting in a criminal
case feels compelled to explore a case to determine if there has been any violation of any
right ofa defendant (regardless of guilt or innocence), and to urge a denial of the right in
any case in which arguments can be made which are not patently silly. Today it is standard procedure to test each confession, each piece of evidence obtained as a result of a
search, each piece of identification evidence. Create a right to test the sufficiency of an
indictment and it will become standard operating procedure to test it. Why? Under
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963), a defendant may not be tried for a crime
without an opportunity to have counsel. Under the post-Gideon developments, the sixth
amendment requirements are not met unless the representation has been adequate. See
United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), which perhaps expresses the
outer limits of the rule. There is in the minds of most lawyers who defend criminal cases
the thought that one day a Section 2225 (the federal equivalent of habeas corpus) petition
may be filed claiming that the lawyer was not adequate. One ground which could be
claimed would be, given the enactment of H.R. 1277 or the bills similar to it, the failure of
the lawyer to test the sufficiency of the indictment. We are not talking, therefore, about an
occasional review of a grand jury indictment: we are talking about a routine review of
grand jury indictments at the district court level and a review of the district court action at
the court of appeals level.
I believe Judge Smith is mistaken in several respects. First, recent studies suggest that
defense counsel do not act as adversarily as he suggests. See notes 231-40 supra and accompanying text. While defense counsel in white collar, political corruption, and organized crime
cases often have the resources to raise a host of procedural objections, the majority of defense
counsel do not. See Section III supra. Moreover, the directed-verdict standard will easily be
met in most federal prosecutions. If the defense attorney already has access to the transcript,
little would be gained by filing a motion to dismiss where it is obvious that a directed-verdict
standard has been met. I would anticipate that motions testing the legal sufficiency of the
charges would be filed most frequently when the prosecutor has presented some hearsay testimony to the grand jury under the compelling justification exception.
583. However, my reform proposals do not duplicate the trial's protections at the grand
jury stage. To ensure efficient grand jury review, the prosecutor may present hearsay testimony under certain specified circumstances and need not present all evidence that would be
considered exculpatory at trial to the grand jury.
584. But see note 557 supra and accompanying text.
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presented to the grand jury. Disclosure of the indicting grand jury's
transcript may generate litigation concerning prosecutorial requests
for protective orders and increase defense claims of prosecutorial
misconduct before the grand jury.
On the other hand, these reforms may save some court time later
in the process. Disclosure of the transcript removes the defense
counsel's incentive to file frivolous motions based on what may have
occurred before the grand jury in the hope of gaining some incidental discovery of the prosecution's case. Courts will no longer have to
determine whether the defendant has shown a particularized need to
see grand jury testimony. Moreover, a judicial determination that
the prosecutor presented a prima facie case to the grand jury should
save time at a subsequent plea hearing because the transcript can be
used to demonstrate the factual basis of those pleas. 585
Despite those savings, one must concede that any serious attempt
to provide greater protection of our system's legal guilt requirements
will inevitably decrease the efficiency of our present system. However, the experience of those states that have imposed similar requirements on their grand juries suggests that the costs are
tolerable.586 Moreover, one cannot examine these additional burdens in a vacuum: they must be compared to the costs of alternative
reforms, like the proposal to mandate preliminary hearings for all
federal prosecutions. As Sections IV and V suggested, requiring the
585. See note 30 l supra and accompanying text. In Afford plea situations, the court might
wish to make its own credibility judgment by personally considering the live testimony of the
government's critical trial witnesses. See note 293 supra.
586. California presently permits defendants to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
considered by the grand jury. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 995 (West 1970). While California
does not define "probable cause" to require a high likelihood of conviction, see Cotton v.
Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 459,462, 364 P.2d 241, 242, 15 Cal. Rptr. 65, 66 (1961) ("[p]robable
cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution or prudence could entertain a strong suspicion of
the guilt of the accused, and if some rational ground exists for an assumption of guilt, the
indictment will not be set aside"), it does require the prosecution to present the grand jury with
evidence that would be legally admissible at trial. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 939.6(b) (West
1970). Like my proposal, the grand jury's consideration of incompetent evidence does not void
the indictment where it also received sufficient competent evidence to support the indictment.
However, the California system does not provide a very useful analogy because most of its
prosecutions co=ence by information followed by a preliminary hearing so its judiciary does
not deal with many post-indictment review motions.
New York also permits dismissal of indictments based on insufficient proof of legal guilt.
See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 43, at 909. New York's experience is
more analogous to the federal system because its state constitution guarantees the right to
grand jury indictment in "capital or otherwise infamous" crimes. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
However, one would need to know much more about the number, types, and frequency of
post-indictment judicial inquiries into evidence sufficiency and prosecutorial misconduct
before drawing any compelling analogy between New York and the federal system. At this
juncture, all that can be said is that New York has adopted a series of requirements somewhat
similar to those proposed here and the resulting pretrial delay and administrative burden generated by such procedures have not devastated its criminal justice system.
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prosecutor to present a prima facie case of legal guilt to the grand
jury and permitting judicial review to test the legal sufficiency of the
government's evidence are far more efficient reforms than a proposal
requiring the prosecutor to present that case twice: once to the grand
jury and once to the magistrate at the preliminary hearing. First,
requiring two dress rehearsals of the prosecution's case would cause
greater inconvenience for the government's trial witnesses. Second,
the adversarial presentation of the prosecutor's case at the preliminary hearing would be far more time-consuming than judicial review
of the indicting grand jury's transcript. While my reforms might
lengthen some grand jurys' proceedings, they would remain essentially ex parte, whereas mandating preliminary hearings would foster
the adversarial mini-trial that Costello sought to avoid.
Finally, some observers might question the necessity of systemwide reforms to deal with a problem that only arises in a few "hard"
cases. According to this view, the government possesses compelling
evidence of factual guilt that can satisfy the trial's formal proof requirements in most cases. Thus, little would be achieved by lengthening the grand jury's review of the case or by subjecting the
prosecution's screening of legal guilt to post-indictment judicial review. While the prosecutor might indict defendants despite questionable legal guilt in a small percentage of cases, these observers
argue that we can rely on defense counsel and the court's application
of the prosecutorial misconduct doctrine to check those isolated
abuses. Therefore, these critics would conclude that the application
of my system-wide reforms to deal with the exceptional case misconceives the scope of the problem and ignores existing and far more
efficient judicial remedies.
This objection falters in defining the problem. 587 First, the distinction between hard and routine prosecutions is somewhat suspect
because some cases that appear routine might become less so if the
defense counsel had the time and resources to conduct a proper factual and legal investigation. One of the dangers in distinguishing
between routine and hard cases in an adversarial system of justice is
that the characterization depends in part on the quality of the defense attorney. Criminal prosecutions involving white collar crime,
organized crime, and corporate crime may prove difficult because
the defendant will have the resources to deal with the government on
587. Indeed, some commentators have minimized the importance of our system's legal
guilt requirements by equating them with the trial's procedural protections, thereby ignoring
how they protect a fair accusatorial process before conviction. See note 71 supra.
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an equal footing. Criminal prosecutions against indigent defendants
may well appear routine for opposite reasons.
However, even assuming that most criminal prosecutions do not
raise the danger that a legally innocent defendant might be convicted, this objection to systemic reform misunderstands the problem
these reforms are trying to remedy. The problem involved is not
simply one of outcome,588 but of the process by which that outcome
is reached. While some of my reforms are designed to ensure that
the government will not secure the conviction of a defendant who
could not possibly be convicted at trial, most of them are designed to
protect a fair accusatorial process before conviction. Regardless of
whether the prosecution is routine or hard, the criminal process
should ensure that
(1) the government shoulders its burden of independently developing
reliable, legally admissible evidence of the defendant's factual
guilt before it encourages the defendant to plead;
(2) someone other than law-enforcement officials independently adjudicates the defendant's legal guilt;
(3) the community participates in the adjudication of the defendant's
legal guilt so that the disposition of society's most serious sanction
is not left exclusively in the hands of professionals.589
All of these values will be fostered if we require the prosecutor to
present the federal grand jury with a prima facie case of legal guilt,
strengthen the grand jury's capacity to make a reliable ex parte adjudication of guilt, and provide greater judicial safeguards against
prosecutorial misconduct before the indicting grand jury. Plea-bargaining shall remain the dominant form of guilt determination; but
these pretrial safeguards590 will ensure that a reliable preliminary
adjudication of guilt will be made before the state applies its considerable pressures to induce a guilty plea.
588. See id
589. See Kipnis, Plea-Bargaining: A Critic's Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SocY. REV. 555, 556-57
(1979).
590. Obviously, any comprehensive effort to promote a fair accusatorial process before
conviction must go far beyond the proposals suggested in this Article. For example, my reforms do not directly address the vitally important question of how to improve the quality of
criminal defense representation. For an interesting examination of this problem, see Tague,
The Attempt lo Improve Criminal .Defense Representation, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (1977).
Tague argues that the courts cannot improve the quality of defense representation through
post-conviction review of counsel's effectiveness. Accordingly, he suggests that the courts
should monitor defense counsel's performance before conviction by requiring counsel to complete a checklist which would indicate and explain what counsel has and has not done and
what he expects to do. Bui cf. United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979)
(plurality opinion arguing that "extensive supervision by the trial judge through a pretrial
checklist to ensure that counsel has met his duties of preparation" would disrupt adversary
system by "increasing intrusio_n into the development and presentation of the defense case by
the trial judge, and (out of self protection) by the prosecution." Slip op. at 40).

580

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 78:463

.APPENDIX

In 1974, the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Section
created a committee on the grand jury. This committee, whose
members included federal and state prosecutors, judges, public and
private defense counsel, law professors, and law students, was asked
to evaluate pending grand jury reform legislation and to offer "legislative principles" to guide such reform efforts. Under the careful
leadership of Mr. Richard Gerstein, an attorney with over twenty
years of prosecutorial experience, this committee proposed twentyfive grand jury reform principles which were then approved by the
Criminal Justice Section, a body whose members represent every
segment of the criminal justice system. In August, 1977, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates enacted a resolution that
supported grand jury reform legislation consistent with these twentyfive principles. 1
In 1979, the Grand Jury Committee began work on a Model
Grand Jury Reform Act to implement its reform principles. As
chairperson of the subcommittee responsible for drafting this Act, I
wrote several statutes that would effect some of the reforms I have
advocated in this Article. On February 29, 1980, the Grand Jury
Committee approved the following model statutes.
DRAFT STATUTE

§ 100: GRAND JURY RULES

OF EVIDENCE2

I. The prosecutor should not present the grand jury with evidence
against a putative defendant which he knows was obtained in violation of
that putative defendant's constitutional rights.
2. Except as provided in sections 3 and 4, the prosecutor should not
present the grand jury with hearsay evidence which would not be admissible at trial absent some compelling justification for its use. [Such justification must be stated on the record at the time of its admission. Examples of
such compelling justifications include:
(a) the admission of a written or oral statement made by a seriously injured victim of the crime who is presently unavailable to testify
where circumstances require prompt grand jury action;
(b) the admission of a written or oral statement, taken under oath,
from a witness who will be available to testify at trial, when that witness' safety would be jeopardized if he or she were required to make a
personal appearance before the grand jury;
I. See 1977 Hearings, pt. I, supra note 108, at 173-74.
2. On May 9, 1980, the Grand Jury Committee deleted the bracketed segment of section 2
and redrafted sections 3 and 4 into a more condensed format. Several states presently require
the grand jury to receive only evidence that would be admissible at trial: Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah. For a listing of the specific
statutes and rules imposing this requirement, see 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 723 n.S I.
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(c) the admission of a hearsay summary of the contents of voluminous business or financial records.]
3. A report or a copy of a report made by a public servant or by a
person employed by a public servant or agency who is a physicist, chemist,
coroner or medical examiner, firearms identification expert, examiner of
questioned documents, fingerprint technician, or an expert or technician in
some comparable scientific or professional field, concerning the results of
an examination, comparison or test performed by him in connection with a
case which is the subject of a grand jury proceeding, may, when certified by
such person as a report made by him or as a true copy thereof, be received
in such grand jury proceeding as evidence of the facts stated therein.
4. A written or oral statement, under oath, by a person attesting to one
or more of the following matters may be presented to the grand jury as
evidence of the facts stated therein:
(a) that person's ownership of premises and of the putative defendant's lack of license or privilege to enter or remain thereupon;
(b) that person's ownership of, or possessory right in, property,
the nature and monetary amount of any damage thereto and the putative defendant's lack of right to damage or tamper with the property;
(c) that person's ownership of property, its value and the putative
defendant's lack of superior or equal right to possession thereof;
(d) that person's ownership of a vehicle and the absence of his
consent to the putative defendant's taking, operating, exercising control over or using it;
(e) that person's qualifications as a dealer or other expert in appraising or evaluating a particular type of property, his expert opinion
as to the value of a certain item or items or property of that type, and
the basis for his opinion;
(f) that person's identity as an ostensible maker or drafter of a
written instrument and of its falsity.
5. Nothing in subdivisions 2(b), 3, or 4 of this section shall be construed to limit the power of the grand jury to cause any person to be called
as a witness where the grand jurors entertain doubts about the v~lidity of
said testimony.
6. Whenever a court presiding at a jury trial would be required to instruct the jury with respect to the significance, legal effect or evaluation of
evidence, the prosecutor, in an equivalent situation in a grand jury proceeding, may so instruct the grand jury.3
DRAFT STATUTE§ 101: MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT ON
GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF GRAND JURY
EVIDENCE4

I. After arraignment upon an indictment, the court may upon motion
3. Sections 3, 4, and 6 were taken from N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 190.30 (McKinney Supp.
1979). See note 525 supra.
4. Many states, including some that require the grand jury to consider only legally
admissible evidence, refuse to examine the quality, sufficiency, or competency of the evidence
underlying the indictment. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 723 n.50. In the minority of
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of the defendant made [within 30 days] after the entry of a not guilty plea,
dismiss such indictment or any count thereof upon the ground that the evidence before the grand jury was not legally sufficient to establish the offense
charged or any lesser included offense.
2. The evidence presented to the grand jury is legally sufficient if,
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it would support a conviction at trial.5
3. In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the
grand jury, the court can only consider evidence which would be admissible
at trial except for hearsay testimony admitted under § 100(a)(2)-(4). The
fact that the grand jury considered evidence which would have been excluded at trial does not invalidate the indictment as long as the remaining
competent evidence is legally sufficient to warrant a conviction at trial; except in those cases where the nature, extent, and prejudicial effect of the
incompetent evidence presented to the grand jury provides strong grounds
for believing that the grand jury would not have indicted the defendant if it
had only considered the legally admissible evidence presented to it.
4. The validity of an order denying any motion made pursuant to this
section is not reviewable upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction
following trial based upon legally sufficient evidence. 6
DRAFT STATUTE§

102:

PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY7

1. If the prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence which, if believed, negates one of the material elements of the crime, he must disclose 8
jurisdictions (Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nevada, and New York) that permit courts to
quash indictments based on insufficient evidence, the grand jury's consideration of
incompetent as well as competent evidence will not automatically invalidate the indictment,
See 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 724 & n.54.
Judicial review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence underlying the indictment is only
necessary where the jurisdiction does not use its preliminary hearing to screen legal guilt.
Thus, to avoid duplicated screening, the defendant's election to receive a preliminary hearing
which screens legal guilt should automatically waive his right to grand jury screening. In those
jurisdictions where indictment is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived, the
defendant's election to receive a preliminary hearing that screens legal guilt should waive his
right to judicial review under this statute. See note 358 supra.
5. While a majority of states do not identify an evidentiary standard to measure probable
cause to indict, a substantial minority require that the evidence would support a conviction at
trial if unexplained or uncontradicted. See ARK. STAT. ANN, § 43-920 (1977); CAL, PENAL
CODE§ 939.8 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE§ 19-1107 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 813.2, Rule 4(3)
(1979); ALAsKA R. CRIM. P. 6(9) (Supp. 1966). See also 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 724
n.55.
6. See notes 517 & 521 supra.
7. A number of states have statutes like CAL. PENAL CODE§ 939.7 (West 1970), see text at
notes 473-86 supra, which advise the grand jury to consider any evidence that would explain
away the charge. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 43, at 722 n.45. New Mexico has recently
amended its statute to impose a mandatory duty on the prosecutor to present exculpatory
evidence "that directly negates the guilt of the target where [the prosecutor] is aware of such
evidence." N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-6-11 (Supp. 1979).
8. My original proposal in this subsection contained a stronger requirement that the
prosecutor present the grand jury with exculpatory evidence that, if believed, "negates one of
the material elements of the crime or seriously undermines the credibility of a prosecution
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and, if feasible, present such evidence to the grand jury.
_
2. If the prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence which bears upon
a possible affirmative defense that, if believed, raises a reasonable doubt
about the defendant's guilt, he should alert the grand jury to its existence
and inform them of their right to call for such evidence.
3. After arraignment upon an indictment, the court, upon motion of
the defendant made [within 30 days] after the entry of a not guilty plea,
must dismiss any indictment where the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence of the type defined in section 1. The court should not dismiss an indictment because of the prosecutor's failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence of the type defined in section 2 unless the court determines that such omitted exculpatory evidence was so compelling that it;Ldictment by the grand jury was not justified upon the evidence presented.
DRAFT STATUTE § 103: DISCLOSURE OF GRAND JURY
TRANSCRIPT TO AN INDICTED DEFENDANT9

1. A reasonable time prior to trial, and after the return of an indictment or the filing of an information, a defendant shall, upon request and
under such conditions and limitations as the court deems reasonable, be
entitled to examine and when appropriate and necessary copy a transcript
or electronic recording of:
(a) the grand jury testimony of all witnesses to be called at trial;
(b) all statements to the grand jury by the court and the attorney
for the Government relating to the defendant's case;
(c) all grand jury testimony or evidence which in any matter
could be considered exculpatory, and
(d) all other grand jury testimony or evidence which the court
may deem material to the defense.
2. Upon a showing of good cause, the court may, at any time, order
that the disclosure of the recorded proceedings of a grand jury be denied,
restricted or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate. Upon
motion by the govemn;ient, the court shall permit the government to make
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such a showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the
witness whose testimony is necessary to support a conviction." The Grand Jury Committee
eliminated the credibility segment of this provision.
9. There is a growing movement in the states to liberalize pretrial discovery procedures.
See VT. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l) (requiring disclosure of all witnesses known to the prosecution
and access to their statements, whether or not the witnesses are to be used at trial); FLA. R.
CRIM. P. § 3.220 (3.220(d) permits the defendant to take "the disposition upon oral
examination of any person who may have information relevant to the offense charged"). This
movement has prompted some state courts and legislatures to provide the indicted defendant
with far greater access to the grand jury's transcript than that provided formally by the federal
system. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 938.1 (West 1979) (automatic disclosure of transcript to
indicted defendant); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 172.225 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 29-10.1-38 (1974)
(if an indicted defendant's petition for transcript of grand jury proceeding is denied, the
defendant has a right to a preliminary examination); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 18.05(2); VT. R. CRIM.
P. 16(a)(2)(B).
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appellate court in the event of an appeal by the defendant. 10
DRAFT STATUTE

A.

§ 201:

RIGHTS OF GRAND JURY WITNESSES

Counsel:
(1) Every witness subpoenaed to appear and testify before a grand
jury or to produce books, papers, documents, or other objects
before such grand jury shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, including assistance during such time as the witness is questioned in presence of the grand jury. Such counsel may be
retained by the witness or shall be appointed in the case of any
person financially unable to obtain legal representation.
(2) Counsel shall be allowed to be present in the grand jury room
only during the questioning of the witness and shall be allowed to
advise the witness. Such counsel shall not be permitted to address
the grand jurors, raise objections, make arguments, or otherwise
disrupt proceedings before the grand jury. Counsel is authorized
to disclose matters which occur before the grand jury to the same
extent as is permitted to the client.
(3) If the court determines that counsel for a grand jury witness has
violated Subsection (2), then the court may take such measures as
are necessary to ensure compliance with this rule.

DRAFT STATUTE

§ 202:

RIGHTS OF THE TARGET OF A GRAND
JURY lNVESTIGATIONll

Except as hereinafter provided, the prosecutor shall advise a target of
the grand jury either personally, through counsel, or by mail at his last
known address that:
(1) he is a target of the grand jury investigation;
(2) he shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to testify before the
grand jury, provided he signs a waiver of immunity; and
(3) he has the right to present the prosecutor with exculpatory evidence; including the names and addresses of witnesses who possess exculpatory information.
Such notice need not be given if the prosecutor is unable with reasonable diligence to notify said person, or if on representation of the prosecutor, the court in camera concludes that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that to give such notice would create an undue risk of danger to
other persons, flight of the target, or other obstruction of justice. Absent
these circumstances justifying a failure to give notice, an indictment that
issues without the notice required by this provision shall be dismissed.

The Grand Jury Committee's acceptance of these proposals does
not constitute official American Bar Association approval. The
Committee must first complete a comprehensive Model Grand Jury
IO. This proposal was taken verbatim from H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 33~4(c), (d)
(1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 108, at 990-91.
11. Professor George Pugh drafted this proposal.
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Act and then the entire Act must be accepted by the Criminal Justice
Section's Council before it can be presented to the American Bar
Association's House of Delegates for final approval.

